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LAW, LANGUAGE AND STATEHOOD: The




On March 4, 1998, the United States House of Representa-
tives approved the Young Bill by a one-vote majority.' That bill
* Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico Law School. J.D., 1977, B.A.,
1974, University of Puerto Rico; LL.M., 1978, Yale University. This is an ex-
panded and footnoted version of an address the author delivered at the "Foreign in
a Domestic Sense Conference" at Yale Law School on March 28, 1998.
I am indebted to Hiram Meldndez Juarbe, second-year student at the Univer-
sity of Puerto Rico Law School, for his enthusiastic research assistance, as well as
to two colleagues and excellent reference librarians, Carmen Mireya Meldndez and
Maria M. Otero. I am also indebted to many good friends at the University of Ari-
zona Law School who offered valuable criticisms in 1990 on an oral presentation
on this topic, as well as to Ms. Teresa Medina Monteserin, now a Municipal Judge
in Puerto Rico, who assisted in research at that earlier stage. Thanks are also due
to David M. Helfeld, Ana Matanzo, Luis Mufiiz Argielles, John L. de Passalacqua,
Carmelo Delgado Cintr6n, David Wexler, Antonio Garcia Padilla, Fernando
Martin, Efr6n Rivera Ramos, Roberto Aponte Toro, Owen M. Fiss, P. Michael
Whipple, Betsy Levin, Luis E. Rodriguez, Ana I. Garcia and Olivette Rivera Tor-
res, who read earlier drafts and made valuable suggestions.
In this Article, all Spanish words and names---even of judicial decisions-
appear in the correct Spanish spelling, irrespective of whether they so appear in
the original sources.
1. H.R. 856, 105th Cong. (1998). Rep. Donald Young (R-AK) is the Chairman
of the House Committee on Resources. He has championed the cause of Puerto
Rican statehood in that committee for several years and has been the main force
behind the drive to organize a federally-sponsored plebiscite on the political status
of Puerto Rico.
The final vote was 209-208 in favor of statehood. See 144 CONG. REC. H837
(daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998). Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND) cast the deciding vote when he
changed his negative vote at the last minute, purportedly at the urging of Rep.
Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) and of Puerto Rico Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero
Barcel6. See Lizette Alvarez, House Approves Measure on Self-Determination for
Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A24; Comisionado Persuasivo, EL NUEVO
DIA, Mar. 6, 1998, at 3; Robert Friedman, Pomeroy Casts Deciding Ballot in Tense
Vote, SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 5, 1998, at 5; James McDonough, Tie-Breaking Vote on
Plebiscite Attributed to CRB, SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 6, 1998, at 4; Leonor Mulero,
Por Virazdn la Victoria, EL NUEVO DIA, Mar. 5, 1998, at 4; Nancy E. Romfin,
Puerto Rico Bill Advances in Senate: 1-Vote Margin Dims Prospects in Senate,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at Al. The vote was unexpectedly partisan for a
measure which had seemed to have the backing of the Republican leadership: Of
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would have required Puerto Rico to conduct a federally-sponsored
plebiscite geared toward the solution of its political status prob-
lem.2 One of the proposed alternative solutions was statehood.3
Thus, the people of the United States, whether or not they are
aware of it, embarked on a discussion that could lead to the admis-
sion of a fifty-first state. Although the Senate failed to act on the
Young Bill4 and the Puerto Rico electorate thereafter refused to
endorse statehood, 5 the issue will not become moot until a final de-
cision is taken concerning the political status of Puerto Rico.
R Any serious discussion of the prospect of statehood for Puerto
Rico must pay particular attention to the single most important
difference between that potential state and the first fifty: lan-
guage. That is the objective of this Article.
Part I explores the history and juridical status of English as
an official language of Puerto Rico. It then contrasts that legal ab-
straction with a simple sociological fact: Puerto Rico is a monolin-
gual society where Spanish reigns and English plays an absolutely
minor role.
Part II considers three aspects of the linguistic dilemma of
statehood for Puerto Rico: (a) the predominant view of supporters
of the statehood solution who assert that Puerto Rico's culture and
Spanish language are not negotiable under statehood and would
not be affected by that change of status; (b) the requirements of in-
ternational law concerning integration of a colonial enclave to the
metropolitan power; and (c) the recent Congressional attitudes to-
ward the question of language in a State of Puerto Rico. I conclude
that the two most recent Congressional treatments of the Puerto
Rican statehood alternative have not complied with the require-
ments of international law because Congress has not addressed
the 209 ayes, there were 165 Democrats, 43 Republicans and 1 Independent; of the
208 nays, there were 31 Democrats and 177 Republicans. See Mulero, supra.
2. See H.R. 856 § 4(a).
3. See id.
4. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-AK), was unable to persuade a significant number of the
11 Republican members of the Committee to support any bill on Puerto Rico in
1998. See Robert Friedman, Murkowski: No Committee Vote in '98, SAN JUAN
STAR, Sept. 11, 1998, at 5.
5. On December 13, 1998, the pro-statehood government of Puerto Rico held a
referendum among five alternatives: 1) Commonwealth, defined as a colonial
status; 2) free association; 3) statehood, defined in the most favorable terms; 4)
independence; and 5) none of the above. "None of above," defended by the pro-
Commonwealth Popular Democratic Party, garnered a majority of the vote
(50.2%), followed by statehood (46.5%), independence (2.5%), free association
(0.3%) and colonial Commonwealth (0.1%). See John Marino, 'None of the Above'
Wins, SAN JUAN STAR, Dec. 14, 1998, at 5.
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the issue of language with the clarity necessary to foster a knowl-
edgeable exercise of Puerto Rico's right to self-determination.
Part III explores the impact of the official English movement
throughout the United States and addresses the different constitu-
tional arguments that have been proffered against a federal stat-
ute that would require a State of Puerto Rico to recognize true and
effective official status to the English language. I conclude that
considerable doubt exists as to what the ultimate solution to those
constitutional questions might be and that such uncertainty is a
formidable barrier to an authentic exercise of Puerto Rican self-
determination with regard to the statehood alternative.
Part IV considers two queries: (a) whether the Puerto Rican
question is analogous to that posed by Quebec in the Canadian
context; and (b) whether there is a reasonable analogy between
Puerto Rico and pockets of other Spanish-speaking inhabitants of
the United States. My conclusion is that Puerto Rico presents a
"problem" for the United States which is similar to the Quebec-
Canada dilemma; if anything, I contend, Puerto Rico's linguistic
and cultural identity is stronger than Quebec's. Concerning the
second issue, I maintain that the Puerto Rican "problem" is differ-
ent in nature to that presented by Hispanic communities through-
out the United States, and would pose a serious challenge to the
idea of the "melting pot."
Part V asserts that the prospect of Puerto Rican statehood
must be the subject of ample debate in the United States, poses
some questions that should be addressed, and pleads for a clearer
articulation of the terms on which the United States would be
willing to admit Puerto Rico into the Union.
Part VI concludes that the issue of language in Puerto Rico
simply will not go away through inattention or neglect, and that
the issue of Puerto Rican statehood bears the seed of another de-
bate which the United States confronted more than a century ago:
secession.
I. Law and Reality: The "Official" Status of English in
Puerto Rico
In a speech at the "Foreign in a Domestic Sense Conference,"
held at Yale Law School on March 27-28, 1998, the governor of
Puerto Rico, Dr. Pedro J. Rossell6, reminded the audience that
since 1902 both Spanish and English have been official languages
of government in Puerto Rico, predating the declaration of English
19991
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as an official language in any of the states.6 That fact, however,
does not respond to a sociological reality. Rather, it underscores
the peculiar nature of Puerto Rican colonial politics.
A. English in Puerto Rico: The Law
In 1898, Puerto Ricans were beginning to experience the first
true measure of self-government under Spanish rule, the Auto-
nomic Charter of 1897.7 Then, an act of war produced drastic
changes.
On July 25, 1898, as the Spanish American War drew to a
close,8 United States troops under the command of General Nelson
A. Miles, of Wounded Knee infamy,9 landed on the southern coast
of Puerto Rico. Miles's invasion met with little armed resistance, 10
although there were several skirmishes which caused some casual-
ties.11 Miles had been preceded by Admiral William T. Sampson,
who was sent to look for the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera.
Before dawn on May 12, 1898, while the capital city of San Juan
6. See Honorable Pedro J. Rossell6, Address at the "Foreign in a Domestic
Sense" conference (Mar. 28, 1998) (transcript on file with author). Governor
Rossell6 reiterated this in a subsequent op-ed piece. See Pedro Rossell6, Puerto
Rico's American Dream, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A17.
The first state to declare the official status of English as a language of gov-
ernment was Nebraska in 1920. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also RAYMOND
TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN? THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE MOVEMENT
AND THE AMERICAN STATES 33 (1995). That action came "at the height of the 1920s
nativism that followed in the wake of World War I and reached a climax with the
enactment of federal quotas on immigration." Id.
7. For an English version, see 1 Jos6 JuliAn Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Rico, in
CONSTITUTIONS OF DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES 45 (Albert P.
Blaustein ed., 1991) [hereinafter 1 Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Ricol. The United
States invasion of Puerto Rico ended that experiment at its inception. For a gen-
eral critical analysis of the Charter, see Jos6 Julidn Alvarez GonzAlez, El Viejo
Pacto: El Elemento de Bilateralidad en la Carta Autondmica de 1897, 67 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 983 (1998) [hereinafter Alvarez Gonzfilez, El Viejo Pacto].
8. Before departing for Cuba with his "Rough Riders," Theodore Roosevelt,
then Undersecretary of the Navy, pleaded in a telegram to Sen. Henry Cabot
Lodge not to make peace with Spain until Puerto Rico could be had. See RAYMOND
CARR, PUERTO RICO: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 25 (1984); JULIUS W. PRATT,
EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898 231, 327 (1936); CARMELO ROSARIO NATAL, PUERTO RICO
Y LA CRISIS DE LA GUERRA HISPANOAMERICANA (1895-1898) 201 (1989); 1 Jost
TRfAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO 144 (1980) [hereinafter
1 TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA]. According to Carr, Lodge soon responded: "Puerto
Rico is not forgotten and we mean to have it." CARR, supra.
9. See REX ALAN SMITH, MOON OF POPPING TREES 4 (1975); John Rhodes, An
American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52 MONT. L.
REV. 13, 31 (1991).
10. See CARR, supra note 8, at 28-29.
11. See ANGEL RIVERO, CRONICA DE LA GUERRA HISPANOAMERICANA EN PUERTO
RICO 196-205, 235-49, 256-80 (1922).
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slept, Sampson opened fire and continued the bombardment for
three hours. The attack killed four civilians and two soldiers,
wounded sixteen civilians and thirty-six soldiers, caused general
panic and seriously damaged several buildings, both military and
civilian. 12
At that time, Puerto Rico was culturally and linguistically a
homogenous society where few people spoke English. 13 There was
no official language law, nor any need for one. That need
emerged-for the United States-when their troops invaded the
Island. One of the first official acts of General Miles was to issue a
bilingual proclamation to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. 14 Four
days after disembarking in Puerto Rico, Miles announced that the
United States had waged war against Spain "in the cause of lib-
erty, justice and humanity. 15 Its purpose was to bring protection
to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and their property, to promote
their prosperity, and to bestow upon them "the immunities and
blessings of the liberal institutions of our Government," as well as
the "advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization."16 Sub-
sequent events would prove that Miles's promise was not meant to
be kept. 17
During the nearly two years of military government that fol-
lowed, under three successive military governors,' 8 English be-
came a de facto official language. It was the language in which the
military governors issued their General Orders,' 9 and the native
12. See id. at 65-108.
13. See MARIA M. L6PEZ LAGUERRE, EL BILINGJISMO EN PUERTO RICO 8 (1989).
14. A photographic reproduction of the Spanish version of this proclamation,
issued on July 28, 1898, is found in RIVERO, supra note 11, at 232. An English
version is found in 1 Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Rico, supra note 7, at 67.
15. 1 Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Rico, supra note 7, at 67.
16. Id.
17. See CARR, supra note 8, at 32:
A closer examination of American actions would have revealed Miles's
proclamation to be a weapon in psychological warfare, not a pledge that
bound Congress. Both in the armistice negotiations (August 1898) and in
the hard bargaining that followed in Paris, it was evident that the United
States meant to keep Puerto Rico subject to the sovereign will of Con-
gress.
Id.
18. Concerning this period, see EDWARD J. BERBUSSE, THE UNITED STATES IN
PUERTO Rico: 1898-1900, at 77-110 (1966); MARIA D. LUQUE DE SANCHEZ, LA
OCUPACION NORTEAMERICANA Y LA LEY FORAKER 27-81 (1980); 1 TRIAS MONGE,
HISTORIA, supra note 8, at 159-85; JOSe TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO RIco: THE TRIALS
OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 30-35 (1997) [hereinafter TRIAS MONGE,
COLONY]; Josd JuliAn Alvarez GonzAlez, The Protection of Civil Rights in Puerto
Rico, 6 ARIz. J. INTL & COMP. L. 88, 91 (1989) [hereinafter Alvarez GonzAlez, Pro-
tection].
19. See U.S. DEPT. OF WAR, GENERAL ORDERS AND CIRCULARS, 1898-1900, at 1-
1999]
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tongue of the cabinet members with whom the second military
governor, General Guy V. Henry, substituted the Puerto Rican of-
ficeholders20 who had been elected in 1898.21 Thereafter, when
Congress approved the first Organic Act for Puerto Rico, the Fora-
ker Act of 1900,22 it did not issue a general provision on language
of government. 23 That dubious honor would correspond to the co-
lonial government of Puerto Rico.
The Foraker Act created a classic colonial government for
Puerto Rico. The President of the United States, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, appointed the governor, the judges of
the Supreme Court and the members of the upper house of the
legislative assembly, a strange body called the Executive Council
that merged both legislative and executive functions.24 Only the
lower house of the legislature, the House of Delegates, was an elec-
tive body. Its real power vis-d-vis the Executive Council and the
governor was very slight.25 Passage of the Foraker Act polarized
the Island's political parties. The pro-statehood Republican Party
generally applauded it, while the autonomist Federal Party de-
nounced it.26 The Federals eventually decided to boycott the 1900
elections for the House of Delegates which resulted in Republican
control of all thirty-five seats.2 7
3 (1900), cited in 1 TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA, supra note 8, at 165. For a summary
of the most important of these General Orders, see 1 TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA, su-
pra note 8 at 165-72.
20. SeeTRAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 31-32.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
23. The Foraker Act contained few provisions concerning the English lan-
guage: (1) it provided that all books in that language would enter Puerto Rico
from the United States duty free (§ 2, 31 Stat. 77); (2) it required that members of
the lower house of the legislature, the House of Delegates, be literate in either
Spanish or English (§ 30, 31 Stat. 83); (3) it provided that the federal District
Court therein created to succeed the provisional federal court established by order
of the last military governor would conduct all proceedings in English (§ 34, 31
Stat. 84); (4) it provided that all appellate proceedings in the United States Su-
preme Court concerning Puerto Rico would also be conducted in English (§ 35, 31
Stat. 85); (5) it required that the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico to the
United States be able to read and write in English (§ 39, 31 Stat. 86); and (6) it
created a commission to compile and revise the laws of Puerto Rico, which would
render a report to Congress in both Spanish and English (§ 40, 31 Stat. 86).
24. See Alvarez GonzAlez, Protection, supra note 18 at 91 & n.12. While the
Executive Council appeared to resemble a parliamentary body, foreign to United
States traditions, in fact it was quite different, since its members were not elected
and, therefore, were not responsible to parliament, but only to the President who
appointed them.
25. See id.
26. See 1 TRIAs MONGE, HISroA, supra note 8, at 273-8 1.
27. See id. at 279-80; see also TRIAs MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 54. The
magnitude of the Federal electoral boycott is illustrated by the following facts: (1)
[Vol. 17:359
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This was the state of affairs when on February 21, 1902,
Spanish and English became official languages of government in
Puerto Rico. 28 This 1902 Act provided:
In all the departments of the Commonwealth government and
in all the courts of this island, and in all public offices the
English language and the Spanish language shall be used in-
discriminately; and, when necessary, translations and oral in-
terpretations shall be made from one language to the other so
that all parties interested may understand any proceedings or
communications made therein.29
At a time when the governor of Puerto Rico was a United
States-born Presidential appointee and the upper house of the
legislature was dominated by other United States-born Presiden-
tial appointees, who were also the heads of the executive depart-
ments, the 1902 law was deemed necessary to permit these Anglo-
phone colonial administrators to function. More important, the
1902 law was a vital element of the policy of Americanizing Puerto
Rico immediately, which became a prime goal of colonial adminis-
trators.30 That policy had been advocated early in the military
government period by the United States Consul in Puerto Rico,
Phillip C. Hanna, who had urged that all things Spanish, including
language and culture, should be discarded. 31 In these efforts to
in the 1898 elections for the local parliament under Spanish rule, the predecessors
to the Federals had trounced all opposition by a margin of nearly five to one; (2)
less than 59,000 electors voted in the election of 1900, while some 144,000 had
voted in that of 1898, id. at 129, 280; (3) while the predecessors to the Federals
had garnered 82,627 votes in 1898, the Republicans only received 58,367 votes in
1900. See 1 TRIAS MONGE, HISTORIA, supra note 8, at 129, 280.
28. See 1902 P.R. Laws Feb. 21, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1 § 51 (1982), repealed by
1991 P.R. Laws 4, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1 § 56 (Supp. 1993), repealed by 1993 P.R.
Laws 1, P.R. LAWS ANN tit. 1 § 59 (Supp. 1995-1996).
29. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1 § 51 (1982) (repealed).
30. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 55.
The department heads were the subject of frequent criticism by the Fed-
eral party and its successors. The policy of Americanizing Puerto Rico as
fast as possible, one of the major matters on which there was enthusiastic
consensus among the governor and the department heads, was singled out
for special attack. The Commissioners of Education ordered all school-
children to start the school day by saluting the American flag, declaiming
the Pledge of Allegiance, and singing the national anthem and other pa-
triotic songs. The teachers, often in broken English, would lead the exer-
cise while the children mouthed words that most did not understand. The
teaching in English of the whole public school curriculum started as soon
as teachers became available.
Id. at 57. On the wholesale substitution of United States laws for institutions of
the Civil Law during this period, see id.; see also Manuel Rodriguez Ramos, Inter-
action of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal Method in Puerto Rico,
23 TUL. L. REV. 1, 345 (1948-49); Eulalio A. Torres, The Puerto Rican Penal Code
of 1902-1975: A Case Study of American Legal Imperialism, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1
(1976).
31. See Carmelo Delgado Cintr6n, Pensamniento Juridico e Idioma en Puerto
1999]
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Americanize Puerto Rico, the lower house of the legislature, exclu-
sively composed of pro-statehood delegates until 1902, and domi-
nated by that party until 1904, cooperated willingly. 32
The 1902 statute suffered no change until 1991. In 1990, the
pro-Commonwealth Popular Democratic Party, which then con-
trolled the governorship and the legislature, decided to underscore
its autonomist tendencies and to put pressure on its rival, the pro-
statehood New Progressive Party.33 At a time when the United
States Senate was taking another look at the question of Puerto
Rico's political status, the governing Populares decided to make
things more difficult for the statehood movement. 34 Thus, in
March 1990, they took up a bill originally filed one year earlier,
held public hearings and finally approved it on April 4, 1991 over
the opposition of the pro-statehood forces. 35 Governor Hernindez
Col6n signed it into law the next day. 36 This 1991 law repealed the
1902 statute and made Spanish the only official language.37 That
action earned the people of Puerto Rico the Prince of Asturias
award, one of the most coveted distinctions granted by the Spanish
crown.
38
The 1991 statute may have been a strategic mistake. Puerto
Rico is a very homogeneous society, as the statement of purposes
of that statute itself recognized. 39 Puerto Rico, therefore, does not
need an official language statute, such as more linguistically di-
verse societies may need. The simple repeal of the 1902 statute,
which was once necessary to permit Anglophone colonial adminis-
trators to function, would have been sufficient. To make Spanish
the sole official language only served to fuel partisan fires, without
Rico: Un Problemna ttico, Juridico y Lingidstico, 10 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 200, 202
(1976).
32. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 52-60.
33. The story that follows is told in further detail in EDGARDO MELPNDEZ,
MOVIMIENTO ANEXIONISTA EN PUERTO Rico 275-77 (1993).
34. See id.
35. See Carmelo Delgado Cintr6n, Historia de las Luchas por el Idioma
Espaiiol en Puerto Rico, in CARMELo DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO
SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico 17-22 (1994).
36. See id. at 22.
37. See 1991 P.R. Laws 4, 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1 § 56 (Supp. 1993) (repealed):
It is hereby declared and established that Spanish shall be the official
language of Puerto Rico to be used in all its departments, municipalities
or other political subdivisions, agencies, offices and government depend-
encies of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico.
Id.
38. See Delgado Cintr6n, supra note 35, at 24.
39. 1991 P.R. Laws 4, available in WESTLAW, PR-LEGIS 4 (1991) (Statement
of Motives) ('Puerto Rico [is] a homogeneous cultural and linguistic society").
[Vol. 17:359
LANGUAGE IN PUERTO RICO
altering the sociological reality of the overwhelming predominance
of Spanish in Puerto Rico.
The return to power of the pro-statehood New Progressive
Party in 1993 turned the clock back to 1902. The new government
immediately repealed the 1991 statute and again made both
Spanish and English official languages, in terms similar to the
1902 statute. 40
B. English in Puerto Rico: A Dose of Reality
After a century of United States presence in Puerto Rico,
what is the linguistic reality of the Island? According to the 1990
Census, 98.2% of all residents of Puerto Rico speak Spanish, 52.6%
of all residents of Puerto Rico do not speak English at all, and an
additional 23.8% have very limited command of that language. 41
At best, only 23.6% of the population is truly fluent in English. 42
And fluency in English does not run along the lines of political
status preferences, but rather, along the lines of socioeconomic
class and of urban or rural residence. 43
40. See 1993 P.R. Laws 1, P.R. LAWS ANN tit. 1 § 59 (Supp. 1995-1996).
Spanish and English are established as official languages of the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico. Both languages may be used, indistinctively, in all
departments, municipalities or other political subdivisions, agencies, pub-
lic corporations, offices and government dependencies of the Executive,
Legislative and Judiciary Branches of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act or by that which is provided by a
special law.
Id. An excellent collection of articles, essays and statutory materials con-
cerning the issue of government language in Puerto Rico is DELGADO CINTRON,
supra note 35; see also Luis Muffiz Argielles, The Status of Languages in
Puerto Rico, in CARMELO DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE
LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO RICO 69-82 (1994).
41. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS
OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, PUERTO RICO 46 (1993)
[hereinafter CENSUS]. The Census only measures language ability for persons of
at least five years of age.
42. See id.
43. The Census does not attempt to correlate ability to speak English with so-
cioeconomic conditions, such as schooling and income. However, it may safely be
predicted that there exists a strong correlation between such factors and the abil-
ity to speak English, although reverse migration of Puerto Rican families from the
United States to Puerto Rico may have begun to weaken it.
The Census does correlate the ability to speak English of persons older than
four with an urban or rural dwelling, however imprecise such categories may have
become in modern day Puerto Rico. The following table shows that, in comparison
to the island-wide figures, fluency in English is somewhat higher in the urban set-
ting and appreciably lower in rural areas:
1999]
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It is often said in Puerto Rico that if Census employees con-
ducted their interviews in English, rather than in Spanish, the
statistics on English proficiency would be still lower. Census sta-
tistics are assailed as unreliable because they depend on the self-
evaluation of interviewees, which in the political climate of Puerto
Rico tends to overestimate English proficiency. 44 That caveat
aside, the Census statistics are confirmed in a more recent study
conducted in 1993 for the Ateneo Puertorriquefio, the oldest pri-
vate organization for the promotion of Puerto Rican culture. 45
Among other findings, that study found that only 25% of the in-
habitants of Puerto Rico consider their command of English as
"good" or "excellent," while only 20.6% consider themselves bilin-
gual.4 6
Notwithstanding the long-standing status of English as an of-
ficial language of Puerto Rico, the 1902 legislation exemplifies an
abyss between law and reality. Let me offer some examples.
1. Judicial Proceedings
All proceedings in the courts of Puerto Rico are conducted
only in Spanish. That is the law of Puerto Rico, as interpreted by
its courts in the leading case of Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior.47 In
that case the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found against an An-
glophone attorney who invoked the 1902 law in support of a
claimed right to a trial in English. The Court stated:
It is a fact, not subject to historical rectification, that the vehi-
cle of expression, the language of the Puerto Rican people-an
integral part of our origin and our Hispanic culture-has been
English fluency % Island wide Rural Urban San Juan
Easily 23.6 14.5 27.2 28.3
With difficulty 23.8 20.0 25.3 24.6
Unable 52.6 65.5 47.5 47.1
CENSUS, supra note 41, at 32, 71.
44. See L6PEZ LAGUERRE, supra note 13, at 86.
45. See Resumen del Estudio del Ateneo Puertorriqueiio Respecto al Uso, Do-
minio y Preferencia de los Idiontas Espaiol e Ingles en Puerto Rico, in CARMELO
DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN
PUERTO RIco 83 (1994) [hereinafter Ateneo Study].
46. See id. at 84. The Ateneo Study poll was designed by three distinguished
sociolinguists from the United States: Dr. Kenji Hakuta of Stanford University,
Dr. Leonni Huddy of the State University of New York and Dr. David Sears, Dean
of Social Sciences of the University of California at Los Angeles.
The very definition of "bilingualism" has been the object of debate. See LOPEZ
LAGUERRE, supra note 13, at 43-56. In this Article, I use the term to describe an
individual who is able to communicate in two languages with an analogous compe-
tence to that possessed by the monolingual users of each language. See id. at 45.
47. People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R.R. 580 (1965).
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and continues to be Spanish....
The determining factor as to the language to be used in judi-
cial proceedings in Commonwealth courts does not arise from
the law of [19021, which Mr. Rout invoked in his petition that
the trial be held in English because he did not have good
command of Spanish. It arises from the fact that the means of
expression of our people is Spanish, and that is a reality that
cannot be changed by any law.48
The pro-statehood legislature of Puerto Rico expressly en-
dorsed this view when it restored the official status of English in
1993.4 9 It stated then:
No provision of this bill harbors the unfounded speculation
that, upon its approval, the Legislature would be authorizing
or validating the use of a language other than Spanish in judi-
cial proceedings in the Courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. The matter of judicial language was resolved by our Su-
preme Court in the case of Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior (1965)
and what was established therein does not suffer any change
whatsoever by the approval of this measure. Neither does it
alter Rule 8.5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to the effect that
"the allegations, petitions and motions shall be filed in Span-
ish" in the Courts of Puerto Rico.5 0
Under the law of Puerto Rico, therefore, anyone who does not
have an adequate command of Spanish will need an interpreter in
order to testify or to follow the proceedings. The state will provide
that interpreter only to a criminal defendant.5'
2. Legislative and Executive Proceedings
Legislative proceedings and executive rulemaking or adjudi-
catory hearings are in Spanish.52 With regard to legislative activi-
48. Id. at 588-89 (footnotes omitted); see also P.R. R. CRIM. P. 96(d); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 34 Ap. II, R. 96(d) (1991) (criminal jurors must read and write in Span-
ish); P.R. R. Civ. P. 8.5, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 Ap. III, R. 8.5 (1983) (all pleadings
and motions must be in Spanish; documents in other languages must be accompa-
nied by a Spanish translation).
49. See 1993 P.R. Laws 1, available in WESTLAW, PR-LEGIS 1 (1993)
(Statement of Motives).
50. Id.
51. See 92 P.R.R. at 590. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit later held that a criminal trial in Spanish, with a right to translation services
where the accused does not speak that language, satisfies due process. See Jack-
son v. Cintr6n Garcia, 665 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1981).
52. See Mufiiz Argielles, supra note 40, at 80-81. As Professor Mufiiz recog-
nizes: "Governmental affairs are, as a matter of fact, conducted in Spanish, except
for isolated cases: official dealings with the federal government, foreign consulta-
tions-basically where the consultant is from the United States-and similar af-
fairs." Id. at 81.
Pro-statehood Secretary of State Baltasar Corrada del Rio, now a Puerto Rico
Supreme Court Justice, while testifying in 1993 in support of official language
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ties, even though the Constitution of Puerto Rico requires legisla-
tors to be able to read and write in Spanish or in English, 53 modern
legislators almost never address the assembly in English, except
for isolated instances in which a few of them have sought to un-
derscore their support for statehood. 54 In the overwhelming ma-
jority of instances, laws are approved in Spanish and subsequently
translated. 55 Article 13 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico provides
certain language rules for interpreting statutes, which generally
favor the Spanish version. 56
In the executive branch, there are some exceptions to the
overwhelming practice of operating exclusively in Spanish, but
such exceptions are both rare and of minor importance. 57
3. Public Education
At all public school levels all instruction is in Spanish, except
for English courses.58 The story behind this fact is another classic
status for English, also conceded that: "On April 4, 1991, Spanish was used in the
immense majority of official businesses in all branches of the Government of
Puerto Rico." Baltasar Corrada del Rio, Ponencia del Secretario de Estado, Hon.
Baltasar Corrada del Rio, in CARMELO DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO
SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico 614 (1994) (author's translation).
53. See P.R. CONST. art. II, § 5.
54. See, e.g., Pepo Garcia, Llega el 'English only' al Senado, EL NUEVO DIA,
Apr. 23, 1997, at 14 (Senator Kenneth McClintock-Hernfindez addressed the Sen-
ate in English while defending a Senate resolution in that language in praise of
the Shriners Hospital of Philadelphia).
55. In recent years, the pro-statehood legislative majority in Puerto Rico has
approved several measures in both languages, while specifically providing that in
case of conflict the English version shall prevail. Statutes of this type include:
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 1996 P.R. Laws 178 art. 15, P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit 31, § 621 (Supp. 1998); The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
1997 P.R. Laws 180 § 9.905, P.R. LAWS ANN tit. 8, § 541 (Supp. 1998); The Com-
inercial Transactions Act, 1996 P.R. Laws 241, art. 19, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 19, §
401 (1998); The Puerto Rico Timeshare and Vacation Act, 1995 P.R. Laws 252, §
13-106, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1269d (Supp. 1995-1996).
56. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 13 (1993).
In case of discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts of a statute
passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, the text in which the
same originated in either house, shall prevail in the construction of said
statute, except in the following cases: (a) If the statute is a translation or
adaptation of a statute of the United States or of any State or Territory
thereof, the English text shall be given preference over the Spanish. (b) If
the statute is of Spanish origin, the Spanish text shall be preferred to the
English. (c) If the matter of preference cannot be decided under the fore-
going, the Spanish text shall prevail.
Id.
57. For a collection of instances where official government business may be
conducted in English or in both languages, see Radl Serrano Geyls & Carlos Gor-
rin Peralta, Puerto Rico y la Estadidad: Problemas Constitucionales, 42 REV. COL.
AB. P.R. 1, 43-46 (1981).
58. At the University of Puerto Rico there are some courses in English, espe-
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vignette of colonial politics. 59 At the start of its colonial admini-
stration of Puerto Rico, the United States attempted the transcul-
turation of the Puerto Rican people, through several measures.
One of the most important of these measures occurring in 1905
was the imposition of English as the language of instruction in the
public school system, with the cooperation of important segments
of the local, minoritarian statehood movement. That policy, sup-
ported by all United States Presidents, including Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt,60 lasted officially until 1949. It was then revoked by an
administrative order of the Commissioner of Education, Mr. Mari-
ano Villaronga, a member of the then ruling Popular Democratic
Party. That administrative order was not enacted into law until
1990.61
When the Puerto Rico legislature restored the official lan-
guage status of English in 1993,62 it expressly reaffirmed this pol-
icy:
No provision of this measure harbors or validates the un-
founded speculation that, upon its approval, the Legislature
would be opening the doors to the use of a language other
than Spanish as a vehicle for teaching in the public schools of
Puerto Rico. This bill does not repeal, nor change, nor amends
Section 1.02 of the Organic Act of the Department of Educa-
tion-Act No. 68 of August 28, 1990-which in its pertinent
section establishes that "education shall be imparted in the
vernacular language, Spanish. English shall be taught as a
second language." We hereby reiterate the public policy to that
cially where the instructor is an English-speaker. Still, the overwhelming major-
ity of university courses in Puerto Rico, at public and private institutions, are in
Spanish.
59. For a broader discussion of that story, see DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-
ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR AMERICANS? 166-70 (1990); ALFONSO
L. GARCIA MARTINEZ, IDIOMA Y POLITICA EN PUERTO Rico (1976); LOPEZ LAGUERRE,
supra note 13, at 7-31; AIDA NEGR)N DE MONTILLA, AMERICANIZATION IN PUERTO
RIco AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM: 1900-1930 (1971); JUAN J. OSUNA, A
HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO RICO (1949); Alfonso L. Garcia Martinez, Lan-
guage Policy in Puerto Rico: 1898-1930, 42 REv. COL. AB. P.R. 87 (1981); Mufiiz
Argiuelles, supra note 40, at 72-74; Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57,
at 31-39.
60. As late as 1937, President Roosevelt instructed his appointee, Puerto Rico
Commissioner of Education Josb M. Gallardo, to teach English on the Island "with
vigor, purposefulness and devotion, and with the understanding that English is
the official language of our country ... Only through the acquisition of this lan-
guage will Puerto Rican Americans secure a better understanding of American
ideals and principles." 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 160-61
(1941), cited in BARON, supra note 59, at 169.
61. See 1990 P.R. Laws 68 § 1.02, available in WESTLAW, PR-LEGIS 3RS 68
(1990) ("It is hereby provided that education shall be imparted in Spanish, the
vernacular language. English shall be taught as a second language.").




There is bilingual education in some public classrooms in
Puerto Rico. It used to be geared principally toward developing
the Spanish language proficiency of Anglophones, so that they
might participate fully in the affairs of Puerto Rican society. Con-
gress expressly authorized this policy in the 1978 amendments to
the federal Bilingual Education Act, which provided that Puerto
Rico could assist children with insufficient knowledge of Spanish,
the language of instruction in Puerto Rican public schools.
64
Recently, there have been a few experiments with English
immersion laboratories. 65 It is too early to tell what their chances
for success are.66
4. Operation of the Federal Government in Puerto Rico
The federal government functions in English throughout the
United States. The reality in Puerto Rico, however, is strikingly
63. 1993 P.R. Laws 1, available in WESTLAW, PR-LEGIS 1 (1993) (Statement
of Motives).
A pro-statehood former Secretary of Education, Dr. Ram6n Mellado Parsons,
concluded in 1979 that Spanish would continue being for the foreseeable future the
native tongue of all Puerto Ricans, which required that the policy of instruction in
Spanish be maintained, along with the teaching of English as a second language.
See RAMON MELLADO PARSONS, LA EDUCACION EN PUERTO Rico 71-72 (1979). He
also advocated the establishment of special schools, in order to develop the Span-
ish language proficiency of the children of Puerto Ricans who return from the
United States. See id. He further proposed that bilingualism should be a goal of
the public education system, and recognized that the attainment of this goal re-
quires bilingual teachers who also have an adequate understanding of the cultures
of both Puerto Rico and the United States. See id; see also LOPEZ LAGUERRE, supra
note 13, at 92-93.
64. See Pub. L. 95-561, § 721(d), 92 Stat. 2275 (1978). The current version of
this provision is found in 20 U.S.C. § 7432 (1994). See generally Juan Cartagena et
al., United States Language Policy: Where Do We Go from Here?, 18 REV. JUR.
U.I.P.R. 527, 532 (1984); Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 44-46.
65. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO, PROJECT
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BILINGUAL CITIZEN (1997) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION]; see also Wanda I. Matias, Inician Laboratorio en Pro del Bi-
lingdiismo, EL NUEVO DIA, Mar. 2, 1998, at 27; Wanda I Matias, Rinde Frutos el
Laboratorio de Inmersidn en Inglds, EL NUEVO DA, Mar. 6, 1998, at 32.
66. On the pitfalls of immersion as a general method of learning a second lan-
guage, see KENJI HAKUTA, MIRROR OF LANGUAGE: THE DEBATE ON BILINGUALISM
225 (1986) ('[C]hildren are not the instantaneous second-language learners
painted in our folklore .. . [l]t may take them even longer to learn the kinds of
language necessary to perform well in school."). Dr. Hakuta is recognized as an
authority in the Puerto Rico Department of Education publication cited supra note
65, at 31. He also helped design the Ateneo Study. See supra note 45; see also
BARON, supra note 59, at 196 (stating that immersion may be successful with
highly motivated middle class students, but not with unmotivated potential drop-
outs).
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different.67
a. Federal Executive Agencies
All formal proceedings in federal agencies in Puerto Rico are
conducted in English, but Spanish translations are invariably a
fact of life. All forms have an English version, but in most agen-
cies there are Spanish versions as well. Informal dealings with
federal employees in Puerto Rico, however, are usually conducted
in Spanish, as the bulk of federal employees on the Island are na-
tive Puerto Ricans whose vernacular is Spanish. Spanish is most
prevalent among the federal agencies that serve the general pub-
lic, such as the Postal Service, the Department of Labor, the Social
Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, the Small Business Admini-
stration, the Farmers Home Administration, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the National Labor Relations
Board, the Customs Service and the Veterans Administration.68
b. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico
Federal law requires that all formal business in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico be conducted in
English,6 9 notwithstanding that usually all participants share
Spanish as their native tongue. This often leads to situations
which border on the ridiculous. As Professor Mufiiz Argielles
states:
Use of English there is at times absurd, as when attorneys,
parties, jurors and the judge are all native Spanish speakers,
and yet all is translated back and forth between English and
Spanish for no other reason than to comply with a statutory
mandate, for no one pays any attention to the English transla-
tions.70
This court has always been a bone of contention in United
States-Puerto Rico relations,71 but all efforts to abolish it or to
67. Statements in this section are based on the author's first-hand knowledge
and on Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 48-50.
68. For a more detailed treatment of the situation in some of these agencies,
see Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 49.
69. See Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act § 42, 48 U.S.C. § 864 (1994).
70. Mufiiz Argilelles, supra note 40, at 79.
71. On the role of the federal court in Puerto Rico as one of the principal
agents of transculturation, see, for example, Carmelo Delgado Cintr6n, El Tribu-
nal Federal corno Factor de Transculturaci6n en Puerto Rico, 34 REV. COL. AB. P.R.
5 (1973); Mufiiz Argiielles, supra note 40, at 79; Angel Tapia Flores, Language in
the Federal Court, 40 REV. COL. AB. P.R. 333 (1976); Roberto Tschudin, The United
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permit it to operate in Spanish have failed.72 Even in this theo-
retically English-only setting, judges and attorneys will often go
into chambers to confer in Spanish.73
5. Private Affairs
In the private realm, Spanish reigns.74 The pro-statehood
Puerto Rican legislature said as much when it restored the official
status of English in 1993: "Through this measure, the Legislature
does not pretend to establish by legislative fiat, a condition of bi-
lingualism alien to the everyday reality of the Puerto Rican Peo-
ple. 76
It is very rare for two Puerto Ricans whose native tongue is
Spanish to carry on a private conversation in English. 76 Their use
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico: Can an English Language
Court Serve the Interests of Justice in a Spanish Language Society? 37 REV. COL.
AB. P.R. 41 (1976).
72. See Mufiiz Argiuelles, supra note 40, at 79; Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta,
supra note 57, at 50.
73. See Mufiiz Arguielles, supra note 40, at 79.
74. See, e.g., Manuel Alvarez Nazario, Sobre la Intenci6n Legislativa de Insti-
tuir al Espailol conto Lengua Oficial Unica de Puerto Rico, in CARMELO DELGADO
CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico
378-79 (1994); Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 55-56.
The Ateneo Study, supra note 45, at 84-85, contains the following additional
findings concerning the residents of Puerto Rico:
(a) 95% prefer Spanish as their only official language;
(b) 97% prefer that the government communicate with them in Spanish;
(c) 96% prefer that all legislation be in Spanish;
(d) 96% prefer that all government instructions, such as traffic signs, be in
Spanish (which they are);
(e) 95% prefer government forms in Spanish;
(f) 93% claim that they will never renounce Spanish, even if Puerto Rico
becomes a state and English is imposed as the only official language;
(g) 87% find important cultural differences between Puerto Rico and the
United States;
(h) 91% consider themselves Puerto Rican first and American second;
(i) 97% consider themselves Puerto Rican, while only 58% consider them-
selves American;
(0) 87% confess to harbor great patriotic sentiments toward the Puerto Ri-
can flag;
(k) 95% manifest great love for Puerto Rico, while only 4.2% harbor simi-
lar feelings toward the United States;
(1) 78% consider their Puerto Rican identity extremely important, while
only 26% make similar claims about their American identity.
Id.
75. See 1993 P.R. Laws 1, available in WESTLAW, PR-LEGIS 1 (1993)
(Statement of Motives).
76. See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 55. Popular par-
lance in Puerto Rico refers to English as "el diftci' ('the difficult one"). See, e.g.,
Ram6n Lpez, La Controversia del Espahol y el Inglds, in CARMELO DELGADO
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of English will be reserved for the rather few occasions when they
may need to communicate with Anglophones, usually in the work-
place.77 Cultural manifestations in Puerto Rico, by or involving
Puerto Ricans, such as literature, theater and film, are almost ex-
clusively in Spanish, even where the participants are fully bilin-
gual.78 Literature in English by Island Puerto Ricans is not very
common and is usually reserved for exportation. That is the case
with professional 79 and popular literature.8 0
In a political rally, no politician will address the audience in
CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico
188 (1994).
77. According to the Ateneo Study, supra note 45, at 84, only 11% of the resi-
dents of Puerto Rico use English with significant frequency at work; see also Mufiiz
Argiuelles, supra note 40, at 81 ("Despite this lack of legislation, Spanish is the
language in the workplace and many American businessmen in Puerto Rico find
they must learn it if they hope to bypass the foreman, who, until then, must act as
his translator.").
78. See, e.g., Alvarez Nazario, supra note 74, at 379; Serrano Geyls & Gorrin
Peralta, supra note 57, at 55. Concerning film, Puerto Rican film production has
been to date, with very few exceptions, exclusively in Spanish and is evidence of
Puerto Rico's political and ethnic collective identity. See Silvia Alvarez Curbelo,
Vidas Prestadas: El Cine y la Puertorriqueiiidad, in 2 REVISTA CIENCIAS SOCIALES
68 (1997). One recent exception is director Marcos Zurinaga's Hollywood produc-
tion THE DISAPPEARANCE OF GARCIA LORCA (A Triumph Releasing 1997).
79. See, e.g., TRfAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18. Mr. Trias Monge is one of
Puerto Rico's leading attorneys, a former Chief Justice of its Supreme Court, one
of the principal architects of the Commonwealth relationship and the current
President of the Puerto Rican Academy of the Spanish Language. His most recent
book is clearly addressed to the United States audience, while his prior, monumen-
tal five-volume constitutional history of Puerto Rico is not. See 1 TRIAS MONGE,
HISTORIA, supra note 8.
80. The latest episode of colonial politics concerns Ms. Rosario Ferr6, a well-
known writer of novels, short stories and poetry. Ms. Ferrd, the daughter of the
patriarch of the statehood movement, former Governor Luis A. Ferrd, surprised
her countrymen in the early 1970s, when she announced her embrace of the cause
of independence for the Island. That announcement coincided with her decision to
enter the literary arena, where she was well received by the Puerto Rico intelli-
gentsia. She wrote exclusively in Spanish for two decades. Recently, she started
writing in English, with success. See, e.g., ROSARIO FERRI, ECCENTRIC
NEIGHBORHOODS (1998); ROSARIO FERRk, THE HOUSE ON THE LAGOON (1995). On
March 20, 1998, Ms. Ferr6 published an op-ed piece in the New York Times where
she announced that in view of, among other things, President Clinton's statement
to the effect that statehood for Puerto Rico would not, in his view, alter the Is-
land's culture or Spanish language, see infra note 390 and accompanying text, she
had reconverted to the cause of statehood. Rosario Ferr6, Puerto Rico, U.S.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at A21. Among her most memorable statements in
that op-ed column, is the following: "When I travel to the States I feel as Latina as
Chita Rivera. But in Latin America, I feel more American than John Wayne." Id.
This statement immediately caught the attention of the press in Puerto Rico. See,
e.g., SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 21, 1998, at 13. In spite of Ms. Ferr6's claim, it is very
improbable that a substantial number of Puerto Ricans feel any kinship with John
Wayne, and least of all in Latin America.
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anything but Spanish.8l Those politicians who are fluent in Eng-
lish will only use that language when catering to the tiny segment
of Anglophone voters.
All Hollywood movies shown in Puerto Rico's commercial
cinemas are subtitled in Spanish. Puerto Rico's Resident Commis-
sioner,82 former Governor Carlos Romero Barcel6, recently tried to
challenge this fact on the floor of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives. 83 Anyone who has ever watched a film in San Juan
knows that he is wrong.84 His remarks were televised in Puerto
Rico by the government channel. Curiously, while the audio was
the original English version, it was accompanied by Spanish subti-
tles. On some commercial TV channels, viewers were constantly
reminded that a radio station carried the Spanish translation.
Lastly, it is in business affairs and in certain liberal profes-
81. Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 55, provide an account of
the 1980 Presidential primaries in Puerto Rico, when Anglophone Presidential
contenders became virtual hostages of Puerto Rican political figures, on whom
they depended for effective communication with the masses. In subsequent Presi-
dential primaries that history has repeated itself.
82. The Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico to the United States, a post
created in section 39 of the Foraker Act of 1900, 31 Stat. 86 (1900), and retained
under section 36 of the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 891-94
(1987), is Puerto Rico's representative before the federal government. This elected
official has a voice but no vote in the House of Representatives and may speak and
vote in those of its committees to which he is appointed.
83. Mr. Remero's attempt to deny this fact is perplexing. Rep. Luis Guti~rrez
(D-IL) argued that Hollywood movies were shown in Puerto Rico with Spanish sub-
titles. Mr. Romero denied that movies in Puerto Rico were dubbed into Spanish:
MR. GUTIgRREZ: Let me give my colleagues an example, gentlemen. If I
walk into a theater, a movie theater today anywhere in Puerto Rico, any-
where in Puerto Rico, there are subtitles to everything said in English, in
every movie theater in Puerto Rico. Why? So that the people can grasp
what is going on in the movie. Many times I would laugh two seconds
ahead of the rest of the audience because by the time they read the
translation, I am an English native speaker, and I would understand that.
So I bring that as an issue that even in movie theaters, even in enter-
tainment, and this is much more important than that.
144 CONG. REC. H768 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998) (statement of Mr. Gutierrez)
(emphasis added).
MR. ROMERO-BARCELO: This morning, earlier today, we had the gentle-
man from Illinois saying that in Puerto Rico the movies were dubbed. The
majority of the movies shown in Puerto Rico are not dubbed. They are in
English and the movie houses are full.
At the Blockbusters, the majority of the films that are rented out are not
subtitled and neither are the movies subtitled. And in Puerto Rico the
people who are watching these proceedings now on C-SPAN understand
what is going on.
Id. at H802 (emphasis added). Concerning Mr. Romero's C-SPAN claim, see the
conclusion of the paragraph in the main text.
84. The only exception is a movie house specializing in art films, which some-
times shows fims in English without Spanish subtitles.
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sions, such as medicine, engineering and accounting, where Eng-
lish is most often used.8 5 That influence of English, however, is
not much more pervasive than the similar influence felt in such
contexts all over the Western world.8 6 And in spite of that influ-
ence, the language of the workplace in Puerto Rico is overwhelm-
ingly Spanish.8 7
C. The Current Role of English in Puerto Rico: Final
Thoughts
1. The Facade of Official Bilingualism in Puerto Rico
The role of English as a language of government in Puerto
Rico is truly negligible. It is essentially limited to the possibility of
performing some executive affairs, filing government forms and
recording deeds in that language.8 8 But no one has a right to force
the government of Puerto Rico to conduct a proceeding in Eng-
lish.89
Ignorance about the fagade of official bilingualism in Puerto
Rico is alarming. Recently, a student commentator characterized
Puerto Rico as a jurisdiction which "permits statutes of Spanish
origin to be printed in Spanish," and suggested that "functionally
monolingual states, which wish to effectively address problems as-
sociated with growing multilingual populations, could learn from
the bilingual official language laws of Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto
Rico, states which have had more experience dealing with multi-
85. See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 41-43; Mufiiz Ar-
gilelles, supra note 40, at 82.
86. See BARON, supra note 59, at 177-79.
87. See Mufiiz Argiuelles, supra note 40, at 81.
88. Concerning the latter activity, see P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 30 § 2210 (1993).
For an argument against this practice, see Luis Mojica Sandoz, Voto Disidente Re-
specto de la Regla 24, Sobre el Idioma a Ser Utilizado en los Instrumentos Pibliicos,
in CARMELO DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL
IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico 99 (1994) (stressing that the Puerto Rico Land Registry,
in contrast to those in Canada and Belgium, is not truly bilingual, because it does
not require recordation in both official languages, but in either of them). For an
analysis of some of the problems that such practice engenders, see Mufiiz Ar-
gilelles, supra note 40, at 78.
89. This point was eloquently made in 1989 by Resident Commissioner Romero
Barcelo, during his initial appearance before the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, which was then considering a plebiscite bill for Puerto Rico.
He stated: "Locally in our local legislature and our local judiciary and the execu-
tive, the official language is both except that Spanish is the language that is used,
not English. However, if someone needs a translation or wants a translation, a
translation is provided." Political Status of Puerto Rico: Hearings on S. 710, S.
711, and S. 712 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 101st
Cong. 364 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings].
1999]
Law and Inequality
lingual populations."9 0 This commentator does not recognize that,
as I have shown, Puerto Rico is a "functionally monolingual" juris-
diction, and that the only language is Spanish, not English. Her
pairing of Puerto Rico with Guam and Hawaii is untenable. In
Guam and Hawaii, the autochthonous language-Chamorro and
Hawaiian, respectively-clearly has second-class status, since it
"shall not be required for.., public acts and transactions."91 Con-
cerning the supposed permission to print Puerto Rican statutes in
Spanish, suffice it to say that the collection of the laws of Puerto
Rico in Spanish-Leyes de Puerto Rico Anotadas-is supplemented
annually, while the supplementation to the English version-
Puerto Rico Laws Annotated-is running years behind. By the
same token, publication of the English version of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stopped in 1972 with volume
100 of the Puerto Rico Reports. Meanwhile, the Spanish version-
Decisiones de Puerto Rico-has reached volume 132.92
2. Resistance to English and Nonnegotiability of Spanish
The fact that more than three-fourths of Island Puerto Ricans
are not fluent in English after a century of United States presence
is not due to a collective genetic flaw. It is undeniable that educa-
tional policies have been much less than perfect.93 But, besides the
lack of need to master English in order to take part in the affairs of
90. Lucy Chiu, The Emerson English Language Empowerment Act: The House's
'Straw Man' Bill" A Plea to the Senate Not to Pass the Emerson English Language
Empowerment Act of 1997, 23 J. LEGIS. 231, 239 (1997).
91. 1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 706 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-13 (1993).
92. Resident Commissioner Romero Barcel6 denounced this fact in his 1989
appearance before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. See
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 364.
93. For a review of criticisms on the subject, see LOPEZ LAGUERRE, supra note
13, at 7-31, 71-82. According to this author, the most complete study on the sub-
ject is still the one commissioned by the Puerto Rico Council on Higher Learning
in 1958. See id. at 31; ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ BOU, ESTUDIO DEL SISTEMA EDUCATIVO
DE PUERTO Rico (1960).
The Puerto Rico Department of Education recently published an indictment of
the policies of past administrations, in the course of arguing in support of its new
proposal to foster bilingualism. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 65, at
6-9. Two studies cited in that report, critical of methods on teaching English in
Puerto Rico's public schools, are J. Rodriguez, A Case Study of an Exemplary Dis-
trict English Supervisor in Puerto Rico (1977) (unpublished dissertation, Pennsyl-
vania State University) (on file with the author), and N. Llad6-Torres, Puerto Ri-
can Student Attitudes Toward English as a Second Language, 8(4) J. EDUC. RES.
Q. 92 (1984).
Additionally, the Department's own statistics show that by March 1997, 5400
out of 9300 English teachers were not properly certified, as well as that only 19%
of students from third to twelfth grade reached "competency" level in English. See
Carmen Millfin, Rezago Lingfifstico, EL NUEvo DIA, Mar. 10, 1997, at 8.
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Puerto Rican society, 94 there may be a deeper factor at work. For
very many Puerto Ricans, English may be a proxy for attempts at
political and cultural domination, which began in 1898 and have
been resisted ever since.
95
Even supporters of statehood evince their own version of this
trait. According to their leaders, the Spanish language and Puerto
Rican culture are non-negotiable. In 1976, the New Progressive
Party included that statement on page one of its electoral plat-
form. 96 In 1984, that party approved three resolutions concerning
statehood. 97 The second of these resolutions, demanding that
Spanish be the official language of any State of Puerto Rico, de-
clared that "Spanish language and culture will not be a matter of
negotiation upon [Puerto Rico's] request for admission as the 51st
State of the Union" and announced that under statehood
"education will still be offered in Spanish, and English will be
taught as well as other languages."98  Statehood leaders have
coined a term for their brand of statehood: "Jibaro Statehood,"
alluding to the popular name for the erstwhile Puerto Rican peas-
ant who is today an endangered species.99
The most eloquent exponent of the nonnegotiability thesis
used to be Resident Commissioner Romero Barcel6.'04 In recent
years he has toned down this view. That process began in 1989.
During his initial appearance before the Senate Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, Mr. Romero proposed that the plebi-
94. See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 55.
95. See BARON, supra note 59, at 170 ("Language in Puerto Rico has always
been more a political issue than an educational one, tied up with issues of state-
hood or independence, cultural pluralism and Americanization. With no clear so-
lution to the political problem in sight, observers are tempted to describe the lan-
guage problem as hopeless."); TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 86 ('The
Americanization policy was not working. Puerto Ricans were as resistant to
learning English as most of the American governors were to learning Spanish.");
see also BARON, supra note 59, at 197; LOPEZ LAGUERRE, supra note 13, at 87-88.
96. See 1 REECE B. BOTHWELL GONZALEZ, PUERTO RICO: CIEN AjOS DE LucHA
POLITICA 1293 (1979).
97. See Laurence H. Tribe, Memorandum of Law Re: NPP Statehood Resolu-
tions 20 (Oct. 12, 1984) (co-authored with the law firm of Covington & Burling) (on
file with the author).
98. Id.
99. Governor Luis Ferr6 coined this term. See LUIS A. FERR,, EL PROPOSITO
HUMANO 50, 61-62 (1972); see also 4 REECE B. BOTHWELL GONZALEZ, PUERTO RICO:
CIEN AlOS DE LUCHA POLITICA 472-80 (1979) [hereinafter 4 BOTHWELL GONZALEZ].
The underlying idea was not new. It had been elaborated by other pro-statehood
ideologues in the 1930s and 1940s. See EDGARDO MEL2NDEZ, PUERTO RIco's
STATEHOOD MOVEMENT 75-76, 130 (1988).
100. See CARLOS ROMERO BARCEL6, LA ESTADIDAD Es PARA LOS POBRES 13
(1976); Carlos Remero Barcel6, Puerto Rico, U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood, 59
FOREIGN AFF. 60, 64, 65, 69, 72, 78 (1980).
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scite bill guarantee that Spanish would be an official language of a
State of Puerto Rico, as well as that English would not be imposed
on that State. l0 ' Thereafter, however, he acquiesced to the view
that the plebiscite bill not address the question of language.
10 2
Since that time, the statehood movement has not requested that
Congress provide any written assurance concerning the role of
Spanish in a State of Puerto Rico. In fact, during consideration of
House Bill 856, Mr. Romero opposed an amendment that would
have made Spanish the official language of Puerto Rico, arguing-
incorrectly-that persons currently have the right to have "their
business with [the Puerto Rican] government transacted in either
Spanish or English."'103 Additionally, Mr. Romero has consistently
downplayed the linguistic and cultural differences between Puerto
Rico and the United States. 104 Finally, he recently abandoned all
attempts to defend another long-standing claim of the statehood
movement: the right of a State of Puerto Rico to retain after
statehood the international Olympic personality that Puerto Rico
currently enjoys. 10 5
101. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 364-72.
102. See MEL9NDEZ, supra note 33, at 270-71.
103. 144 CONG. REC. H803 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998).
104. See supra note 83; see also 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 141, 368.
105. During the House debate on H.R. 856, Mr. Romero rose in opposition to an
amendment offered by Mr. Guti~rrez that would have allowed a State of Puerto
Rico to retain its Olympic personality. After claiming that such a decision would
be in the hands of the International Olympic Committee, which could decide to
continue recognizing Puerto Rico, Mr. Romero went on to argue that even if that
did not occur, statehood was of paramount importance:
However, whether or not we participate in the Olympic games every 4
years for 2 weeks cannot be put in the same table of consideration as the
economic welfare of the people of Puerto Rico and the political equality of
the people of Puerto Rico; the right to vote, the right to representation and
the right to participate in a democratic system. We believe in democracy.
We cannot put that aside in order to participate in the games every 4
years for 2 weeks. That is not in the same table of consideration.
144 CONG. REC. H830 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998). He had sounded that same note on
national television on the eve of the House debate. Appearing in the CNN pro-
gram Crossfire on the evening of March 2, 1998, co-host Pat Buchanan asked Mr.
Romero: "Are you willing to give up your Olympic team, the Spanish languageT'
Crossfire, Transcript no. 98030200V20 (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1998).
He responded:
For equality, let us vote on that. For equality, for equal participation, for
equal rights, for the right to vote and the right to representation, you
cannot put us at the same status. You can't put it at the same level. At
the same, participation in the Olympic Games every four years for two
weeks is not on the same level with the right to vote and the right to par-
ticipate.
Id. Mr. Romero subsequently asserted that statehood would not mean having to
give up the Spanish language, but did not make that argument extensive to Olym-
pic participation. See id.
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Governor Rossell6 also espoused the nonnegotiability rheto-
ric. 106 He soon followed Mr. Romero in toning down that rhetoric.
In a speech on April 8, 1991, Dr. Rossell6 suggested that "the term
'jibaro statehood' should be put aside in future status discus-
sions."'107 One week after that statement, he explained his rea-
soning: "statehood is the same for all states; there is no such thing
as a different statehood and, therefore, what has been termed
jibaro statehood is simply classic statehood with some individual
elements that a state has."'0
8
Similarly, former pro-statehood Senate President Roberto
Rexach Benitez stated in 1993:
Our Spanish language has never been in danger; better yet, as
a consequence of the development of our educational system
during the last ninety years, it is of higher quality and rich-
ness than the one we spoke at the beginning of the century. I
assure you that in Puerto Rico we will continue speaking
Spanish for centuries and centuries.
Our culture is irreducible; non-renounceable. The problem is
different. During these last years the government of Mr.
Hernindez Col6n has tried to put obstacles on the road to
statehood. To legislate Spanish as the only official language
was a gesture of rejection toward Washington, it was a pro-
independence fit.
I believe that it is useless to legislate on language because it
is clear that Puerto Rico has a different culture from the rest
of the United States. But that is not a problem for us to re-
solve; it is a problem for the Americans themselves to resolve.
For a consideration and rejection of the statehood leaders' claim that a State
of Puerto Rico could retain its Olympic franchise, see Rafil Serrano Geyls & Carlos
Gorrin Peralta, Puerto Rico y la Estadidad: Problemas Constitucionales, 41 REV.
COL. AB. P.R. 1 (1980). Professors Serrano Geyls and Gorrin Peralta cogently ar-
gue that not only is it improbable that the International Olympic Committee
would approve such a course of action, but that Congress would have to amend the
federal statute that grants the United States Olympic Committee exclusive juris-
diction over all matters pertaining to participation of the United States in the
Olympic and Pan-American Games. See id. For the current version of that stat-
ute, see Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (codified as 36
U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1988)).
That amendment was precisely what Mr. Gutibrrez proposed and Mr. Romero
opposed. The amendment would have read: "Notwithstanding the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978, Puerto Rico retains its separate Olympic Committee and ability
to compete under its own flag and national anthem in international athletic com-
petitions, even against the United States." 144 CONG. REC. H829 (daily ed. Mar. 4,
1998).
106. See, e.g., Pedro J. Rossell6, Ponencia del Dr. Pedro J. Rossell6, in CARMELO
DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN
PUERTO RICO 395-96 (1994) ("Spanish is not negotiable under any circumstance or
political change.") (author's translation).




It is they who must decide whether in the political community
of the United States there is room for a state that is different
culturally and linguistically. 0 9
I fully agree with Senator Rexach Benitez that Puerto Rican
statehood would pose a serious problem for the United States, but
only if there is certainty that Puerto Rico will, after statehood, re-
tain forever its separate linguistic and cultural identity. I have
more reservations than he appears to have concerning the latter
hypothesis.
II. Gazing at the Crystal Ball: The "Official" Status of
English Under Statehood
A long-standing debate in Puerto Rico centers on the role that
English would play under statehood, if Puerto Rico were ever ad-
mitted as a state of the United States. Several factors have fig-
ured prominently in that debate: the opinions of pro-statehood
Puerto Ricans; the requirements of International Law; and the
views of members of Congress. Let me briefly consider each of
these factors.
A. English and Puerto Rican Statehood: The Views of Pro-
Statehood Puerto Ricans
As just stated, among supporters of statehood, the prevailing
view is that joining the Union will not have a significant impact on
the current use of Spanish as the language of government, instruc-
tion and common understanding in Puerto Rico. The leaders of the
statehood movement have claimed for decades that statehood will
not affect Puerto Rico's culture, language or way of life." 0 That
view deserves critical attention, lest any voter-let alone hundreds
of thousands of them-be deceived by it, were it to prove unjusti-
fied. That view also deserves the attention of the United States
electorate and of its representatives in Congress, lest they be
deemed to have embraced it tacitly through their silence.
B. Statehood and the Requirements of International Law
The two latest Congressional efforts to steer a solution to the
Puerto Rican status question-those of 1989-1991 and 1996-1998-
have recognized Puerto Rico's right to self-determination under in-
ternational law."' That is a welcome development. For too long
109. Delgado Cintrdn, supra note 35, at 42 (author's translation).
110. See supra notes 96-109.
111. See S. 712, 101st Cong. (1990), as preliminarily approved by the Senate
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the United States claimed that the Puerto Rican question was a
domestic affair, off-limits to the world community. 112
Under any reasonable definition, Puerto Rico is a nation,
with a separate culture, a distinct personality and a characteristic
language." 3 That is precisely why United Nations' Resolutions
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on September 6, 1990, S. REP No.
101-120 (1990), (providing in section 1(1): "IThe United States of America recog-
nizes the principle of self-determination and other applicable principles of interna-
tional law with respect to Puerto Rico."); see also H.R. 856, 105th Cong. (1998).
This latter bill refers to this subject several times: (1) it mentions in section 2(6)
the international legal standards for the attainment of self-government, as set in
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); (2) it recognizes in sections 2(8)-(9) that the
United States has never formally consulted Puerto Rico regarding its ultimate po-
litical status; and (3) it announces in section 3(a) the federal commitment to en-
courage attainment of a permanent political status by the Puerto Rican people.
112. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 136-40. A collection of reso-
lutions on Puerto Rico by the United Nations Decolonization Committee is found
in 2 Jos6 Julidn Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Rico, in CONSTITUTIONS OF DE-
PENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES 203-33 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1991)
[hereinafter 2 Alvarez GonzAlez, Puerto Rico]. For other views on that process, see
LOIDA FIGUEROA, EL CASO DE PUERTO RICO A NIVEL INTERNACIONAL (1979);
CARMEN GAUTIER MAYORAL & MARIA DEL PILAR ARGUELLES, PUERTO RICO Y LA
ONU (1978); Jos6 Axtmayer, Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Constitutive
Process of the United Nations: A General Analysis and the Case Study of Puerto
Rico, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 211 (1976); Humberto Garcia Muhiz, Puerto Rico and
the United States: The United Nations Role 1953-1975, 53 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1
(1984); Carlos Rivera Lugo, Puerto Rico ante la ONU (1976-1983): Autodeter-
minacidn y Transferencia de Poderes, 53 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 267 (1984).
113. See Jos6 Julina Alvarez Gonzdlez, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional
Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. LEGIS. 309,
313 n.14 (1990) [hereinafter Alvarez Gonzflez, Empire] citing F. HINSLEY,
NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 22 (1973) (nationality means
"that sense or sentiment of being a nation ethnically, culturally or linguistically
which undoubtedly can exist before the political loyalty is nationalized"); Patrica
McGarvey-Rosendahl, A New Approach to Dual Nationality, 8 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
305, 305-06 (1986) ("[N]ationality refers to the bonds an individual has with those
with whom he shares a common heritage, because nations can exist without sover-
eignty."); see also Lisa Napoli, The Puerto Rican Independentistas: Combatants in
the Fight for Self-Determination and the Right to Prisoner of War Status, 4
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 131, 144 (1996) ('Puerto Rico has a racial, religious,
linguistic, and territorial identity distinguishable from that of the metropole.").
At least two sitting Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico have argued
recently that Puerto Rico is a nation. See De Paz Lisk v. Aponte Roque, 124 D.P.R.
472, 507 (1989) (Negr6n Garcia, J., dissenting); Ramirez de Ferrer v. Mari BrAs, 97
J.T.S. 134, 208 (Herndndez Denton, J., concurring).
On the other hand, while persuasively arguing that the Quebec situation is
not comparable to that of Hispanic communities throughout the 50 States, a recent
article unwittingly, but powerfully underscores the parallelism between the cases
of Quebec and Puerto Rico. See Deborah E. Richardson, Recent Development, The
Quebec Independence Vote and its Implications for English Language Legislation,
26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521 (1997).
French-Canadians were not immigrants, but were a founding race, guar-
anteed equal status from the beginning. Immigrants to the United States,
on the other hand, expect to assimilate into American culture and accept
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1514 (XV) 1 14 and 1541 (XV)115 apply to the Puerto Rican people in
the first place. 116 According to the President of the Puerto Rican
Independence Party, the principal pro-independence political party
in Puerto Rico:
PUERTO RICO IS A NATION
Puerto Rico's heart is not American. It is Puerto Rican. The
national sentiment of Puerto Ricans is entirely devoted to our
patria, as we call our homeland in Spanish, our language. We
are Puerto Ricans in the same way that Mexicans are Mexi-
cans and Japanese are Japanese. For us, "we the people"
means we Puerto Ricans. Only through the distorted prism of
Coca-colonization would any observer confuse U.S. cultural
influence in Puerto Rico with inclusion in the melting pot that
has kept the United States e pluribus unum. Puerto Ricans
that knowledge of English is an economic necessity. Furthermore, His-
panics in the United States lack the cohesiveness to pose a serious seces-
sionist threat, whereas the French of Quebec share a cultural, political
and linguistic history which ultimately gave rise to their secessionist vote.
Id. at 534; see infra notes 321-357 and accompanying text.
114. U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); see 2 Alvarez
GonzAlez, Puerto Rico, supra note 112, at 191-92. Resolution 1514 (XV), entitled
"Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,"
declares that colonialism is a denial of fundamental human rights, an act contrary
to the Charter of the United Nations; recognizes that all peoples have the right to
self-determination and independence; calls for the end to all repressive measures
against dependent peoples and for respect for their territorial integrity; and urges
that immediate steps be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of all territo-
ries which have not yet attained independence. See id.
115. G.A. Res 1514 (XV), supra note 111; see 2 Alvarez Gonzdlez, Puerto Rico,
supra note 112, at 193-96. Resolution 1541 (XV) establishes a set of principles to
determine whether member States must, pursuant to article 73(e) of the Charter,
transmit certain information concerning non self-governing territories under their
administration. That obligation ceases whenever a territory attains one of three
political conditions which reflect a full measure of self-government. See infra
notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
116. For obvious reasons, those resolutions are not applicable to nation-states,
which have attained a full measure of self-government, but to the peoples of incho-
ate nation-states, which have not.
A recognition by Congress of the international law of self-determination, as
expressed in Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV), and its assumption of obligations
under such resolutions, as S. 712 and H.R. 856 would have entailed, would moot
the much discussed question concerning whether General Assembly resolutions
are international law or merely "recommendations" by international bodies. See
Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952) (holding that UN charter provi-
sions did not supersede domestic legislation); see also Dispute between Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Govern-
ment of the Lybian Arab Republic, 17 INT. LEG. MAT. 1 at 83-91 (1978), partially
reproduced in HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS -
MATERIALS AND TEXT 491-96 (4th ed. 1994). In any event, as the 1977 Texaco v.
Lybia arbitral award recognizes, id. at 87, the general acceptance of certain Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions may signify that such resolutions embody customary
international law. That is precisely the case of Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV), as
the International Court of Justice proclaimed in 1975. See generally Western Sa-
hara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12.
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are U.S. citizens, but they are not Americans. Although
Puerto Rico is not a politically independent nation, it is no less
distinguishable from the United States than the non-
independent Palestinian nation is from Israel.117
Resident Commissioner Romero recently conceded on the
floor of the House that Puerto Rico may be a nation from a socio-
logical, but not from a legal standpoint.118 That was a telling ad-
mission. The concept of nationality is cultural and sociological. 19
117. Ruben Berrios Martinez, Puerto Rico's Decolonization, 76 FOREIGN AFF.
Nov./Dec. 1997, at 102-03.
118. His complete statement also deserves a full quote:
MR. ROMERo-BARCELA: Mr. Chairman, we have been hearing about the
nation of Puerto Rico, and once again I repeat, Puerto Rico in geopolitical
terms is not a nation. One might consider Puerto Rico a nation in socio-
logical terms, but not in geopolitical position.
We are a community. What the gentleman from Illinois and the gentle-
woman from New York are trying to do here is trying to confuse the issue
by saying Puerto Rico is a nation, a different nation; therefore we have to
treat it differently from what we treat all the other U.S. citizens. But the
issue before us is clear. The issue before us is, are we going to allow self-
determination or not to the U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico.
144 CONG. REC. H829 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998) (emphasis added).
Mr. Romero's concept of "community" is curious. No other "community" in the
United States has an international legal right to self-determination, except, per-
haps, the original inhabitants of the several states and territories. See, e.g., Cath-
erine J. lorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-DeterminationL" Challenging State Sov-
ereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. IN'L L. 199 (1992); Lisa Cami Oshiro, Recognizing Na
Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 65, 79 (1995)
("Although the United States has invoked the principle of self-determination many
times in pursuit of its own goals... the United States has a poor history of allow-
ing peoples within its territories to invoke the principle against itself."); Raidza
Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm,
16 YALE J. INV'L L. 127, 156 (1991) ("The proliferation of domestic and interna-
tional declarations, the publication of various studies, the creation of international
bodies dealing exclusively with indigenous issues, and the attention given by
states to indigenous concerns are all evidence of the crystallization of a norm pro-
tecting indigenous rights.").
For a suggestion of several other parallelisms between the situation of Puerto
Rico and that of Native Americans, see Alvarez Gonzfilez, Empire, supra note 113,
at 313 n.14. Another such parallelism concerns the subject of language. The
movement to educate Native Americans exclusively in English, see for example,
Michael DiChiara, A Modern Day Myth The Necessity of English as the Official
Language, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 103 (1997), roughly coincided with in-
struction in English in Puerto Rican public schools. See supra note 57.
For a consideration of the right of self-determination of another relevant
community, native Hawaiians, see S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People
and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing
Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 314-19 (1994) (addressing the United States' annexa-
tion of Hawaii); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Sense of Justice and the Justice of
Sense: Native Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Second "Trial of the Century," 71
WASH. L. REV. 379, 379-81 (1996) (addressing the struggle for sovereignty by na-
tive Hawaiian people).
119. See RAFAEL GARZARO, DICCIONARIO DE POLITICA 245 (1977) ("Nationality is
a psycho-sociological category.") (author's translation); see also BENEDICT AN-
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Its legal relevance ensues when law ascribes some consequence to
that concept. And that is precisely what the international law of
self-determination does.
To recognize that what is at stake is the right of self-
determination under International Law has serious repercussions.
The Young bill,120 recognizes that the relevant principles of Inter-
national Law are found in United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 1541 (XV). 12 1 One of the three solutions to a colonial
problem which that resolution accepts is integration into another
nation-state. 122 But that Resolution also requires that integration
take place without any distinction or discrimination concerning
fundamental rights, 123 and only after the subject territory has
DERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 26 (1991) ("The idea of a sociological organism moving calendarically
through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation,
which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) his-
tory."); ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 62-68 (1966) ("[P]eople who speak an origi-
nal language are nations, and . . . nations must speak an original language.");
HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND
10-13 (1944) ('Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of con-
sciousness."); LOUIS L. SNYDER, THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM 2 (1964)
("Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people liv-
ing in a well defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a
literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, being at-
tached to common traditions, and, in some cases, having a common religion.");
Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: Historical Development, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 240 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937)
(describing a nationality as cultural group of people who speak a common language
or closely related dialects and who possess a community of historical traditions,
including religious, territorial, political, military, economic, artistic, and intellec-
tual).
Mr. Gutifrrez also brought this message to the House of Representatives in
the March 4, 1998 session:
I want people to understand. It did not happen in Alaska and it did not
happen in Hawaii and it did not happen in Texas. Why can we bring up
all these issues, and it happened in Puerto Rico, of language and culture?
And the resident commissioner said it was not geopolitical. Okay. But he
said it was sociological. That is pretty incredible. That is an admission
here. Sociological nationality. Let us examine what that means. That
means it is a separate and distinct people.
144 CONG. REC. H830 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998).
120. H.R. 856, 105th Cong. (1998).
121. See id., § 2(6), citing G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 111.
122. See G.A. Res 1541 (XV), supra note 111, at Principles VI(c), VIII & IX. The
other internationally accepted solutions are full independence and free association
to another nation-state. See id. at Principles VI(a) & (b); 2 Alvarez Gonzhlez,
Puerto Rico, supra note 112, at 194-95.
123. See G.A. 1541 (XV), supra note 111, at Principle VIII. And the Charter of
the United Nations denounces discrimination on the basis of language at least four
times. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 13(b), 55(c) and. 76(c). Other sources of inter-
national law that protect linguistic rights are article 2 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (1948), article 2(2)
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966,
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"attained an advanced stage of self-government,"' 124 and after its
people act in an "informed and democratic process,"125 "with full
knowledge of the change in their status."'
126
C. Statehood, International Law and Congress: An Exercise
in Avoidance
The statehood option, as framed in the two recent Congres-
sional processes concerning the status of Puerto Rico, does not
comply with the principles of International Law to which Congress
has adhered. The 1989-1991 process did not comply with those
principles by studied silence; the 1996-1998 process, by insufficient
specifity.
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966), and articles 2(1), 14, 24(1), 26, and 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). See gen-
erally Ramsey Clark, A Legal Opinion on International Law, Language and the
Future of French Speaking Canada, in CARMELO DELGADO CINTRON, EL DEBATE
LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO Rico 193-204 (1994); Joseph
P. Gromacki, The Protection of Language Rights in International Human Rights
Law: A Proposed Draft Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 515
(1992).
While dealing with the case of Quebec, former Attorney General Clark had
this to say regarding Puerto Rico:
Remember Puerto Rico which, though dominated by the United States for
nearly a century, saturated with its culture and products, taught in its
English language schools for generations, has defied foreign political, eco-
nomic and cultural intervention and revived its cultural heritage, its
Spanish language and its own rich literature, art and music. Among the
reasons for this success must be the vitality of its people, its remote island
location, its affirmative legislation to protect the Spanish language and its
intense psychological commitment shared throughout Latin America to its
own identity in the shadow of its giant northern neighbor.
Clark, supra, at 201-02.
124. G.A. 1541 (XV), supra note 111, at Principle IX(a).
125. Id.
126. Id. at Principle IX(b).
The full text of Principle IX, concerning integration as a measure of self-
government, reads:
Integration should have come about in the following circumstances:
(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of
self-government with free political institutions so that its peoples would
have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and
democratic processes;
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of
the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and demo-
cratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suf-
frage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise
these processes.
Id. at Principle IX.
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1. The 1989-1991 Process: The Vice of Silence
At the inception of the 1989-1991 process, statehood advo-
cates requested that the plebiscite bill expressly acknowledge that
Spanish would be an official language of a State of Puerto Rico. 127
The then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, 128 Senator J. Bennett Johnston, 29 rejected that pro-
posal, claiming that it was better to "just be silent on the question,
just leave it out altogether."'130 On such an important issue for the
overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans, however, silence is unac-
ceptable. Mr. Johnston argued that insistence on posing the lan-
guage issue could lead federal legislators to conclude that Puerto
Rico is too distinct and separate to join the Union.131 In this he
was surely right, which is precisely why silence on that issue,
rather than golden, would be fraudulent. 132
The language issue was clearly one of the main factors which
derailed that first process. 133 After initial approval of Senate Bill
712 in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
the Senate Finance Committee conducted its own set of hearings
which revealed widespread preoccupation with the economic as-
pects of the bill, particularly as concerned the transition to state-
hood. 134 Ultimately, the plebiscite proposal did not survive the
mark-up in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
127. See S. 712, 101st Cong., tit. II, § 17 (1989). That request complied with the
command of the 1984 resolutions of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text.
128. That committee is the Senate committee with primary jurisdiction over
Puerto Rican affairs, since it is the successor to the former Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs. See Alvarez Gonzflez, Empire, supra note 113, at 310-11 n.3.
129. Mr. Johnston, a Democrat, was the senior Senator from Louisiana until he
chose not to run again in 1992. In late 1996 he became a lobbyist for the statehood
cause. See Leonor Mulero, De Cabildero Johnston, EL NUEVO DIA, Mar. 7, 1997, at
18 [hereinafter Mulero, Johnston] Leonor Mulero, Lider la Isla en Gastos de Ca-
bildeo en el Congreso, EL NUEVO DIA, Apr. 8, 1997, at 12; Leonor Mulero, Millon-
ario el Cabildeo por la Estadidad, EL NUEVO DfA, Oct. 29, 1997, at 17; Magdalys
Rodriguez, Paga Bien la Experiencia, EL NUEVO DIA, Apr. 19, 1997, at 7; Ms.
Wanda Rubianes, then Director of the Puerto Rico Administration for Federal Af-
fairs (PRAFA), confirmed that Johnston & Associates, Mr. Johnston's firm, was
then receiving a monthly fee of $20,000 for its services. See Mulero, Johnston, su-
pra.
130. 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 370.
131. See id. at 371. For Mr. Johnston's further views concerning this subject,
see id. at 364-72; 388-92; 779-80.
132. See Josb Juliin Alvarez Gonzfilez, Don't Gamble with Puerto Rico's Ver-
nacular, SAN JUAN STAR, July 14, 1989, at 14 [hereinafter, Alvarez Gonzdlez, Ver-
nacular].
133. See MELUNDEZ, supra note 33, at 274.
134. See Puerto Rico's Political Status: Hearings on S. 712 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 101st Cong. (1989).
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sources itself.135
This turn of events was due to the retirement in 1990 of the
Committee's ranking minority member, Senator James McClure
(R-ID). His replacement, Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), proved
to be an outspoken foe of Senate Bill 244, the modified successor
bill to Senate Bill 712,136 particularly because of his opposition to
Puerto Rican statehood. 137 As Professor Edgardo Mel6ndez con-
vincingly argues, it was opposition to statehood, particularly be-
cause of the linguistic and cultural issues which killed the 1989-
1991 Senate process.1 38 It was after that defeat that Puerto Rican
statehood leaders began to tone down the jibaro statehood rheto-
ric.139
2. The 1996-1998 Process: The Vice of Imprecision
In the 1996-1998 process, key members forced the House to
address the language issue. The main player was Representative
Gerald Solomon (R-NY), Chairman of the Rules Committee and a
prime supporter of the official English movement. In 1996 Mr.
Solomon had required, as the price that the Young Bill would need
to pay to sail through his committee, that it include a provision
making English the language of instruction in the public school
system of a State of Puerto Rico. Resident Commissioner Romero
opposed this condition and prevailed upon Representative Young
to withdraw the bill from consideration. 140 In 1998, Mr. Solomon
agreed to let the bill go to the floor, but required an open debate
where he and others could present amendments on language and
135. See Bill McAllister, Puerto Rico Referendum Killed, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1991, at A6; Harry Turner, Plebiscite Bill Shot Down, SAN JUAN STAR, Feb. 28,
1991, at 1.
136. See S. 244, 102d Cong. (1991).
137. See supra note 135; see also Statehood Foes Surface: Outcome Uncertain for
P.R. Plebiscite Bill, SAN JUAN STAR, Feb. 21, 1991, at 1. See generally MEL9NDEZ,
supra note 33, at 261-62.
138. See MEL]NDEZ, supra note 33, at 274 (quoting statements of Sens. Wallop,
Nickles (R-OK) and Conrad (D-ND)); see also 2 JUAN M. GARcIA PASSALACQUA &
CARLOS RIVERA LuGo, PUERTO Rico Y LOS ETADOS UNIDOS: EL PROCESO DE
CONSULTA Y NEGOCIACION DE 1989 Y 1990 at 281-90, 379 (1991); Rafael Hernfndez
Col6n, Reflexiones sobre la Autodeterninacidn Puertorriquefla (1989-1991), 65 REV.
JUR. U.P.R. 431 (1996); McAllister, supra note 135.
139. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
140. See Robert Friedman, Young Finally Shepherds Status Bill to House Floor,
SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 4, 1998, at 4; Leonor Mulero, Con Piel de Camale6n el Plan
Young, EL NuEvo DIA, Mar. 2, 1998, at 5; Leonor Mulero, Encendida la Discordia
Congresional, EL NUEVO DIA, Feb. 26, 1998, at 4; Leonor Mulero, Sin Reversa Pese
al Inglds Exclusivo, EL NuEvo DIA, Feb. 27, 1998, at 8; Gerardo Reyes, Possibility




on other issues.' 4 ' While his amendment to make English the offi-
cial language of all government in the United States was defeated,
a substitute amendment, sponsored by Representatives Dan Bur-
ton (R-IN), Bill McCollum (R-FL), George Miller (D-CA), ranking
member of the House Resources Committee, and Mr. Young, was
approved instead. 142
The Young bill, as approved by the House, devotes three pro-
visions to language. First, section 3(b) states that in the event of
statehood, "the official English language requirements of the Fed-
eral Government shall apply to Puerto Rico in the same manner
and to the same extent as throughout the United States."143 That
statement, which would be on the plebiscite ballot,'" is striking
since currently there are no federal official language requirements
applicable to state governments. 45 Yet, that statement is quite
significant. It is no coincidence that in 1996 this same House ap-
proved a bill to make English the official language of the federal
government. 146 Some of the key proponents of the Young bill voted
in favor of that measure. 47 Second, section 3(c) states that "[i]t is
141. See Friedman, supra note 140, at 4; Leonor Mulero, En Su Hora Decisiva el
Plan Young, EL NUEVO DIA, Mar. 4, 1998, at 4.
142. See Robert Friedman, Officials: Teaching in English Not a Mandate, SAN
JUAN STAR, Mar. 7, 1998, at 5; Robert Friedman, Young Bill Passes 209 to 208,
SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 5, 1998, at 5; Leonor Mulero, Por Viraz6n la Victoria, EL
NUEVO DIA, Mar. 5, 1998, at 4.
143. H.R. 856, 105th Cong. § 3(b) (1998).
144. See id. § 4(a)(C)(7). The statement on the ballot on this subject would be:
"Official English language requirements of the Federal Government apply in
Puerto Rico to the same extent as Federal law requires throughout the United
States." Id.
145. The juridical situation concerning the federal government is not much dif-
ferent:
[N]owhere in the U.S. Constitution is English privileged over other lan-
guages, and while a few subsequent federal laws require the use of Eng-
lish for special, limited purposes--air traffic control, product labels,
warnings, official notices, service on federal juries, and naturalization of
immigrants--no law establishes English as the language of the land.
BARON, supra note 59, at 1 (citation omitted).
146. See The English Language Empowerment Act of 1996, H.R. 123, 104th
Cong. (1996) approved by the House on August 1, 1996 by a vote of 259-156. 142
CONG. REC. H9771-72 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996). It was again filed on January 7,
1997, after the Senate did not act in 1996. See H.R. 123, 105th Cong. (1997). See
generally Chiu, supra note 90.
147. That is the case, for example, of Rep. Young himself, as well as of Reps.
Burton and McCollum. All three again cosponsored a similar measure in 1997.
See H.R. 123, 104th Cong. (1997). This is the second time that key players in a
process geared to the self-determination of Puerto Rico happen to be supporters of
the official English campaign. That was also the case with Sens. Johnston and
McClure, the main figures behind the 1989-1991 process. See Alvarez Gonzilez,
Empire, supra note 113, at 347-48 n.157.
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in the best interest of the [United States] for Puerto Rico to pro-
mote the teaching of English as the language of opportunity and
empowerment in the United States in order to enable students in
public schools to achieve English language proficiency by the age
of 10."'14 Lastly, section four requires that in the event of a vote
for statehood, the President shall prepare for Congress's approval
a transition plan. 149 That plan, the bill states, "shall . . . include
proposals and incentives... including teaching in English in pub-
lic schools [and] promote the use of English by the United States
citizens in Puerto Rico in order to ensure ... efficiency in the con-
duct and coordination of the official business activities of the Fed-
eral and State Governments."'150
It appears that the House is suggesting that Spanish cannot
be the language of instruction in a State of Puerto Rico,151 and that
efficient coordination requires that Spanish not be the language of
government in Puerto Rico, as it currently is and has been for 500
years. If that is the intent of Congress, it should appear clearly on
the ballot in order to comply with International Law and to avoid
voter confusion. 52
148. H.R. 856 § 3(c) (emphasis added). This promise of a better future through
English, however, is under scrutiny:
[R]esearchers are now finding that the large numbers of Hispanics who
have become monolingual English speakers are not reaping the promised
benefits of assimilation. Their competence in English does not readily
translate into increased salaries and greater job opportunities: apparently
the discrimination against American Hispanics is deeper than language
alone.
BARON, supra note 59, at 23; see also id. at 194, quoting Joshua Fishman, "English
Only": Its Ghosts, Myths and Dangers, 74 INT'L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 125, 131 (1988)
('Mastery of English is almost as inoperative with respect to Hispanic social mo-
bility as it is with respect to Black social mobility.").
149. See H.R. 856 § 4(b)(1)(A), (C).
150. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(C)(i) & (ii)(I) (emphasis added).
151. A Puerto Rican commentator agrees about the importance of the "in Eng-
lish" provision on public school classes. See Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, 'English-
now' Is Key Effect of House Vote, SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 15, 1998, at V2. He ar-
gues--correctly-that this requirement would operate even before statehood, as
soon as the transition plan is approved by Congress, after a first vote for state-
hood. See id. Mr. Garcia Passalacqua's column contains references to messages
sent to House members by the sponsors of the Burton-McCollum-Miller-Young
substitute amendment, as well as to Mr. Burton's remarks on the floor, which
stressed that the objective was to make English the language of instruction in
Puerto Rican public schools long before statehood is granted. See id.
152. Controversy over the meaning of this language arose immediately. See id.
(quoting statements denying the literal thrust of the "in English" provision); see
also Burton Add-on Stirs English-Only Controversy, SAN JUAN STAR, Mar. 11,
1998, at 6; Friedman, supra note 142, at 5.
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III. Language Requirements and the Federal Constitution
The Constitution of the United States is silent concerning a
language of government, either federal or state. 153 It is undeni-
able, however, that English is the de facto national language of the
United States, as stated in several court decisions,1 54 and as
claimed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, while venting his frustra-
tion in 1937 over the lack of success of English in Puerto Rico.1
55
In the last two decades a movement has been afloat, both at the
federal and state levels, to formally make English the official lan-
guage of government throughout the United States. At the federal
level, various constitutional amendments and statutes have been
proposed to either make English the language of the federal gov-
ernment, or to proclaim its official character both for the federal
and state governments. Such efforts began in 1981 and have not
abated, although none of the constitutional amendment proposals
has yet been approved by any Congressional committee. 56
It has been suggested that the official English campaign will
never succeed at the federal level. 157 I do not find any evidence
that such movement is dying; quite the contrary seems to be the
153. See BARON, supra note 59, at 1.
154. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Frontera v. Sindell,
522 F.2d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1975).
155. See 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEvELT 160-61 (1941); see
also Baron, supra note 59, at 177 ("mhe English language continues to function as
the language of the laws, the courts, the schools, and the business community in
the United States."); Arnold Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Dis-
crimination, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 7, 50 (1969) ("[The] implicit premise in Ameri-
can law is that English is the official language of the United States.").
156. Concerning proposed constitutional amendments, see for example, H.R.J.
Res. 109, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 171, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 81,
102d Cong. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong. (1989); S.J. Res. 13, 100th Cong.,
(1987); H.R.J. Res. 96, 99th Cong. (1985); S.J. Res. 20, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R.J.
Res. 169, 98th Cong. (1983); S.J. Res. 167, 98th Cong. (1983); S.J. Res. 72, 97th
Cong. (1981).
Typical of these proposed amendments is H.R.J. Res. 37, 105th Cong. (1997),
introduced by Rep. Doolittle on February 4, 1997. It would provide:
Section 1. The English language shall be the official language of the
United States. As the official language, the English language shall be
used for all public acts including every order, resolution, vote or election,
and for all records and judicial proceedings of the Government of the
United States and the governments of the several States.
Section 2. The Congress and the States shall enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
Id.
Concerning proposed statutes, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., BILL PiATT, LONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 28-29 (1990); BARON, supra note 59, at 191.
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case, as even opponents of that movement admit.158 The rapid in-
crease in popular support for a federal official language law is il-
lustrated by two National Election Studies in 1990 and 1992.159
Persons polled were asked: "Do you favor a law making English
the official language of the United States, meaning government
business would be conducted in English only, or do you oppose
such a law?"' 60 Responses in the affirmative were 54.4% in 1990
and 64.5% only two years later.'61
On the other hand, the success of the official English drive at
the state level has been swift and dramatic. In 1981, only two
states-Nebraska (1920) and Illinois (1923)-had official language
laws. 162 By 1998, English was an official language of at least
twenty-two states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wyoming. 163 Other states are weighing similar measures, 164 while
158. See, e.g., Michele Arington, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The
Battle in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 325-29
(1991); DiChiara, supra note 118, at 101 ("Recently, the campaign to make English
the official language of the United States (U.S.) has been gaining momentum.");
Rachel F. Moran, Irritation and Intrigue: The Intricacies of Language Rights and
Language Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 790, 791 (1991) (discussing success of English-
only movements at the state and local level); Michael A- T. Pagni, The Constitu-
tionality of English-Only Provisions in the Public Employee Speech Arena An Ex-
amination of Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
247, 248-49 (1996); Richardson, supra note 113, at 524.
159. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 178-80.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See Arington, supra note 158, at 325-26 & n.7. Those two laws were a
product of the nativist era following World War I. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6,
at 33-62 (Nebraska) and 65-69 (Illinois).
163. See ALA. CONST. amend. 509; ARIZ CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1-4; ARK- CODE
ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie 1996). The governor who signed this statute was Bill Clin-
ton. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 222. In the 1992 Presidential campaign he
claimed that he should have vetoed it, but that it was passed with a veto-proof
majority. See id. As Tatalovich rejoins, that is not a particularly principled stand.
See id; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; FLA. CONST. art. II, §
9; GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (1998); HAw. CONST. art. XV, § 4; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
460/20 (West 1993); IND. CODE § 1-2-10-1 (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2.013 (Michie 1996); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510
(1997); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-C:1 (Supp. 1998); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §
1-1-696 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-27-20 to 1-27-26
(Michie Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1- 42
(Michie 1998); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1997). Some commentators in-
clude Louisiana as a twenty-third state. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 90, at 239
(citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:52 (West 1987)). That is inexact. That statute is
not a general declaration of the official status of English, but is limited to govern-
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still others have English language requisites for certain public
functions. 165
Moreover, while academics have been accused of dealing ex-
haustively with matters of no practical significance, 166 the fact that
thousands of pages have been published in the last decade alone
on the alleged unconstitutionality of official English proposals,
both at the federal and state levels, 67 better reflects another
ment advertisements: "It is sufficient in all the parishes of the state to publish
advertisements, judicial or otherwise, notices, and publications required by law, in
the English language only." Id. Other analogous Louisiana statutes are found in
LA. REV. STAT. ANN..§§ 43:201-03 (West Supp. 1999), § 43:204 (West 1982), §
47:2181 (West Supp. 1999).
164. According to a 1996 student note, 12 states had similar bills then pending
in the legislature. See Pagni, supra note 158, at 248 & n.4.
165. At least 15 additional states, although lacking an official English language
statute, require English for certain governmental transactions. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 21.09.310 (Michie 1998) (English translations of documents of alien insurers);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-18 (West Supp. 1998) (English translations for regis-
trations of securities); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6210 (Supp. 1998) (all documents
of fraternal benefit societies must be filed in English); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 49.90,
490A.120 (West Supp. 1999) (all documents of limited liability companies must be
filed in English); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 457.62, 457.683 (West 1989)
(documents of French-language fraternal societies and alien insurers must be filed
in English); id. § 730.404 (West 1993) (jurors must speak English); MINN. STAT. §
331A.02 (1998) (public notices must be published in English language newspapers
or in English in grandfathered foreign language newspapers); id. § 546.44 (1998)
(English translation of court testimony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.10 (West 1996)
(English translation of foreign birth records); id. §§ 35:1-2 to 1-2.2 (official adver-
tisements must be published in English language newspapers)); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-16-4, 72-16-14, 72-17-4, 72-17-14, 72-19-4, 72-19-14 (Michie 1997), §§ 74-10-4,
74-10-22 (Michie 1993) (certain official advertisements must be published in Eng-
lish language newspapers); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 5711-q (McKinney 1979)
(policemen must speak English); OR. REV. STAT. § 726.280 (1998) (all entries in the
register of pawnbrokers shall be made in the English language); R.I GEN. LAWS §
17-11-12 (1996) (election officials shall be able to read the Constitution of the state
in the English language); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN § 61.031 (West 1986) (election offi-
cials must communicate in English, except when the voter cannot); W. VA. CODE §
31A-8F-9(a)(2) (1996) (foreign banks must file English translations of its charter);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.30(2)(c) (West Supp. 1998) (election officials shall be able to
read and write English).
166. See generally Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amokl Excesses in the Pursuit
of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926 (1990); see also J. M. Balkin & San-
ford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843,
855 (1996) (offering a tongue-in-cheek piece of advice for would-be writers of law
review articles: "Never confuse what's important in the world outside law schools
with what's important in law reviews."); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ...
and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1825-26 (1997) (telling the story of academ-
ics holding symposia to discuss the correct characterization and political signifi-
cance of a recently unearthed old document which is obviously-for everyone
else-a recipe for fried chicken).
167. The number of books, law review articles and newspaper columns opposing
the official English thrust, both at the state and federal levels, is impressive. The
following list, limited to this decade and omitting newspaper columns, is simply
illustrative: BARON, supra note 59; JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE:
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charge also leveled at academics: that we take legal stances
against measures which we feel have a good chance of enact-
BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ENGLISH ONLY (1992); CARL GuTIPRREZ-JONES,
RETHINKING THE BORDERLANDS: BETWEEN CHICANO CULTURE AND LEGAL
DISCOURSE (1995); PIATT, supra note 157; TATALOVICH, supra note 6; Mark L. Ad-
ams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L.
REV. 849 (1995); Arington, supra note 158; Laura A. Cordero, Constitutional Limi-
tations on Official English Declarations, 20 N.M. L. REV. 17 (1990); DiChiara, su-
pra note 118; Daniel J. Garfield, Don't Box Me In" The Unconstitutionality of
Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690 (1995);
Donna M. Greenspan, Florida's Official English Amendment, 18 NOVA L. REV. 891
(1994); Jos6 Roberto JuArez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language Rights: The
Forgotten Right to Government in a "Known Tongue," 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 443
(1995); John J. Louizos, gQu6, Ya No Hablan Ingles en este Pais?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of English Only Provisions Under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, 3 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L. DIG. 14 (1997); Frank M. Low-
rey, IV, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41
EMORY L.J. 223 (1992); Lori A. McMullen & Charlene R. Lynde, The "Official Eng-
lish" Movement and the Demise of Diversity: The Elimination of Federal Judicial
and Statutory Minority Language Rights, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 789 (1997);
Alfredo Mirande, En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto Es Rey (In the Land of the
Blind, the One Eyed Person Is King): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L. REV.
75 (1996); Moran, supra note 158; Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis
of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 503, 546-59, 582-89 (1998); Wendy Olson, The
Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 1 (1991); Pagni, supra note 158; Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:
An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992) [hereinafter Perea, Demography]; Juan F. Perea, Eng-
lish-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265 (1990); Juan F. Peres, Hernfindez v. New York:
Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1992); Juan
F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965
(1995) [hereinafter Perea, Los Olvidados]; Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to Speak
One Language: Free Speech and the English Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 35 (1991); Richardson, supra note 113; Karla C. Robertson, Out of
Many, One: Fundamental Rights, Diversity, and Arizona's English-Only Law, 74
DENY. U. L. REV. 311 (1996); Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism
and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285 (1996); Martina Su-
san Kiyomi Serrano, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yfiiguez and
the Racialization of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221 (1997); Stewart, Eng-
lish-Only Laws, Informational Interests, and the Meaning of the First Amendment
in a Pluralistic Society, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539 (1995); Andre Sol6, Official
English: A Socratic Dialogue/Law and Economics Analysis, 45 FLA. L. REV. 803
(1993); Yvonne A. Tamayo, "Official Language" Legislation Literal Silenc-
ing/Silenciando la Lengua, 13 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 107 (1997); Aileen Maria
Ugalde, "No Se Habla Espafiol": English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 44 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1209 (1990); Cecilia Wong, Language Is Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official
English After Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277
(1996).
A few articles have recently appeared rejecting the alleged unconstitutionality
of official English statutes. See, e.g., Chris Boehler, Yfhiguez v. Arizonans for Offi-
cial English: The Struggle to Make English the Official Language, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 1637 (1998); Michael W. Valente, One Nation Divisible by Language: An
Analysis of Official English Laws in the Wake of Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official




I find no solace in the various assurances on the unconstitu-
tionality of any federal law which attempted to force the Puerto
Rican government to function in English. Illustrative of such ar-
guments are: (1) Professor Paul Gewirtz's statement on behalf of
the Puerto Rico statehood movement before the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources during the 1989-1991 process, 169
(2) a recent memorandum by the Congressional Research Service's
Senior Specialist on United States Constitutional Law, Mr. Johnny
H. Killian, 7 0 and (3) a two-volume study authored by a group of
pro-statehood Puerto Rican professionals, which is in fact a brief
for that cause. 17 1
These sources make various claims: (1) that a law condi-
tioning Puerto Rican statehood upon an English language re-
quirement would violate the equal footing doctrine; (2) that no in-
dependent federal powers exist to justify a general federal official
language statute applicable to states; (3) that such a federal stat-
ute would violate the principle of state sovereignty found in the
Tenth Amendment; and (4) that such a federal statute would vio-
late individual rights to equal protection of the laws and of free-
dom of expression. 72 Yet, from the Puerto Rican perspective such
claims do not seem so obviously right as to provide an adequate
guarantee.' 73 Many such arguments must rely on current, unsta-
168. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 166, at 933-34 (collecting accusations that
view law review articles as pieces of advocacy). Lest it be thought that such a
charge fits this Article, I hasten to plead nolo contendere. I did not set out to write
a detached, neutral piece on language and political integration of nations; that
would have been both impossible and contrived, since the nation whose future is at
stake is my own.
169. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 339-40. For my two brief replies to
Professor Gewirtz, see Alvarez Gonzilez, Empire, supra note 113, at 347-48 n.157,
and Alvarez Gonzilez, Vernacular, supra note 132, at 14.
170. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POWER OF CONGRESS TO IMPOSE
USE OF ENGLISH AS CONDITION ON ADMISSION OF PUERTO RIco AS A STATE (Oct. 20,
1997) [hereinafter CRS LANGUAGE MEMORANDUM]. For my rejoinder to Mr. Kil-
lian's 1989 memorandum on the United States citizenship of Puerto Ricans, see
Alvarez Gonzdlez, Empire, supra note 113, replying to CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, DISCRETION OF CONGRESS RESPECTING CITIZENSHIP STATUS OF PUERTO
RICANS (Mar. 9, 1989). Mr. Killian's latest memorandum is much better re-
searched and argued than his first. Still, it has serious omissions, drawbacks and
limitations, which I discuss throughout this part of this Article.
171. See GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUEIFOS, BREAKTHROUGH FROM
COLONIALISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF STATEHOOD 1379-1478 (1984)
[hereinafter BREAKTHROUGH].
172. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 339-46; CRS LANGUAGE MEMO-
RANDUM, supra note 170, at 8-23 (expressly refusing to address individual rights
claims); BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 171, at 1147, 1456-78.
173. For a rejection of all such claims, see Tribe, supra note 97, at 28-46.
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ble 5-4 Supreme Court majorities. 174 No people should rest their
future on such constitutional quicksand.
Let me briefly sketch the problems that those constitutional
arguments present.
A. Federalism-Based Arguments
Arguments based on different notions of federalism have
been offered against a federal statute that would force a State of
Puerto Rico, in particular, or all of the States, in general, to func-
tion in English. Such arguments are respectable, but not neces-
sarily irresistible.
1. The Equal Footing Doctrine
The judicially-created equal footing doctrine holds that in a
state admission process Congress may not impose conditions that
would place the new state "upon a plane of inequality with its sis-
ter States in the Union."'175 Some have argued that an official
English language condition to statehood would violate this doc-
trine, as expounded in Coyle v. Oklahoma,176 a 1911 decision con-
cerning the location of the capital of Oklahoma. 177 That argument
is not as compelling as its proponents appear to believe.
There is a significant difference between the site of a state
capital and the language a state government uses to communicate
with the general public.178 The decision of where to locate the
capital of a state is an eminently local matter, which should not be
of any concern to the federal government or to the other states. In
which language a state government communicates with its citi-
zens, as well as with citizens of other states and with legally ad-
mitted aliens, however, does involve important issues of federalism
since it may affect interstate commerce, the effective right of inter-
state travel and the privileges and immunities of United States
citizenship.179
Moreover, the equal footing argument necessarily supposes
174. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
175. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (invalidating Congressional
requirement that the capital of Oklahoma remain at Guthrie until 1913).
176. Id.
177. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 339-40; CRS LANGUAGE MEMO-
RANDUM, supra note 170, at 4-11; BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 171, at 1445-55; see
also Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto
Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1173, 1176 (1997).
178. See Tribe, supra note 97, at 26.
179. See id. at 26-30.
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that all Congressional precedents on imposition of English lan-
guage requirements to new states were unconstitutional. 180 How-
ever, at least five United States Supreme Court Justices have
stressed the relevance and importance of delving into early history
to interpret the Constitution. 181 That history contains four exam-
ples of such language conditions: Louisiana, very early, in 1811,182
Oklahoma in 1906,183 and New Mexico and Arizona in 1910,184 all
states with a substantial number of non-English speakers.185 Was
that not Congress's way of guaranteeing equal footing to all
states? It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would intervene
under the judge-made equal footing doctrine to invalidate what-
ever decision Congress made on government language in Puerto
Rico in a statehood admission process.18 6
Of course, the argument of advocates of statehood for Puerto
Rico concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of an English-
language condition to statehood may ultimately backfire. Faced
with a none too veiled threat that such a condition would be as-
180. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 346-48; CRS LANGUAGE MEMO-
RANDUM, supra note 170, at 8-11; BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 171, at 1147.
181. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 103 (1997) (opinion of the
Court written by Scalia, J., in which Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J.,
and Thomas, J., joined): "[Elarly congressional enactments provide contemporane-
ous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning. Indeed, such contempo-
raneous legislative exposition of the Constitution, acquiesced in for a long term of
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions." (quotations and citations
omitted).
182. See Louisiana Enabling Act, ch. 21 § 3, 2 Stat. 641, 642 (1811) (after the
aamission of Louisiana, "the laws which such state may pass shall be promulgated,
and its records of every description shall be preserved, and its judicial and legisla-
tive written proceedings conducted, in the language in which the laws and the ju-
dicial and legislative written proceedings of the United States are now published
and conducted").
183. See Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335 § 3, 34 Stat. 267, 271 (1906)
(Oklahoma public schools "shall always be conducted in English").
184. See Joint Enabling Act for New Mexico and Arizona, ch. 310 §§ 2, 20, 36
Stat. 557, 559, 570 (1910) (public schools "shall always be conducted in English";
"ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English language sufficiently
well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter shall be a
necessary qualification for all state officers and members of the state legislature").
On the history of the New Mexico and Arizona drives to statehood, see BARON, su-
pra note 59, at 94-106.
185. For a discussion of these four precedents from different perspectives, see
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 346-48; CRS LANGUAGE MEMORANDUM, supra
note 170, at 8-11; BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 171, at 1147; Tribe, supra note 98,
at 24-26; TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 185.
In none of these four territories, however, was the role of English as insignifi-
cant as it is in Puerto Rico. In New Mexico, for example, on the eve of statehood
the court system operated in English, albeit with frequent need for translators.
See BARON, supra note 59, at 99.
186. Accord Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 75-79.
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sailed in the courts after statehood, 87 Congress could decide to
follow well-settled historical practice and announce that it will not
consider granting statehood to Puerto Rico until there is an Eng-
lish-speaking majority on the Island.188
Speaking specifically of the case of Puerto Rico, Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan has written:
Congressional resistance [to a plebiscite which includes state-
hood as an alternative] arises largely from the question of
whether the island should have the option to choose statehood
whilst retaining Spanish as an official language. In two cen-
turies, the United States Congress has admitted thirty-seven
new states to the original union of thirteen. But always a
stated or unstated condition was that English be the official
language. Louisiana, for example, might and did retain the
Code Napolgon, but trials were to be in English. This position
may seem arbitrary, but it is defensible. Epluribus unun.
18 9
2. The Interstate Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty
Even some of those who rely on Coyle admit that a condition
to statehood would be valid and enforceable if Congress has inde-
pendent powers over the subject. 190 In fact, to hold that Congress
187. See Georgie Anne Geyer, Puerto Rico Status Act Leaves U.S. Open to Bilin-
gualism, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1998, at 25 (quoting Eric Pelletier, legislative aide to
Rep. Gerald Solomon, who claimed that statehood leaders made that threat).
188. See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 75. As another
author points out:
The United States has generally withheld statehood from territories until
they contained English-speaking majorities. Louisiana is the one striking
exception. It became a state in 1812 despite its French-speaking majority,
and although the constitution of 1812 does not protect the French lan-
guage in the state, the subsequent constitutional history of Louisiana re-
veals alternative periods of protection, toleration, and prohibition of the
language. Statehood was delayed for Michigan, originally settled by the
French. State boundaries in the American Southwest were drawn to en-
sure English-speaking majorities for Colorado, Nevada, and Arizona. And
statehood was withheld from New Mexico for over sixty years because of
nativist opposition in Congress to the territory's Mexican American ma-
jority population and to the prevalence of Spanish in New Mexican life.
Spanish was both restricted and supported by legislation in the state.
Hawaiian statehood was affected by a similar racial and linguistic preju-
dice, which could preclude statehood for Puerto Rico as well.
BARON, supra note 59, at xv-xvi (citations omitted); see also HEINZ KLOSS, THE
AMERICAN BILINGUAL TRADITION 128 (1977), (showing that Congress only con-
sented to New Mexico statehood once there was a majority of English speakers in
that territory, after a statehood drive that lasted some sixty years).
189. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN INTERNA.
TIONAL POLITICS 73-74 (1993).
190. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 326-27, 342-46; CRS LANGUAGE
MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 8-11 (recognizing that Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568,
validated conditions "intended to operate in futuro, which are within the scope of
the conceded powers of Congress over the subject"). For a similar argument, by
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lacks any such powers over government language would read into
the Constitution the sovereign right of every state to impose upon
its sisters a multilingual confederation. Citizens of the United
States need not be motivated by nativist or racist impulses' 91 in
order to oppose such a result, 192 which certainly was not contem-
plated by the founders of the United States republic. 93
The commerce clause and state sovereignty arguments are
two sides of the same coin. If the commerce clause does not
authorize Congress to enact a language of government applicable
to all states, its enactment would infringe state sovereignty. 194
However, the state of the law in this area is highly unstable. As
one who does believe that Congress has the power to impose language require-
ments, see Tribe, supra note 98, at 27.
191. That is the usual indictment of the official English campaign. See, e.g.,
TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 32, 243-57. But see id. at 187, 189, 252. See also
PIATT, supra note 56, at 20-23; McMullen & Lynde, supra note 167, at 824; Perea,
Demography and Distrust, supra note 167, at 361-62.
192. See BARON, supra note 59, at xiv, xviii, 5-7, 22-23, 28, 31, 41 (accepting
that, for some, the monolingual tenet may be based upon a philosophical notion of
the connection between language and nationality, instead of on a racist impulse).
Among the promoters of the idea of English as an official language of the United
States one can find Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John
Quincy Adams, John Marshall, Theodore Roosevelt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Franklin D. Roosevelt. See id. at 2, 28-29, 64-67, 134, 148-49, 169; see also Lowrey,
supra note 167, at 292:
While racist and xenophobic impulses may explain a certain portion of the
official English constituency, the broad and diverse support for such
measures suggests that some concern for the political and social unity of
the nation is reflected in the recent surge of official English declarations.
Clearly the official English movement attracts the support of those who
favor the exclusion of ethnic and racial minorities from American society
for bigoted and prejudicial reasons. The overwhelming approval by a di-
verse mix of constituencies in those states officializing English by consti-
tutional amendment, however, suggests that these measures are sup-
ported by many who are not motivated by mere racial or ethnic prejudice.
In each case a large percentage of the votes cast by Democrats and ethnic
minorities favored official English declarations.
Id.
The approval of state constitutional amendments through referenda has in-
deed produced lopsided margins in all states, except Arizona. The favorable mar-
gins were: 88.5% in Alabama, 73.25% in California, 64% in Colorado and 83.9% in
Florida. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 101, 122, 158, 182. In Arizona, the
amendment passed with only 50.5% of the vote, id. at 145, after an especially ac-
rimonious campaign. See id. at 131-46. Arizona's amendment, however, was un-
doubtedly the most restrictive official language law in the United States. See id.
at 23.
193. See BARON, supra note 59, at 191 (pointing out that "[t]he founders were
certain that national and linguistic unity went hand in hand and never conceived
of the United States as permanently multilingual. They may even have resisted
designating an official language because they could not decide on an appropriate
name for it, whether American, English, or Federal").
194. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Does Federalism Matter to its Devotees on the
Court, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1997).
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the Congressional Research Service is forced to admit,195 its argu-
ment ultimately rests on the proposition that the collective effect
of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 196 New York v. United States,197 United
States v. L6pez' 98 and Printz v. United States'99 is implicitly to
overrule Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority200
and South Carolina v. Baker.201 Garcia, another 5-4 decision, had
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,202 yet another 5-4 de-
cision, which in turn had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz. 20 3 It seems
that this area of Constitutional Law is currently characterized by
stare indecisis. If Justices, law professors and lawyers cannot
make up their minds, it would not seem particularly appropriate to
ask more than two million Puerto Rican voters to make such a
momentous decision against this background of absolute uncer-
tainty.
This area of Constitutional Law had been very stable from
the late 1930s until 1976, when National League of Cities v. Usery
was decided. 204 And that stability reflected the Supreme Court's
utmost reluctance to find internal limits to federal affirmative
powers and to find in the Tenth Amendment's concept of state sov-
195. See CRS LANGUAGE MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 13-19.
196. 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding as a matter of statutory interpretation, to
avoid the constitutional issue, that the federal Age Discrimination Act did not pre-
empt a state constitutional provision for mandatory retirement of judges at age
70).
197. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating on Tenth Amendment grounds, a provi-
sion of a federal law that required states to legislate on the disposal of radioactive
waste).
198. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (denying Congress' power under the commerce clause
to make it a federal offense to possess a firearm within a school zone).
199. 521 U.S. 98 (1997) (invalidating a temporary provision of the Brady Gun
Control Act which required state and local law enforcement agents to conduct
background checks on applicants for gun permits; held on state sovereignty
grounds that the federal government may not command state officers to enforce a
federal regulatory program).
200. 469 U.S. 528, 531, 555 (1985) (holding valid the application of federal wage
and hour laws to a municipal transportation system; rejecting, except for unde-
fined egregious instances, judicial enforcement of Tenth Amendment and holding
that protection of state sovereignty should be entrusted to the political system).
201. 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding the imposition of a federal tax on interest
from state bonds, but refusing to evaluate the actual operation of the federal po-
litical system).
202. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (holding invalid application of federal wage and
hour laws to virtually all state employees, since it was a regulation "directed... to
the States as States").
203. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding valid federal wage and hour law applicable to
non-professional employees of state-run schools and hospitals).




ereignty an external limit on such powers. 205 Under the state of
the law that prevailed during that forty-year period, the constitu-
tionality of a federal language law applicable to state governments
would have seemed almost certain.206 And it does not seem at all
obvious that such a law would be invalid under the somewhat less
deferential judicial standards that exist today.20 7 It would not re-
quire much effort for Congress "to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens [that a state government functioning in a lan-
guage other than English would have] on interstate commerce." 208
A Congressional finding that "intercourse and traffic" between citi-
zens of different states209 would be substantially obstructed by a
state court system which functions exclusively in Spanish and by
the difficulty of gaining access to laws, legislative materials, and
rules and regulations in English, would make it much more diffi-
cult for the courts to substitute their judgment for the judgment of
Congress on "whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects'
interstate commerce." 210 The reasonableness of such a conclusion
would even seem to be "visible to the naked eye." 21'
Moreover, it has been suggested that federalism arguments
by members of the conservative faction of the Supreme Court can-
not be taken at face value; that such arguments often mask other
unstated considerations and values which are actually the decisive
factors, and which fit a conservative agenda.212 If that explanation
205. See id. at 156.
206. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954) ("IT[he Court is on weakest ground when it op-
poses its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interests of
the states."); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-d-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977) (arguing
that courts should abandon the protection of states from exercises of federal
power).
207. See Tribe, supra note 98, at 30-32 (arguing that Congress would have a ra-
tional basis for determining that a uniform national language would remove obsta-
cles to interstate commerce and communication, and citing examples of federal
laws that prescribe English language requirements in activities that constitute
such commerce).
208. United States v. Lbpez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (asserting that such a lack of
formal findings makes it more difficult for the courts to defer to a Congressional
judgment).
209. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)
(quoting Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913)).
210. L6pez, 514 U.S. at 559.
211. Id. at 563 (suggesting the standard applicable in the absence of formal
Congressional findings).
212. See Gottlieb, supra note 194, at 1179 ("'[Flederalism is the specific means
necessary to accomplish another principle which is significant for the conservative
Justices-but which they are reticent to discuss"), 1181 ("federalism is the depend-
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is plausible, as I think it is, then any prediction of the Court's fu-
ture behavior on an official language law would have to take into
account whether the values embodied in such a law are consistent
with a conservative agenda. The answer seems obvious.
213
3. Other Congressional Powers
While making the federalism arguments already discussed,
the Congressional Research Service-surprisingly-has failed to
address the issue of Congress's power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment 214 or its spending power to create condi-
tional grant programs. 215 Mr. Killian's CRS Memorandum recog-
nizes that "[tihe setting of language policies per se is not beyond
Congress' reach,"216 and cites several Congressional actions, an-
chored on these two federal powers, which have resisted constitu-
tional attack.217 The CRS, however, does not deal adequately with
either of these two potential moorings for a federal language law.
Let me briefly address each of them.
a. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
The CRS asserts that section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "is particularly preemptive of state powers, in ways that the
powers conferred by Article I of the Constitution are not."218 At
ent variable in the calculations of the conservative Justices and therefore explains
little. It is partly beside the point, partly a rationalization, and partly a means to
entirely different ends.") (citation omitted), 1192-93 ("when [United States v.
L6pez] and other cases restricting national power under the Commerce Clause for
expressed reasons of federalism are compared with cases in which the members of
the Court sustain or advance national power over state power, it is not apparent
why federalism applies to the first group and not to the second. The Court has
simply made too many decisions which restrict important exercises of state power
on flimsy grounds. L6pez can hardly stand for the proposition that this Court has
been or intends to be a significant defender of state authority.") (citation omitted),
1196 ("Mhe easiest conclusion, quite consistent with the facts, is that federalism
is a red herring."); see also id. at 1183 & n.24 (citing other commentators who also
view the federalism discourse with skepticism).
213. See id. at 1191 (stating that race is an area where talk of federalism masks
results which conform with other values, such as maintenance of homogeneous
communities), 1192 ('Conservative support for homogeneous localism is evident in
other areas, supporting localities when they decide in favor of a strong moral code,
but overruling localities when they opt for diversity or liberty.") (footnotes omit-
ted).
214. See CRS LANGUAGE MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 12-13.
215. See id. at 12, 24.
216. Id. at 12.
217. See id. at 12-13, 24.
218. Id. at 13. Section five provides: "The Congress shall have power to en-




that point, when one would expect a thorough analysis of how the
"particularly preemptive" section Five is still insufficient to permit
Congress to impose an official language requirement, the CRS de-
parts with a puzzling non sequitur: "But for purposes of imposing
upon the States an English-Only, or an official-English, require-
ment, it is to the authority under the commerce clause that one
must look."2' 19 Just why Congress's power on this subject must
stand or fall on commerce clause analysis, and may not rely on the
"particularly preemptive" section five, we are never told.220
The fact is that Katzenbach v. Morgan221 held in 1966 that
section five enabled Congress to set certain language policies.
Congress had banned state English literacy requirements for vot-
ing, as applied to persons who completed the sixth grade in Puerto
Rico. Morgan, however, does not prohibit Congress, acting under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment or under section two of
the Fifteenth, from setting uniform English literacy require-
ments.222 And it has been argued that Congress may act under
this power to establish a national language of government, in or-
der to enforce the privileges and immunities of national citizenship
and the right of interstate travel.223 Thus, an analysis of section
five powers may prove crucial in the enactment of a federal lan-
guage law.
b. Congress's Powers to Create Conditional Grant Programs
Since 1936 it has been black-letter law that Congress's power
219. CRS LANGUAGE MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 13.
220. Interestingly, the CRS also failed to deal with that affirmative grant of
Congressional power when in 1989 it considered the citizenship status of persons
born in Puerto Rico. See Alvarez GonzAlez, Empire, supra note 113, at 337-38.
221. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding valid Congressional enfranchisement of per-
sons educated in Spanish in Puerto Rico).
222. That is, at least, as long as the Supreme Court continues to refuse to hold
that English literacy requirements violate equal protection. See Lassiter v. North-
ampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Some commentators went
beyond this, and argued that Congress, acting under section five, might even di-
lute Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress
in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 259-60 (1971). That view
was apparently rejected in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding
that Congress may not resort to section five in order to alter judicial pronounce-
ments concerning the substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment).
For the view that Lassiter is probably still good law, see Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms and Constitu-
tionalism, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 725, 745-47 (1998).
223. See Tribe, supra note 97, at 28-30, 32-39. See generally John E. Nowak,
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Gov-
ernments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1975).
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to spend for the general welfare is an independent power, which
"is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution."224  Subsequent decisions have interpreted this
power broadly and have legitimated Congressionally-imposed con-
ditions with which the states must comply in order to receive fed-
eral moneys. 225 The Court has specifically asserted that these con-
ditions do not intrude upon state sovereignty since the states
remain free to reject such funding.226
The CRS treatment of this issue is even more perfunctory
than its treatment of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It states:
Briefly, it should be noted that it is likely that Congress has
power to condition receipt of federal moneys upon Puerto Rico
as a State agreeing to adopt English to the degree Congress
chooses . . .The condition would be imposed after Puerto
Rico's admission to the Union, because the spending power is
ordinarily contractual, not coercive. That is, since a State may
choose to receive or to reject the proffered funds, it may accede
to or reject the condition in its discretion. This approach to
the issue raises analytically different questions, which are not
dealt with here.227
The question is analytically different only because the CRS
chose to limit its analysis to the validity after statehood of condi-
tions imposed before statehood. But the critical question is
whether Congress could force Puerto Rico to conduct all or part of
its governmental operations and educational system in any lan-
guage other than Spanish. Whether the imposition occurs before
or after statehood is irrelevant from the Puerto Rican perspective.
Still, what little the CRS did say concerning the question of
spending conditions speaks volumes.
224. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). See generally NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 204, at § 5.6.
225. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937);
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
226. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 ("Even if Congress might lack the power to
impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encourage-
ment to state action ... is a valid use of the spending power."); Bell v. New Jersey,
461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983) ("Requiring States to honor the obligations assumed as a
condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds simply
does not intrude on their sovereignty. The State chose to participate in the ...
program and, as a condition of receiving the grant, freely gave its assurances that
it would abide by [its] conditions."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the 'contract.'").




This question is crucial for Puerto Rico. To cite just one of
many examples, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,2 28
the huge federal funding program for public education in the
United States, is a conditional grant program. 2 9 Just one further
amendment-on language of instruction-would radically alter a
central factor in the preservation of Puerto Rican culture and iden-
tity.230 Of course, a sovereign State of Puerto Rico, unwilling to
negotiate its language and culture,231 theoretically could decide to
forego all federal aid, and finance its costly public school system
entirely out of its own Treasury. Needless to say, it seems ex-
tremely unlikely that such a theoretical possibility could ever be-
come a concrete reality.232
B. Individual Rights
While federalist arguments are exclusively addressed to a
federal statute which attempted to impose English as the language
of government of a state, or of all states, individual rights argu-
ments are equally applicable to federal and state attempts to leg-
islate a language of government.
1. Equal Protection of the Laws
The typical equal protection arguments against an official
English federal statute-that it would eliminate statutory rights
228. Act of April 11, 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
229. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 2721-22 (1994).
230. Other amendments to that program have been proposed already, such as
the elimination of its Title VII, which covers bilingual education. For a description
of such an amendment, see TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 15-16.
231. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
232. It must be recognized that Puerto Rico has refused to accept conditional
federal grants in an area where all States have accepted them. Puerto Rico has
refused to increase its legal drinking age from 18 to 21 and, consequently, each
year it loses a significant amount of federal funding for highways. See 23 U.S.C. §
158 (1990). While one might view that decision as a commitment to preserve
"culture," which could be extended to the public education context, the argument is
not convincing for two reasons. First, the refusal to raise the drinking age in
Puerto Rico is best explained in electoral, rather than "cultural" terms. Both prin-
cipal political parties who have governed the Island in the last decade perceive
that decision as a poison pill which could signify an electoral defeat for that party
who adopts it, particularly in view of the high percentage of young people among
the Island's population. See CENSUS, supra note 41, at 923 (44.6% of Puerto Rico's
population is 24 years old or younger). In other words, the drinking age limit has
absolutely no connection to political status preferences, while that connection is
more probable concerning language of instruction in public schools. Second, the
amount of federal funding involved in the highway context is a pittance, compared
to the level of funding that would be at issue under a hypothetical amendment to
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
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already recognized by federal law in important areas, such as vot-
ing and education, and that derogation of such rights would un-
constitutionally discriminate against Hispanics-have a major,
evident flaw. Such arguments presuppose either that Congress
may not directly abrogate these statutory rights or that even if ab-
rogated such rights would continue to exist as a contstitutional
matter.233 It is implausible that absent federal legislation on these
subjects the Supreme Court would have ruled that these rights
flow directly from the Constitution or that, somehow they now flow
from the Constitution once Congress created them.
234
Most equal protection arguments hinge decisively on the ap-
plication of some kind of heightened scrutiny. But that would re-
quire the Supreme Court to do something that it has consistently
refused to do since the days of the Burger Court: to find a new
suspect class, in this case one composed of people who speak lan-
guages other than English. 235 It is quite revealing that the only
233. See, e.g., Cordero, supra note 167, at 26; Garfield, supra note 167, at 694-
95; Lowrey, supra note 167, at 298; McMullen & Lynde, supra note 167, at 811-15;
Perea, Denography, supra note 167, at 356-71; Perea, Los Olvidados, supra note
167, at 985-91; Puig-Lugo, supra note 167, at 47; Robertson, supra note 167, at
329-32; Serrano, supra note 167, at 258-62; Solb, supra note 167, at 818-20;
Stewart, supra note 167, at 557-58; see also Andrew Averbach, Language Classifi-
cations and the Equal Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or
Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481 (1994); Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the
Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 330-46
(1989); Edward M. Chen, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.: Speak-English-Only Rules and
the Demise of Workplace Pluralism, 1 ASIAN L.J. 155 (1994); Marc Douglas Francis,
The Constitutional Future of the All-English Ballot, 16 PAC. L.J. 1029, 1041-45
(1985); "Official English."Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1353-56 (1987).
234. Even a commentator who is sympathetic to cultural and linguistic asser-
tions recognizes that this is not at all probable. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 356 (1986).
"[None of the decisions] by the Supreme Court suggest that the public schools have
a constitutional obligation to provide instruction in students' native languages.
Recognition of such a claim would require a major expansion of equal protection
doctrine." Id. To my knowledge, no one has seriously predicted that the present
Supreme Court will undertake "a major expansion of equal protection doctrine."
Id.
235. See Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the
Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 75 (1992) [hereinafter, Language
Rights] ("The standard of judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause will
continue to be a major issue in the area of language rights. The current interpre-
tation of the equal protection analysis does not recognize language discrimination
as a subset of national origin discrimination. Therefore, English-only laws are not
deemed suspect."); see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99
YALE L.J. 1503, 1567-68 (1990) ("Nor is it clear that language-based classifications,
even if [animus is] demonstrated, warrant enhanced scrutiny under current doc-
trine."); Serrano, supra note 167, at 224 ("[u]nless the Court finds grounds for
heightened constitutional scrutiny, [a] facially neutral [language law] will be sub-
ject to rational basis review"); Kathryn J. Zoglin, Recognizing a Human Right to
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two Courts of Appeals cases which made that finding were vacated
as moot in 1987 and 1989.236 Moreover, in order to find a constitu-
tional violation under the equal protection component of Fifth
Amendment due process, 237 the Court would have to impute to
Congress an intent to discriminate against such class.23s This
prospect is even more improbable under the present composition of
the Court.239
People who speak languages other than English have not
fared well in their claims of constitutional or statutory rights to
have government communicate with them in their native tongues
or to participate in governmental affairs in those tongues. Such
arguments have been rejected by both state2 40 and federal
Language in the United States, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 15, 24 (1989) ('In sum,
current U.S. constitutional analysis does not accord strict scrutiny to state action
affecting linguistic minorities."). But see Serrano, supra note 167, at 234-63
(arguing for a definition of "race" that is not biologically-based but rather socially
constructed).
236. See Gutidrrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1045 (9th Cir. 1988)
(issuing preliminary injunction issued under Title VII against employer's English-
only rule), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d
1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding the investigation of voting fraud directed at
registrants who requested bilingual ballots discriminatory on the basis of race and
national origin), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 (1987), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 131 (9th
Cir. 1987).
237. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (although the equal protection
clause is not applicable to the federal government, fifth amendment due process
prohibits invidious discrimination).
238. See, e.g., Hernfindez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., plurality opinion); Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
239. In essence, the Supreme Court would have to adopt the words of a com-
mentator: "[An official English norm] is an insult to the twenty million people in
this country who speak a mother tongue that is not English, and a gratuitous in-
sult at that." Karst, supra note 234, at 351. On the difficulty of proving discrimi-
natory intent, particularly in language referenda, see Eule, supra note 235, at
1567.
240. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Bd. of Review, 444 A.2d 1075 (N.J.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 806 (1982) (holding that notice of unemployment insurance benefits need not
be translated into Spanish); Herndndez v. Dept. of Labor, 416 N.E.2d 263 (I1.
1981) (no requirement of notice in Spanish); Jara v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d 94
(Cal. 1978) (no constitutional right to an interpreter in a civil case); DaLomba v.
Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 337 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1975) (holding
non-English speaking immigrant not entitled, under procedural due process, to
notice in native tongue on unemployment compensation hearing); Commonwealth
v. Olivo, 337 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Mass. 1975) (criminal conviction for violating an
eviction notice in English; the court stated: "This is not an officially multilingual
country, and notification of official matters in the sole official language of both this
nation and this Commonwealth is patently reasonable."); Guerrero v. Carleson,
512 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974) (no right to notice in
Spanish of termination of welfare benefits, even where known that recipients did
not understand English); Castro v. State, 466 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1970) (no constitu-
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courts. 24 1
In another equal protection case, in 1991, the Supreme Court
sustained a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
Hispanic bilingual potential jurors after finding no proof of pur-
poseful discrimination.242 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion re-
fused to address the question of whether "Spanish-language ability
bears a close relation to ethnicity, and .. .as a consequence, it
violates the Equal Protection Clause to exercise a peremptory
challenge on the ground that a Latino potential juror speaks
Spanish."243 That opinion also stated that "[i]t may well be, for
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in
a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surro-
gate for race under an equal protection analysis."244 However, that
is an entirely different proposition than that involved in the offi-
cial English scenario: Whether a classification which discrimi-
nates against persons who are it proficient in English is based on
race or on another suspect or quasi-suspect criterion. All of the
tional right to a bilingual electoral system).
241. See Toure v. United States, 24 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 1994) (deciding no right to
notice in French of administrative seizure; rational basis test used); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1190 (1994)
(finding that English-only workplace rules do not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Vinlez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that housing documents in English do not discriminate on
racial or ethnic basis); Soberal-Pbrez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984) (finding that the Social Security system is under no
constitutional or statutory obligation to provide Spanish-language forms to His-
panic applicants; rational basis test used); Pab6n v. Macintosh, 546 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that English-only classes are not a violation of equal pro-
tection); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981) (upholding English-only workplace rule); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe
Elementary Sch., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978) (no constitutional right to bilingual
education); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding no equal
protection right to civil service examinations in Spanish; since language is not a
suspect class, rational basis test applies); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1973) (finding no right to employment notices in Spanish).
But see Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated as noot sub iwin., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct.
1055 (1997), discussed infra, text beginning with note 271, where at the end of its
opinion devoted to freedom of expression the court stated that "the equal protec-
tion ramifications of [the Arizona official English provision's] restrictive impact
strongly supports our holding, as well." 69 F.3d at 948. For criticisms of the Ninth
Circuit's handling of the equal protection issue, which claim that this argument
should have been better developed, see Robertson, supra note 167, at 329-32; Ser-
rano, supra note 167, at 222, 231-32.
242. See Hernfindez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). Although there was no
majority opinion, six Justices joined in this holding. See id. at 369, 372 (Kennedy,
J.), 372 (O'Connor, J.).
243. Id. at 360.
244. Id. at 371.
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Justices in Herndndcz apparently assumed the validity of the fed-
eral statute that requires proficiency in English to be eligible for
jury duty.245 That official English requirement is the pertinent
analogy, and, in the case of Puerto Rico, it excludes more than 75%
of its residents from jury duty in the federal court. Thus, a "jury of
his peers" 246 in federal proceedings in Puerto Rico has quite a dif-
ferent meaning from that accorded the term throughout the
United States. This fact, however, has not moved federal courts to
find a constitutional violation.247
For all of these reasons, equal protection does not appear to
be a particularly propitious argument against language laws.248 It
would be an ironic twist that after refusing to find that residents of
Puerto Rico are a suspect class for purposes of their exclusion from
certain welfare programs, 249 the Court were to find otherwise con-
cerning their inclusion in a federal statute of general applicability.
2. Freedom of Expression
The most recent-and in another sense, the oldest-
argument against official English provisions is freedom of expres-
sion.2 50 That was the main ground on which the Ninth Circuit re-
245. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865(b)(2), (3) (1994). Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion
expressly cited this statute. See 500 U.S. at 371.
246. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1969).
247. See United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 492 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 990 (1990) (holding that even if the English-only requirement re-
sults "in a smaller pool of eligible jurors and a 'systematic exclusion' in the jury
selection process, the overwhelming national interest served by the use of English
in a United States court justifies conducting proceedings in the District of Puerto
Rico in English and requiring jurors to be proficient in that language."); see also
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 326 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Benhumar, 658 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982).
248. For other pessimistic views on equal protection as a barrier against lan-
guage laws, see Murray, supra note 167, at 583, Arington, supra note 158, at 335-
37 and Valente, supra note 167, at 238, 251.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona which invalidated that
State's official English constitutional amendment on federal constitutional
grounds, relied in part on equal protection, asserting that the Arizona provision
discriminated on the basis of the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of
expression. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1000-02 (Ariz. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 850 (1999), discussed infra, text beginning with note 280. This additional
ground is meaningless. Whether the Arizona provision violates the federal Consti-
tution will hinge decisively on whether it infringes freedom of speech. If the
United States Supreme Court were to hold that it does not, it is inconceivable that
the Court would reach a different conclusion via the fundamental rights strand of
equal protection analysis. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 204, at § 14.40 (if
the fundamental right itself is not violated, neither is equal protection).
249. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651
(1980).
250. For commentators who have embraced the First Amendment argument see
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lied to invalidate the Arizona constitutional provision on official
language251 in the en bane 6-5 Yihiguez decision which the Supreme
Court later vacated on a mootness rationale. 252 It was also the
principal basis on which the Supreme Court of Arizona relied to
justify its subsequent invalidation of that provision on federal con-
stitutional grounds, a decision which the Supreme Court chose not
to review 253 I will consider each of these decisions separately.
a. The Yiliguez Case
In Yrliguez the Ninth Circuit termed the Arizona provision,
which orders all state employees to "act in English and no other
language"254 except for what that court considered to be "narrow
exceptions," 255 "by far the most restrictively worded official-
Murray, supra note 167, at 584-88; Robertson, supra note 167, at 313-16, 326-27;
Wexler, supra note 167, at 357-69; McMullen & Lynde, supra note 167, at 810-11,
815-20; Tamayo, supra note 167, at 111-22; Louizos, supra note 167, passim; see
also Arington, supra note 158, at 337-39; DiChiara, supra note 118, at 113-19;
Chiu, supra note 90, at 242-46.
251. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII.
252. See Yfiiguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd sub nom.,
Yffiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated as
moot sub nom., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (1997).
The Supreme Court held that the fact that plaintiff Yfbiguez did not litigate her
case as a class action, and voluntarily ceased her state employment in 1990, made
the case moot. See 117 S.Ct. at 1059-60, 1071-72. The Court also held that if the
case had not become moot, the lower federal courts should have certified the inter-
pretation of the new Arizona constitutional provision in dispute to that state's Su-
preme Court. See id. at 1059, 1061, 1072-75. In view of the extraordinary history
of the litigation before the lower courts, the Court further suggested that the case
may have become feigned or collusive. See id. at 1070-71. Lastly, the Court stated
that it expressed "no view on the correct interpretation of Art. XXVIII or on the
measure's constitutionality." Id. at 1060.
253. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 850
(1999).
254. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1(3)(a)(iv), 3(1)(a).
255. 69 F.3d at 931, citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 3(2)(a) (when otherwise
required by federal law), 3(2)(e) (in order to protect the rights of criminal defen-
dants and victims of crime). The complete list of exceptions, as quoted in an ap-
pendix both by the Ninth Circuit, 69 F.3d at 949-50, and by the Supreme Court,
117 S.Ct. at 1075-76, is:
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to
the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational in-
struction in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible
a transition to English.
(b) to comply with other federal laws.
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required or volun-
tary educational curriculum.
(d) to protect public health or safety.
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime.
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(2).
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English law to date."2 56 The court refused to give that provision a
narrow construction, even though the state Attorney General sug-
gested one,257 and struck it down on its face as unconstitutionally
overbroad. 258
The Ninth Circuit's overbreadth analysis is problematic. 259
In order to reach its 6-5 conclusion, that court had to surmount
several hurdles which it did in a rather unconvincing fashion. It
256. Arington, supra note 158, at 337.
257. See 69 F.3d at 928-30, citing Op. Atty. Gen. Az. No. 189-009 (1989).
258. See 69 F.3d at 931-48. The majority joined an opinion by Judge Reinhardt.
Judge Brunetti, while joining the majority opinion, filed a brief concurring opinion.
See id. at 950. The dissenters issued three different opinions: one by Judge
Fernandez, joined by Chief Judge Wallace and Judges Hall and Kleinfeld, see id. at
954, one by Chief Judge Wallace, see id. at 959, and another by Judge Kozinski,
also joined by Judge Kleinfeld. See id. at 960. That latter dissent provoked a rare,
highly personalistic separate concurrence by Judge Reinhardt, the author of the
majority opinion. See id. at 952.
Judge Kozinski later explained his stance in Yviguez as influenced by his own
life experience:
My approach in YIiguez and Gutigrrez was deeply influenced by the eth-
nic strife and mistrust I saw growing up in Romania between the Roma-
nian-speaking majority and the Hungarian-speaking minority. From this
experience, I walked away with the firm conviction that differences in
language lead to differences in thinking, which lead to mistrust and ha-
tred and, eventually, to war. This experience convinced me that we are
very lucky indeed to share a common language and made me most reluc-
tant to strike down rules that ensure that everyone use that language.
Alex Kozinski, Teetering on the High Wire, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1221-22
(1997). The reference to Gutigrrez is to Gutigrrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d
1031, 1045 (9th Cir. 1988) (issuing preliminary injunction under Title VII against
employer's English-only rule), 861 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016
(1989), discussed supra note 236 and accompanying text.
259. See Boehler, supra note 167, at 1651-64 (criticizing both the analysis and
the result of Yfiguez, arguing that the Arizona provision was not aimed at any
communicative impact and should have been sustained as a reasonable restriction
of manner); see also Pildes, supra note 222, at 744 ('If English-only laws are un-
constitutional, it must be because their justification reflects a view of the common
good that government cannot endorse. Only after courts reach this conclusion can
it make any sense to conclude that such policies violate the 'rights' of public em-
ployees.").
Even some who applaud the Yiiiguez result agree with the assessment in the
text. See, e.g., Scott H. Angstreich, Recent Case, Speaking in Tongues: Whose
Rights at Stake, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 634, 635, 642-43 (1995) (criticizing
emphasis on employee speech); Pagni, supra note 158, at 252, 259-79 (criticizing
the use of the speech/conduct dichotomy, arguing that the majority misapplied the
overbreadth doctrine and the public employee speech doctrine, and that it never
decided on the applicable standard of review); Robertson supra note 167, at 325-27
(criticizing emphasis on employee speech and suggesting that the effect on Arizona
legislators would have been a better ground).
For non-critical praises of Yffiguez, see Wexler, supra note 167, at 357-69;
Tamayo, supra note 167, at 111-22; Louizos, supra note 168, passim; see also Chiu,
supra note 90, at 242-46.
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first held that choice of language is speech, not conduct or symbolic
speech, thus clearing the way for application of the strongest First
Amendment standards.260 For that holding, the court essentially
relied on Cohen v. California2 6' although it was unable to identify
a particular content against which the Arizona provision was di-
rected.262 It would seem reasonable to conclude that there is a cru-
cial difference between regulating specific words that carry a
communicative impact-which is what Cohen prohibited-and
regulating the language to be used, irrespective of the message
conveyed. 263 So viewed, the Arizona provision could reasonably be
characterized as a manner restriction which is not directed at any
particular message and is, therefore, subject to less stringent First
Amendment review.264 Curiously, if the Ninth Circuit was looking
for Supreme Court precedents on medium as content, it is sur-
prising that it failed to invoke the "money is speech" holding of
Buckley v. Valeo.265 Even that analogy would not be perfect, how-
ever, since a political contribution implies an endorsement of the
views of its recipient. 266
Second, the Yiguez majority weakly characterized cases that
refused to find a right to government communications in a tongue
other than English267 as standing for the proposition that there is
260. See 69 F.3d at 934-36. However, toward the end of its opinion the court
signaled that its conclusion would be the same whether the applicable standard
were strict scrutiny or a balancing approach. See id. at 947.
261. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction for "offensive conduct" for wearing
a jacket with the message "Fuck the draft").
262. That criticism was the essence of Chief Judge Wallace's dissent. See 69
F.3d at 959-60. It was also central to Judge Fernlndez's dissent. See id. at 957-
58.
263. See Boehler, supra note 167, at 1656-58; Valente, supra note 167, at 222-
25.
264. See Boehler, supra note 167, at 1658-64 (arguing that under the test of
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), as subsequently modified in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989), the Arizona provision
would pass constitutional muster); Valente, supra note 167, at 225-27.
265. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). It is conceivable that this omission reflects the severe
criticism to which the Buckley decision has been subjected. See, e.g., LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONsTTiTTiONAL LAW § 13-27 (2d ed. 1988); J. Skelly Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); see also
Statement in Support of Overturning Buckley v. Valeo (Mar. 4, 1998) (on file with
author) (statement by 209 scholars in support of overruling that case).
266. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15. It could be argued, of course, that by speaking
Spanish plaintiff Yfiiguez was making a statement about herself, her identity and
her heritage. That was one of her arguments before the Ninth Circuit. See Ser-
rano, supra note 167, at 221 & n.4. But that court refused to base its holding on
that argument, and chose to focus on the interests of the recipients of Yfliguez's
message, rather than on any independent right of her own to convey a message.
See id.
267. See supra note 241.
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no such affirmative right, while characterizing plaintiff Yfiiguez's
claim as involving a negative right, the right not to be prevented
from speaking a foreign language while discharging her govern-
mental duties.268 Yet, the court's protracted dissertation on the
importance of government speech in a non-English language for its
recipients went a long way toward recognizing the affirmative
right that it disclaimed. 269
Third, while recognizing that government has wider latitude
to regulate the activities of its employees, rather than private af-
fairs, the court held that Arizona had gone too far in its attempt to
regulate the language used by its employees in discharging their
duties.270 That analysis is flawed because it invokes a line of cases
which is inapplicable to the issue in YMiguez. 271 The court relied
on what it termed the Waters/Pickering line of cases. 272 Those
cases generally prevent government from taking action against
employees who speak on matters of public concern. But as the Su-
preme Court later held in United States v. National Treasury Em-
268. See 69 F.3d at 936-37. The Court also suggested that it had found in free-
dom of expression a stronger constitutional mooring, by distinguishing cases which
refused to find "affirmative rights" to government communication in other lan-
guages as based on equal protection or procedural due process. See id. at 937.
269. See id. at 940-42. That fact was not lost to one of the six members of the
majority. In his concurring opinion, Judge Brunetti recognized that "there may be
some tension between the public interest in receiving Yfiiguez's public services in
Spanish as described by the majority, and our prior cases which hold that there is
no right to receive government services in a language other than English," but
went on to assert--equally unconvincingly: "[W]e are only considering the interest
of the public in receiving speech when government employees exercise their right
to utter such speech, and we do not create an independently enforceable public
right to receive information in another language." Id. at 951. Italics or not, the
distinction seems unfounded, since it produces the very result that its author dis-
claims. For Judge Fernfindez's reply in dissent, see id. at 958.
But see Angstreich, supra note 259, at 640 (proposing a right to receive gov-
ernment communications in a native tongue if there are government employees
who speak that language). That is a very small right, with no corresponding gov-
ernmental duty.
270. See 69 F.3d at 937-44. The court, in the course of rejecting the narrowing
construction by the Arizona Attorney General, had previously engaged in a mean-
ingless distinction between '"official acts' of state governmental entities," id. at
928, and acts by "all government officials and employees during the performance of
government business," id. at 929. Judge Ferndndez's dissent found "no substantial
difference between employees and state officials when the officials are performing
the business of the state." Id. at 954 n.2.
271. See Angstreich, supra note 259, at 635, 640; Robertson, supra note 167, at
326; Valente, supra note 167, at 227-31; see also Judge Fernfndez's dissent, taking
the majority to task for its employee speech analysis; id. at 955-56 (listing exam-
ples of government regulations of public employees that have been sustained).
272. See 69 F.3d at 938-47 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994));
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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ployees UyLioL, 27 3 the type of employee utterances that particularly
deserved protection were "addressed to a public audience, were
made outside the workplace, and involv[ing] content largely unre-
lated to their [g]overnment employment."274 The Yiguez "speech"
did not satisfy any one of these three categories.
Fourth, the court was not particularly persuasive in its at-
tempt to distinguish Supreme Court precedents that accord the
government wider latitude to regulate the content of speech when
the government itself speaks or subsidizes the speech of others.
275
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that since 1973 the Su-
preme Court has required that overbreadth be "both real and sub-
stantial judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep" 276 and
has stressed that "a law will not be facially invalidated simply be-
cause it has some conceivably unconstitutional applications,"' 277 but
rather that "there must be a substantial number of instances in
which the provision will violate the First Amendment."278  It is
questionable, however, whether the Yhliguez analysis satisfies that
standard.
In his dissent, joined by three other judges, Judge Fernindez
characterized the issue in Yiiguez as follows:
This case, then, presents a confluence of lines of argument.
Employees of the State are subject to numerous restrictions
upon their freedoms, their actions, and their speech, which the
government could not impose upon the general public. The
State can, in general, control the content and mode of its own
speech, and the general public does not have a constitutional
right to have the State provide services in any particular lan-
guage. In the face of all of that, it is well nigh unintelligible to
say that individual officers and employees of the State can
perform state business in a language of their own choice, de-
spite the State's direction that they shall use a particular Ian-
273. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
274. Id. at 466.
275. See 69 F.3d at 940 n.24, discussing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-34 (1995), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991). But see Constitutional Law-First Amendent-Ninth Circuit Invalidates
Arizona Constitution's Official English Requirement, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1827,
1830-32 (1996) (suggesting that Rust requires that there be some reasonable nexus
between the restriction on employee speech and a permissible governmental pro-
gram; and arguing that defining the "program" in Yfiiguez as "fostering a common
language" would constitute too high a level of generality).
276. 69 F.3d at 931 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
277. Id. at 932 (citing Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)).





It would seem that only the recognition of a constitutional
right to governmental services in the native tongue of non-English
speakers would lend coherence to the Yfiiguez holding. It also
would seem that such a development is highly unlikely in the fore-
seeable future.
b. Ruiz v. Hull
In Ruiz v. Hull,280 the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
the Arizona language provision is unconstitutional both under fed-
eral freedom of expression and equal protection principles. Since
the equal protection ground is itself based on freedom of expres-
sion,28 ' I will limit my analysis to the First Amendment ground.
The Arizona Supreme Court refused to give the state official
language provision the limiting construction that the Arizona At-
torney General had proposed in Yiligulez. 282 The court held that
choice of language is speech, and that the Arizona prohibition of
government use of any language other than English is too broad. 28 3
As so interpreted, the court found that it unconstitutionally inhib-
its the free discussion of governmental affairs by persons not profi-
cient in English and infringes upon their right to petition for re-
dress of grievances. 28 4 The court also held that the Arizona
provision infringed upon the rights of elected officials and public
employees to communicate with the public in a language in which
both the official or employee and the member of the public are pro-
ficient.28 5 The court stated that the Arizona provision was not con-
tent neutral but that, even if so viewed, it unconstitutionally sup-
pressed too much expression. 28 6
In general, the Ruiz decision is subject to the same criticism
as the Ninth Circuit's Yiiguez decision on which the Arizona Su-
preme Court expressly relied. 28 7 The Ruiz court chose to deal with
some of the problems which plagued the Yiiguez decision by ig-
noring them, while reaching the same conclusion. This is the case,
for example, with the issues of government speech and govern-
279. Id. at 958 (Fernfindez, J., dissenting).
280. 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 850 (1999).
281. See supra note 248.
282. See 957 P.2d at 991-94.
283. See id. at 996.
284. See id. at 996-97.
285. See id. at 997-98.
286. See id. at 998-1000.
287. See id. at 987 n.1 ("[wie agree with the result and with much of the rea-
soning of the Ninth Circuit opinion.").
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ment control of employee speech. The Court also disclaimed reli-
ance on the overbreadth doctrine28 8 while stressing at several
points that the vice of the Arizona provision was its overly broad
inhibition of speech. 28 9
On the other hand, Ruizs discussion of the impact of the Ari-
zona provision on non-English speakers is better than the Ninth
Circuit's. Yet, even that discussion is plagued by the same essen-
tial incoherence that beset the Yiiguez decision: if Arizonans do
not have a constitutional right to force the government to commu-
nicate with them in their native tongues, their rights of freedom of
expression, to participate in public affairs and to petition for re-
dress of grievances ultimately depend on the fortuitous event of
finding some government employee who is able and willing to
speak that language.
Finally, the Ruiz decision itself emphasizes the narrowness of
its holding, which should not satisfy any Puerto Rican who claims
that language and culture are not negotiable.2 90 Thus, Ruiz
stresses "that nothing in this opinion compels any Arizona gov-
ernmental entity to provide any service in a language other than
English,"291 that it does "not hold, or even suggest, that any gov-
ernmental entity in Arizona has a constitutional obligation to pro-
vide services in languages other than English, except, of course, to
the extent required by federal law."2 92 It also assumes the validity
and propriety of the Arizona Enabling Act requirement that Ari-
zona public schools "shall always be conducted in English," and
that all state officers and legislators shall have the "ability to read,
write, speak and understand the English language sufficiently
well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an inter-
preter."293 It additionally argues that if the Arizona provision were
similar to less restrictive provisions in other states, such as Wyo-
ming, Montana, or California, "it might well have passed constitu-
tional muster."294 It furthermore assumes for purposes of the dis-
cussion "that the government may, under certain circumstances
288. See id. at 999 n. 11.
289. See id. at 993, 996-1000.
290. Resident Commissioner Romero Barcel6, however, expressed his satisfac-
tion with the decision. See Leonor Mulero, Alborozado Romero Barcel6 por la De-
cisin de Arizona, EL NUEVO D[A, Apr. 30, 1998, at 10.
291. 957 P.2d at 987.
292. Id. at 1002-03.
293. Id. at 990, quoting Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310 § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569
(1910). Arizona voters who do not speak English, therefore, cannot participate in
Arizona public affairs by becoming state officers or legislators, nor can they seek
redress of grievances by electing one of their own to office.
294. 957 P.2d at 994-96.
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and for appropriate reasons, restrict public employees from using
non-English languages to communicate while performing their du-
ties," 295 but asserts that the vice of the Arizona provision is that its
"reach is too broad."29 6
In sum, the vindication in Ruiz of the rights of freedom of
speech and to equal protection of the laws of non-English speakers
does not, by any stretch of the imagination, transform them into
full-fledged members of the Arizona political community. They
can be excluded from public office or employment and from jury
duty. They have no right to receive written governmental commu-
nications in their native tongue. Their only "right" is to have a
meaningless document explained to them in their native tongue,
but only if they are able to find some state employee or officer who
is able and willing to speak that language. Small victory, indeed.
c. Yftiguez and Ruiz: Some Concluding Comments
Both the Yiiguez and Ruiz courts attempted to find support
for their arguments in the great-grandfather of all language cases,
Meyer v. Nebraska.97 Others had previously argued that Meyer
would stand in the way of official English laws, but they viewed
that case unabashedly as what it originally was, a substantive due
process decision. 298 And while Meyer long before had been recast
by some as a First Amendment case, 299 it was only after the Ninth
295. Id. at 996.
296. Id.
297. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For the Yiliguez majority's recourse to Meyer, see 69
F.3d at 923, 937, 941, 945-46 & n.29, 948 & n.38. For the view that "there is little
if any First Amendment content to Meyer," see Wexler, supra note 167, at 347. See
also Howard 0. Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in
the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 117, 128 (1986) (arguing
that Meyer offers no particular protection to speech).
The Arizona Supreme Court refused to take sides in this debate. It disclaimed
any reliance on Meyer for its First Amendment analysis, but relied on that case for
its equal protection argument. See 957 P.2d at 1000-01 & n.13.
298. See, e.g., 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 345-46; BREAKTHROUGH, supra
note 171, at 1461-66; see also Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human
Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 885-86, 901-02 (1986). For the view that
Meyer may be viewed today as an equal protection decision protecting language
minorities, see Perea, Demography and Distrust, supra note 167, at 358. The
Yiiiguez court also expressed that view, 69 F.3d at 948 n.33, taking note of Meyer's
citation in the plurality opinion in Herndndez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Ruiz court also relied on Meyer for its equal
protection argument. See 957 P.2d at 1001 & n.13.
299. Most notably by the Supreme Court itself in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965). See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1699, 1733 (1991). For an extended analysis of Meyer, its origin, conse-
quences, subsequent reinterpretation and present-day significance, see William G.
Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L.
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Circuit expressly made the connection between Meyer, the First
Amendment and official English laws in Yhiguez,300 that others
joined the bandwagon.30 1
Meyer, however, irrespective of methodology, is a very poor
base on which to ground arguments against the constitutionality of
official English laws. On the contrary, Meyer would serve to sus-
tain such laws, at least as applied to the public school setting.30
2
The precise question in Meyer was whether a state could abso-
lutely prohibit the teaching of a foreign language in a private
school. The Supreme Court ruled that it could not. But the Court
did not prohibit states from requiring that the whole curriculum be
taught in English, except for teaching of foreign languages. Far
from it, in an extended dictum the Court recognized such powers
in the states:
The power of the State to compel attendance at some school
and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not
questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the state's power
to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports.
Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our
concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme
Court [of Nebraska]. 30 3
Thus, Meyer, even if viewed as a manifestation of freedom of
expression, only stands for the right to use foreign languages in a
private setting.304 More important, that case goes a long way to-
ward recognizing that English is indeed the official language of the
United States.
If the Yhiguez and Ruiz decisions are the best jobs that fed-
eral and state courts can perform to invalidate a state official Eng-
lish provision, I would not be confident that such provisions, or a
comparable federal statute, would meet a similar fate when the
Supreme Court finally decides to face this issue. 30 5 And the em-
phasis by both the Ninth Circuit and the Arizona Supreme Court
REV. 125 (1988).
300. 69 F.3d at 945-46 n.29.
301. See supra note 250.
302. Accord BARON, supra note 59, at 148; TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 60; Ser-
rano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 57.
303. 262 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
304. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 60-62; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
204, at §§ 14.27, 14.28, 14.30, 14.45.
305. The Court's denial of certiorari in Ruiz, see 119 S.Ct. 850 (1999), of course,
carries no precedential weight. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S.
912, 917-18 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.). It may only mean that the Court is not ready
yet to address this issue on the merits; see also the special concurrence of Justice
Martone in Ruiz, which suggested some justiciability problems in that case. See
957 P.2d at 1003.
4191999]
Law and Inequality
on the extreme restrictions of the Arizona provision suggests that
even if the Yhiguez and Ruiz First Amendment rationales are
sound, they might be unavailable for other types of official English
statutes which contain more and broader exceptions.3 08 6
Finally, even if the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed the
Yfiiguez and Ruiz rationales, these could be turned around to pro-
duce unexpected results in the Puerto Rican context. Suppose that
Congress admitted Puerto Rico into the Union with no language
restrictions. Suppose further that the State of Puerto Rico then
repealed its current language statute and made Spanish the only
official language, as was the case between 1991 and 1993,307 or
that its courts continue interpreting the current statute as not re-
quiring Puerto Rico to conduct a proceeding in any language but
Spanish.3 08 What would be the constitutional rights of non-
Spanish speaking United States citizens in Puerto Rico? Accord-
ing to both Yfiiguez and Ruiz, they would only have the constitu-
tional right to receive governmental information in English if they
could find a Puerto Rican public employee who was able and will-
ing to provide it. Epluribus unum?
C. Official English and Puerto Rico: A Recapitulation and a
Proposal
I do not contend that the declaration of English as the official
language of government in the United States is a desirable occur-
rence. It probably is not, and would only serve to exacerbate eth-
nic and cultural divisiveness. But I do contend that in view of the
broad electoral support for such a measure throughout the United
States,3 09 its chances of enactment, at least in the form of a federal
statute, are relatively good in the long run. Legislators have a
natural propensity to follow the wishes of their constituents.
If that federal statute becomes a reality, I further contend
that there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the Su-
preme Court would uphold it. I do not share the seemingly politi-
cally correct current view that such measure would easily be found
306. See, e.g., Arington, supra note 158, at 337-39; Murray, supra note 167, at
584. As more fully discussed supra note 294 and accompanying text, the Ruiz
court itself suggests that other, less restrictive language provisions may pass con-
stitutional muster.
307. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
308. See supra part I-C.
309. See supra notes 158, 192; see also Valente, supra note 167, at 208 n.18
(referring to polls which show that between 65% to 86% of the population favors
making English the official language of government in the United States).
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unconstitutional.31 0
The people of Puerto Rico should not be forced to place their
vernacular on this table of constitutional roulette. And even if
Congress is found to lack the power to enact any such law, the
Constitution may be amended, as many have urged.311 Against the
prospect of that dealer's blackjack, no insurance is available.3 12
I am not suggesting that the amendment route is likely to be
successful in the near future, but its chances for success increase
each time another state approves an official English statute. That
was precisely the strategy designed by its supporters, when initial
attempts at the constitutional amendment method failed. 313 And,
if eventually approved, an English language amendment would
pose a formidable obstacle for the future survival of Spanish as the
principal language of common understanding in Puerto Rico.
In short, to force Puerto Ricans to gamble, without adequate
knowledge and understanding, on a matter so essential to their in-
tegrity as a people is neither "informed consent" nor "full knowl-
edge of the change in their status," as United Nations Resolution
1541 (XV) requires.314 As a matter of basic ethics, the United
States must resolve this issue of language rights before Puerto
Rico is asked to take any vote on whether to join the Union.315
Puerto Rico already was a guinea pig in a United States constitu-
tional experiment, as the Insular Cases clearly show.316 It is sim-
310. For a list of those who hold that view, in one form or another, see supra
note 167.
311. See supra note 156.
312. A student commentator stated in 1985:
The ELA [(English Language Amendment)] would surely destroy any
chance of Puerto Rican statehood. Members of the statehood movement
rely heavily on the proposition that Puerto Rico would be able to choose
Spanish as its official language upon entry to the Union. They base this
assumption on the Tenth Amendment and the "equal footing" doctrine,
and repeatedly asseverate that it would take a constitutional amendment
to remove this power. The ELA is just that amendment.
Joseph Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?
3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 519, 548 (1985) (footnotes omitted). If the ELA would
"destroy any chance of Puerto Rican statehood," what would such an amendment
destroy if enacted after Puerto Rico becomes a state? Id.
313. See id. at 523-24.
314. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) supra note 111.
315. While the constitutionality of the Arizona provision was under considera-
tion by the Supreme Court of that state, one commentator remarked that some
type of United States Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue was not far on
the horizon. See Serrano, supra note 167, at 223-24. The Court's denial of certio-
rari in Ruiz, see 119 S.Ct. 850 (1999), may simply signify a postponement of that
pronouncement.




ply unconscionable to subject it to another such experiment.
If, however, the federal government is intent on subjecting
Puerto Rico to another constitutional experiment, that experiment
should be undertaken and its results evaluated before any plebi-
scite is held. Since the House of Representatives claims that the
federal government has plenary powers over Puerto Rico,3 17 there
is a solution available that would release Puerto Rican voters from
the burden of engaging in at least some of the risky prophecies of
constitutional law already discussed. Instead of waiting for all of
these issues to be resolved after Puerto Rico becomes a state, Con-
gress could facilitate that at least some answers emerge now, be-
fore any vote is taken. Let it legislate and make English the offi-
cial language of the Commonwealth government now, as well as
the language of instruction in all public schools on the Island.
Among nearly four million people, enough plaintiffs with justici-
able, individual rights cases will surely appear.3 18 It would be
most fitting that the colonial experiment which began with Dow-
nes v. Bidwell,3 19 a test case framed in Congress in 1900,320 ap-
proach its end with another test case of Congress's making. That
would certainly precipitate a more knowledgeable exercise of self-
determination, both by Puerto Rico and by the United States.
317. H.R. 856, 105th Cong. § 3(b), §§ 2(2), (4), (7) & (12) (1998).
318. So many potential plaintiffs would make it extremely unlikely that the is-
sue could become moot. Thus, the Supreme Court would even more certainly have
the opportunity to decide on the merits whether the individual rights issues were
correctly decided in Yiiguez and in Ruiz.
319. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
320. See JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 32-39 (1985); Jaime B. Fuster, The Origins
of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 43 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 259, 278-88 (1974).
Citing an impressive array of sources, both Professor Fuster-now a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico-and Judge Torruella-now Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit-tell the following story. In
1899 the McKinley administration was determined to establish free trade between
Puerto Rico and the United States. The Foraker bill so envisaged it, in its original
form. But its final version discriminated against Puerto Rico by establishing a
tariff barrier of 15% of the tariff applicable to international commerce. While sup-
porters of the Act justified the measure as necessary to provide revenue urgently
needed to administer Puerto Rico, its opponents denounced this tariff barrier as a
ploy designed to obtain a definitive Supreme Court ruling that would serve as a
precedent for Congress's future dealings with the problem that was perceived as
truly important: the Philippines. The historical evidence amply supports the mi-
nority's claim. Thus, the political branches of the federal government embarked
on a course of action that would finally require-as they understood it and desired
it-the intervention of the judiciary. See generally TORRUELLA, supra; Fuster, su-
pra; accord Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:
The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 240 (1996).
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IV. Quebec, Puerto Rico and Bilingualism in the United
States: Some Necessary Elucidations
1. The Quebec-Puerto Rico Comparison
Supporters of official English, arguing against Puerto Rican
statehood, have used the example of Quebec to buttress their claim
that the United States does not need to take on a problem that has
vexed the Canadian state since its birth.321 Politicians and schol-
ars who support independence for Puerto Rico have also stressed
the Quebec analogy in order to emphasize to policymakers in the
United States the different nature of the problem at hand, in con-
trast to other statehood processes.322 Others have replied that the
case of Puerto Rico is unlike that of Quebec, and have argued that
millions of Spanish-speakers throughout the United States prove
that the Quebec analogy is fallacious. 323 In this controversy, those
321. See Patrick Buchanan, Let Puerto Rico Be a Nation, N.Y. POST, May 16,
1990, at 1; Patrick Buchanan, Puerto Rico as Our 51st State?, SAN JUAN STAR,
Mar. 23, 1990, at 16; U.S. English Foundation, Inc., Avoiding an American Quebec:
The Future of Puerto Rico and the United States, (visited Mar. 25, 1998)
<http://www.us-english.org/prissue.htm>. Another important official English sup-
porter who is on record as opposing the model of Quebec is the former Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich. See Citing Quebec Referendum,
Calls Bilingualism Divisive, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 1995, at 8.
That point was echoed in 1991 by several Senators on the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, while considering Senate Bill 244, 102d Cong., the modified
successor to the 101st Congress's Senate Bill 712. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 102 Cong., Business Meeting, Feb. 20, 1991, at 19-20
(remarks of Sen. Ford), 28-29 (remarks of Sen. Conrad), 33-34 (remarks of Sen.
Wallop) [hereinafter S. 244 Hearings]. These exchanges are reproduced in
Hernfndez Col6n, supra note 138, at 458-59, 461-62, 464-65.
322. See, e.g., Rubdn Berrios Martinez, Independence for Puerto Rico: The Only
Solution, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 578, 583 (1976) (recalling that just three decades ago
support for independence in Quebec hovered around only 8.8% of the popular vote);
Ruben Berrios Martinez, supra note 117, at 110 C'Is the United States willing to
risk a Caribbean Quebec or a tropical Northern Ireland?"); Manuel Rodriguez
Orellana, Quebec y Puerto Rico: Un Hemisferio y Dos Soledades, 67 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 1079 (1998) (reviewing the many parallelisms between Quebec and Puerto
Rico).
Acceptance of the Quebec-Puerto Rico analogy has come from other quarters.
See Wexler, supra note 167, at 377 n.21:
I am often asked why I do not compare the United States to Quebec,
rather than to France. But the comparison to Quebec is much less appro-
priate than one might think. Francophone Canadians are a linguistic mi-
nority with respect to Canada as a whole; thus, in terms of political status
and position, the best analogy to Quebec is probably Puerto Rico. Within
the province of Quebec, francophones are a linguistic majority, of course,
and a strong argument can be made that their demands for a unilingual
Quebec are largely due to many years of repressive anglophone policies.
Id.
323. See, e.g., Romero-Barcel6, supra note 100, at 63, 68-69, 72. Yet, even for-
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who stress the similarities between Puerto Rico and Quebec are on
firmer ground.
There are, of course, important differences between Quebec
and Puerto Rico. Quebec's geographic and economic position
makes it a much more important issue in Canadian politics than
Puerto Rico could ever aspire to be in the political debate in the
United States. 324 The United States survived for more than a cen-
tury without Puerto Rico and would certainly survive without it,
while there is a serious question as to whether Canada, as pres-
ently constituted, could survive without Quebec. 325 Obviously,
that puts Quebec in a stronger bargaining position vis-d-vis Can-
ada than Puerto Rico could ever hope to be in its relation to the
United States.
That stronger bargaining position is reflected in the issue of
language rights in Canada, both at the federal level and in the
province of Quebec. 326 For more than a century after the enact-
ment of the British North America Act of 1867,327 Francophones
clamored for stronger and clearer recognition of their linguistic re-
mer Governor Romero saw fit to add: "So long as individual rights-including
those pertaining to our language and culture---continue to be respected in Puerto
Rico, there will be no civil disorder, nor any significant upsurge in terrorism." Id.
at 69. The rejection of the Quebec-Puerto Rico analogy, premised on cultural and
linguistic diversity in the United States, was also central to the remarks of several
Senators during the consideration of Senate Bill 244 in 1991. See S. 244 Hearings,
supra note 321, at 23-25 (Sen. Bradley), 31-33 (Sen. Wirth), 46-48 (Sen. Akaka),
quoted in Hernfndez Col6n, supra note 138, at 459-60, 462-63, 466-67.
The argument against the Quebec-Hispanic analogy is powerfully made, but
without any reference to the special case of Puerto Rico, in Richardson, supra note
113.
324. On the Qu~bcois question, see generally, RICHARD HANDLER, NATIONALISM
AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN QUEBEC (1988); JONATHAN LEMCO, TURMOIL IN
THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: THE QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT AND ITS IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1994); JEREMY WEBBER,
REIMAGINING CANADA: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, COMMUNITY AND THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION (1994); Lowrey, supra note 167; Salvatore Massa, Secession by Mu-
tual Assent: A Comparative Analysis of the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the
Separatist Movement in Canada, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 183, 217 (1995); Richardson,
supra note 113; Kevin Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context-Legal
Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1357 (1993).
325. See TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 3; Lowrey, supra note 167, at 258-65;
Massa, supra note 324, at 217-18; Sneesby, supra note 324, at 1387-88.
326. For a more detailed exploration of this issue, see JoSP TRIAS MONGE, EL
CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURAS JURDICAS EN PUERTO RICO 23-26 (1991); Lowrey, supra
note 167, at 224-65; Terrence Meyerhoff, Multiculturalism and Language Rights in
Canada: Problems and Prospects, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 913 (1994); Richard-
son, supra note 113, at 525-30.
327. 30 Vict., ch. 3 (Eng.). Although the Act proclaimed that both English and
French were official languages of the national parliament and of Quebec's legisla-
ture, French actually had second-class status in the federal government and no
official status in the provinces. See Lowrey, supra note 167, at 226-30.
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ality. That clamor led to the enactment of the Official Languages
Act of 1969,328 which in section two conferred to the English and
French languages official status within the federal government.
That was followed in 1974 by the enactment in the province of
Quebec of the Official Language Act,329 which proclaimed French
as the only official language of that province, and in 1977 by the
Charter of the French Language,330 which made French the only
official language of the Quebec parliament and of the provincial
judicial system. 331 Finally, in 1982, at the request of Canada, the
United Kingdom approved the Canada Act of 1982,332 which em-
powered Canada to control its constitutional operations and in-
cluded the Canadian-drafted Constitution Act of 1982, with a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.333 The Charter reiterates that
Canada is officially bilingual334 and guarantees Anglophones and
Francophones linguistic equality in federal government func-
tions,33 5 as well as rights to education of children in a minority
language.336 Quebec, however, has refused to endorse the Consti-
tution Act of 1982, and two proposed agreements to grant that
province certain rights in exchange for its endorsement-the Lake
Meech and Charlestown Accords-have failed to gain the ratifica-
tion of all of the Anglophone provinces. 337
It is evident that from a legal perspective Francophones in
Canada-however dissatisfied they may feel-are on a superior
plane to Puerto Ricans, both at the federal and at the local level.
But from a sociological standpoint, the predominance of Spanish in
Puerto Rico is even stronger than that of French in Quebec.
328. S.C. 1968-69, ch. 54, R.S.C. chs. 0-2 (1970) (Can.).
329. S.Q., ch. 6 (1974) (Can.).
330. S.Q., ch. 5 (1977) (Can.).
331. The act also imposed serious restrictions on access to schools in English.
Some of these restrictions were later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.
See A.G. Quebec v. Quebec Protestant School Bds., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66; TRIAS
MONGE, supra note 326, at 24-25; Lowrey, supra note 167, at 242-43.
332. Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
333. Constitution Act of 1982, Part I, §§ 1-34. (Can.)
334. See id. § 16(1).
335. See id. §§ 16-20.
336. See id. § 23.
337. See Meyerhoff, supra note 326, at 977-96; Richardson, supra note 113, at
528-30. From a purely legal standpoint, the Constitution of 1982 is binding on
Quebec; prior to 1982, constitutional amendments did not require the unanimous
consent of the provinces. See Lowrey, supra note 167, at 248 n. 134. However, that
is another example of the limits of law. The generalized Qu~bdcois view as to that
Constitution's lack of political legitimacy has led to calls for secession and to
strenuous attempts from Anglophone Canadian leaders to engineer an agreement
to appease Quebec. See Lowery, supra note 167, at 247-65.
1999]
Law and Inequality
Puerto Rico is a monolingual society, where less than a quarter of
its residents are truly fluent in English, while fewer than 2% of
those residents do not speak any Spanish. 338 In contrast, in Que-
bec there coexists a sizeable group-18%-whose native tongue is
not French, of which little more than half are functional in that
language, with a majoritarian segment (82%) whose native tongue
is French, of which one-third are fluent in English. 339 The statis-
tics for the principal metropolitan areas in Quebec and in Puerto
Rico show the same contrast. While 41% of Montreal's population
is unilingually Francophone, 48% is bilingual and 11% is unilin-
gually Anglophone, 340 70.4% of the population of the San Juan
metropolitan area is only fluent in Spanish, 27.9% is bilingual and
0.4% is unilingually Anglophone. 341 Bilingualism in Quebec is evi-
dently more widespread than in Puerto Rico. Furthermore the
sense of separate identity of Puerto Ricans considerably exceeds
that of the Qubdcois.342
The importance of English in Quebec is more than a conse-
338. See supra note 41. Puerto Rico is as monolingual in Spanish as the United
States is in English. The 98.2% of Spanish-speakers in Puerto Rico, see supra note
41, mirrors the 97% of English-speakers in the United States. See BARON, supra
note 59, at 177.
339. See LEMCO, supra note 324, at 10, 18. The latest statistics available show
the following linguistic breakdown among residents of Quebec:
Language Population Percentage
Only English 358,505 5.09
Only French 3,951715 56.09
Bilingual P2,660,590 37.77
Neither English nor French 74,270 1.05
Total 7,045,080 100.00
RECENSEMENT DE 1996 - STATISTIQUE CANADA, provided to the author by Bureau
de la statistique du Quebec, Centre d'information et de documentation,
<CID@bsq.gouv.qc.ca>.
According to another set of statistics, in 1981 French was the mother tongue of
82.4% of the population of Quebec, while English was that of 11%; the mother
tongue of the remaining 6.6% was another. See SHEILA MCLEOD ARNOPOULOS &
DOMINIQUE CLIFT, THE ENGLISH FACT IN QUEBEC 230 (2d ed. 1984).
340. See WEBBER, supra note 324, at 218. Statistics for 1981 break down as fol-
lows: 41.5% unilingually Francophone, 45.0% bilingual, 12.0% unilingually Anglo-
phone, and 1.5% neither. See ARNOPOULOS & CLIFr, supra note 339, at 233.
341. See CENSUS, supra note 41, at 71. Of that population, 98.2% is able to
speak Spanish, 28.3% is fluent in English and 1.3% is not fluent in either. See id.
342. Accord Rodriguez Orellana, supra note 322, at 1092. In 1990, a poll re-
vealed that 55% of the inhabitants of Quebec consider themselves first as citizens
of that province. See Lowrey, supra note 167, at 260 n. 198. Meanwhile, the 1993
Ateneo Study revealed that the comparable figure in Puerto Rico is 91%. See
Ateneo Study, supra note 45, at 84-85.
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quence of that province's political relation to its Anglophone sis-
ters. It is also-perhaps principally-a by-product of a demo-
graphic reality: the presence within its borders of 800,000 persons
whose home language is English, and who hold a major share of
the means of production.3 43 That important segment of Quebec's
population migrated from the rest of Canada and from other parts
of the world.344 In that sense, Quebec has been "colonized" by An-
glophone Canada in much the same fashion, although certainly not
as extensively, as the United States colonized those of its territo-
ries where a substantial number of non-English speakers origi-
nally lived, such as Louisiana,345 Hawaii, 346 New Mexico 347 and,
343. The home language figure, dating from 1981, is found in ARNOPOULOS &
CLIFT, supra note 339, at 230. Although the situation has changed significantly as
a consequence of the "Quiet Revolution," in the 1960s Quebec's Francophones
owned a mere 22% of manufacturing businesses and only 26% of its financial insti-
tutions. See LEMCO, supra note 324, at 4. Another set of statistics, from 1978,
show that while 30.6% of all non-Francophones were situated in the two highest
earning brackets, the corresponding percentage for Francophones was 20.0%. See
ARNOPOULOS & CLIFT, supra note 339, at 238.
344. The pro-independence Parti Qudbdcois blamed the Canadian federal gov-
ernment for its hair-splitting 50.6% to 49.4% loss in the October, 1995 referendum
on separation from Canada. It argued that an abnormally large number of Anglo-
phone aliens residing in Quebec were granted Canadian citizenship shortly before
that referendum to influence the result. See Rodriguez Orellana, supra note 322,
at 1094.
345. The purchaser of the Louisiana territory-Thomas Jefferson-proposed a
mass settlement of Anglophones in that territory, to alter the legal and linguistic
status of French. See BARON, supra note 59, at 2.
Louisiana was the first and only state admitted into the Union with a majority
population of non-Enghsh speakers. See id. at xv-xvi, 83. Yet, only some 50 years
after statehood, all state constitutional protection of the French language was
eliminated, and Louisiana became in fact an English-only state. See id. at 83-87.
The weak recognition of "historic linguistic and cultural origins" in the Constitu-
tion of 1974, LA. CONST. art. 12, § 4, has not changed that condition.
346. The impact of the English language and of United States values and cus-
toms in Hawaii had already begun early in the nineteenth century with the arrival
of New England missionaries, who instructed most Hawaiians in their native lan-
guage and in English. See NANCY FAIRES CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A
HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 215 (1983).
According to these authors, "[a]s the century wore on, however, English became
increasingly predominant as the language of instruction and public life." Id.; see
also SYLVESTER K STEVENS, AMERICAN EXPANSION IN HAWAII, 1842-1898, at 8-9,
25, 32-33 (1945). By the middle of that century, moreover, the influx of population
into California and the Pacific Coast due to the gold rush also contributed to an
expanded Anglophone population in Hawaii. See id. at 32-33.
During the first five decades of this century, while the population of the
United States as a whole doubled, Hawaii's tripled. This fact can be attributed to
immigration basically from two main sources: foreign immigrants and immigrants
from the mainland United States. Of the total population increase experienced by
Hawaii between 1960 and 1970, net immigration represented about 40%. During
that period, mainland United States immigrants constituted over three-quarters of
the total number of immigrants. See generally DAVID HOOD & BELLA Z. BELL, IN-
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generally, all of the Southwestern states. 348
For geographic reasons-its condition as an island of only
3,600 square miles-as well as for demographic reasons-its world
record population density-Puerto Rico has never been open to
such colonization, and most probably never will. 349 Anglophones in
Puerto Rico have always composed a tiny, mostly self-contained,
and largely un-assimilated group. Most of them have learned
barely enough Spanish to get by. Their lack of numbers makes it
impossible for them to play the role that other United States citi-
zens played in settling and eventually controlling the economic
MIGRATION AS A COMPONENT OF HAWAII POPULATION GROWTH: ITS LEGAL IM-
PLICATIONS 2-15 (1973).
As for foreign immigrants, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the
Hawaiian government fomented the importation of large numbers of contract la-
borers from China, Japan and the Philippines. This was in response to the insuffi-
ciency of the Hawaiian population to meet the labor demands of sugar plantations.
See ELIZABETH BUCK, THE POLITICS OF CULTURE AND HISTORY IN HAWAI'I 74
(1993). As a result, the percentage of the Hawaiian population born elsewhere
shifted from 9,530 (16.4%) in 1878 to 34,306 (42.6%) in 1884. See ROBERT
SCHMITH, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF HAWAII, 1778-1965 182 (1968).
Although the Hawaiian language is protected by the Constitution of that state,
HAW. CONST. § 4, this is merely a symbolic gesture, since most residents of Hawaii
do not speak it. See BARON, supra note 59, at 10. Moreover, section four of the
Hawaii Constitution goes on to state that Hawaiian "shall be required for public
acts and transactions only as required by law," thus conferring upon that language
subsidiary or second-class status. To compare Hawaii's dual language protection
with Puerto Rico's is untenable, unless it is to show the very subsidiary nature of
English in Puerto Rico.
347. The early territorial legislature of New Mexico conducted its business in
Spanish, but that situation had changed by 1889. See BARON, supra note 59, at 95.
On the sixty-year drive for statehood in New Mexico, which met with strong Con-
gressional opposition, principally due to the question of language, see id. at 95-104;
see also KLOSS, supra note 188, at 128 (relating how Congress acquiesced to New
Mexico statehood only after there was a majority of Anglophones in that territory).
348. See BARON, supra note 59, at 187:
The American Southwest did not become the "Qudbec" of the United
States because from the outset it was sparsely populated by its Hispanic
settlers, and because Hispanic immigration was largely cut off after the
Mexican War. Although the original Hispanic families of the Southwest
showed a high degree of language retention, particularly in the rural ar-
eas where they remained, they were quickly outnumbered by Anglos once
the latter began entering the area in force after annexation in 1848.
(Mexican immigration did not resume in great numbers until the labor
shortages of the two world wars, by which time English had gained an
unerodable advantage.) Quebec, on the other hand, retained a majority
French population who could be expected to react negatively, and with
vigor, to the repression of their language in the national and the provin-
cial arena.
Id.
349. See BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 171, at 1475-76. According to Trias
Monge, "only if all the people in the rest of the world moved to America, would the
United States have a population density similar to that of Puerto Rico." TRIAS
MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 2.
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and political life of the above-mentioned territories, or even the
role that Anglophone Canadians have played in Quebec.350
2. Bilingualism in the United States
There remains the issue of bilingualism throughout the
United States. Some have claimed that the existence and persis-
tence of minority languages in the United States prove that state-
hood for Puerto Rico would not present a different problem.351
That is a very serious misconception. What statehood leaders
claim is not that Puerto Ricans will be able to continue speaking
Spanish at home and have regular Spanish classes at school, but
that the principal language of government, instruction and com-
mon understanding in a State of Puerto Rico will be Spanish.352
Currently, no linguistic community in the United States is making
such a claim; and of all those which did make it in the past, none
even came close to succeeding. 353
Bilingual education programs in the United States are transi-
tional; their aim is to permit students to master English as soon as
possible, so that they can enter the regular curriculum in Eng-
lish.354 No federal program exists to permit students to maintain
their native tongue 355 and no court decision has ever held that
350. See Rodriguez Orellana, supra note 322, at 1080 n.2, 1088.
351. See supra note 323.
352. That this posture may not be popular even in some "liberal" circles in the
United States is illustrated in BARON, supra note 59, at 22. This author recounts
the opposition of some members or former members of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) to that organization's stand against official English proposals;
one of them expressed that "millions of aliens have forced their way into our coun-
try, and as they gain majorities in various areas they will change the law to force
Spanish in the same way the French have done in Quebec." Id. Of course, French
Qudb~cois have always been there, and always in the majority. So have Spanish-
speaking Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico.
353. See id. at 64-132 (discussing historical attempts to preserve German in
Pennsylvania and other states, French in Louisiana and Spanish in the South-
west).
354. See id. at 11-12, 173, 192; Richardson, supra note 113, at 532 n.74. That
was also the main thrust of the most important Supreme Court decision on the
subject, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), which held that to force non-English
speaking children into the regular curriculum violates section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994), barring discrimination on account of
national origin. The Lau holding was later reaffirmed in specific legislation. See
20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1994); see also the Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-
3386 (1988). And federal courts have refused to approve bilingual education pro-
grams which do not comply with the transitional requirement. See, e.g., Cintr6n v.
Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
355. Except for Puerto Rican diaspora students, upon their return to the Island.
See supra note 64, discussing 20 U.S.C. § 7432 (1994). That statute permits
Puerto Rico to operate a maintenance system in Spanish, while denying such ulti.
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there is a constitutional right to such a program. 56 That is worlds
apart from the situation of French in Quebec and of Spanish in
Puerto Rico.357
Statehood leaders do not just claim that future generations of
Puerto Rican children will continue eating bacalaftos (cod fritters),
but that they and their descendants will be able to read and write
the recipe in fluent Spanish, in a homogeneous Hispanic society.
Hispanic communities in the United States have not accomplished
that objective. Those communities lack political and cultural cohe-
sion, and the rate of anglicization of their newer generations par-
allels that of other minorities. 358 If statehood leaders can marshal
enough political muscle after statehood to make their claim a re-
ality, it could pose a serious challenge to the vision of e pluribus
mate objective to Native Americans:
Programs authorized under this part that serve Native American chil-
dren, Native Pacific Island children, and children in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, notwithstanding any other provision of this part, may include
programs of instruction, teacher training, curriculum development,
evaluation, and testing designed for Native American children and youth
learning and studying Native American languages and children and youth
of limited-Spanish proficiency, except that one outcome of such programs
serving Native American children shall be increased English proficiency
among such children.
Id.
356. See BARON, supra note 59, at 10-11. Attempts to maintain native languages
through private supplementary schools have not been successful:
While such supplementary minority-language schools are an important
symbol of ethnic and cultural identity, they have not been particularly ef-
fective. Their mother-tongue instruction is more likely to resemble the
foreign language instruction found in the public schools than the mainte-
nance of a non-English first language. In general, sociolinguists have con-
cluded that despite maintenance efforts on the part of ethnic communi-
ties, minority languages tend to survive in the United States more as
cultural artifacts-like ethnic restaurants-than as living languages
transmitted across generations.
Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
357. A student commentator perceptively states:
[TIwo crucial differences ... invalidate the comparison between Canada
and the United States: first, both French and English have been guaran-
teed equal status in Canada since its inception, while the United States
has never officially guaranteed the language rights of any immigrant
class; and second, Quebec's separatist movement involves a cohesive
French culture, while English language legislation in the United States
targets Spanish-speaking immigrants who lack the cultural cohesion to
pose a serious secessionist threat.
Richardson, supra note 113, at 522. Ms. Richardson, however, fails to take into
account the case of Puerto Rico and its similarity to that of Quebec.
358. See BARON, supra note 59, at 188, citing CALVIN VELTMAN, LANGUAGE
SHIFT IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (1983); see also Karst, supra note 234, at 352
('These incentives [to integrate into the mainstream society] are powerful; in the
past they have inexorably led to the adoption of English and, for the most part, to
the exclusive use of English by the third or fourth generation.").
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unun of the United States.359 However, if political realities after
statehood turn out to be less rosy, then Puerto Rico as we know it
might be doomed after statehood.
I do not assume that law will overpower culture, but neither
can I assume the opposite. The relationship between law and cul-
ture is one of reciprocal influence.360 From that standpoint, I am
concerned that the influence of a federal language law over Span-
ish in Puerto Rico would be sufficiently substantial in the long run,
as to present a separate and independent reason to reject the road
to statehood. Even if such a federal law did not signify the demise
of Spanish as the primary vehicle of communication in private af-
fairs, it would have sufficient influence over Puerto Rican culture
and identity, so as to change it in ways that are unacceptable to
the overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans. Such a law would
certainly make English truly an official language of government in
Puerto Rico and would legitimate Anglophones to demand that
government functions be conducted in that language. 361 That is
more than enough.
Additionally, one cannot view the impact of law over culture
in isolation. There are other events, besides a mere statute, that
may have a profound effect on the preservation of Spanish in
Puerto Rico. Some of these events are already taking place, and
statehood would only accelerate them. Extensive cable-TV pene-
tration, education of the children of the elite in English-language
private schools and return migration of mainland Puerto Ricans,
359. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 189, at 73-74. It has been suggested that three
factors are necessary preconditions for an ethnically based movement for political
autonomy: 1) a core territory in which the ethnic minority enjoys substantial or
majority presence; 2) a strong basis of community identity; and, 3) the presence of
the national majority in the core territory occupying a privileged economic posi-
tion. See Lowrey, supra note 167, at 303, citing Colin Williams, More Than
Tongue Can Tell: Linguistic Factors in Ethnic Separatism, in LINGUISTIC MI-
NORITIES, POLICIES AND PLURALISM 179, 184-85 (John Edwards, ed. 1984). Puerto
Rico clearly meets all three criteria today, and will continue to meet them in the
foreseeable future, while Lowrey must engage in a prediction that Hispanics in
certain sectors of the United States might meet all three sometime in the future.
See Lowrey, supra note 167, at 309.
360. That insight is shared by writers who otherwise profess diverging views on
the nature of law. See, e.g., LABOUR, LAW AND CRIME: AN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 10-11 (Francis Snyder & Douglas Hay eds., 1987); Martha Minow, Rights
and Cultural Difference, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 347-65 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995); Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Tradi-
tions in Law and Society Research, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 165, 173 (1987-88); James
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Comu-
nal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985). For an excellent analysis of the reciprocal
influence of law and social reality, with particular emphasis on the case of Puerto
Rico, see Rivera Ramos, supra note 320.
361. See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 74.
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whose children mostly speak only English, are some of these fac-
tors. 362 As long as Puerto Rico has some control over the language
of government and public instruction, these factors by themselves
may not prove decisive, even in the long run. Without such con-
trol, however, the prospect may be quite different.
The pervasive worldwide influence of English, as the lan-
guage of economics, diplomacy and communications is undeniable.
However, that influence has not induced other societies to adopt
English as their main vehicle of government communication, to
the detriment of their vernacular. While no one contests that
Puerto Ricans should have the opportunity to learn English, it is
an entirely different proposition to level the road for a future dis-
placement of one language over another.
The failure of the United States in its attempt to impose
English in Puerto Rico during the first fifty years of this century
does not prove that it is an impossible task.36 3 It is a matter of re-
cord that statehooders were, in general, supportive of such
plans.36 4 But they were clearly not in the majority. Thus, for the
majority of Puerto Ricans the issue was one of them-the Ameri-
cans-against us Puerto Ricans.3 6 5 If statehooders become a ma-
jority, their historical quest for Puerto Ricans to become Ameri-
cans will present a completely changed scenario, one more
conducive toward the imposition of English. 366 It would not be the
first time that a majority discriminated against itself for self-
deprecatory reasons, as the Supreme Court suggested in Cas-
362. See Mufiiz Argiuelles, supra note 40, at 74, 76. On the latter of these fac-
tors, see also Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, supra note 57, at 44.
363. That is the traditional argument of pro-statehood ideologues. See, e.g., 4
BOTHWELL GONZALEZ, supra note 99, at 474-75.
364. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 60; Serrano Geyls & Gorrin
Peralta, supra note 57, at 34-36. And some of them still may be, as shown by the
statements of Mr. Romero Barcel6 in 1989 before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources:
Before 1940, Senator, we had in Puerto Rico about 500 exchange teachers
who came from the mainland. Just about everyone that graduated from
high school in the 30s and 20s had a teacher who was Mrs. Brown, Mrs.
Smith, something or other. When the Popular Party came into office and
control, they did away with that program. By the time Luis Ferr6, the
first statehood governor, came into office in 1969, there were less than a
dozen or two dozen of those teachers left in Puerto Rico....
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 187.
365. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 158-59 (1980) (arguing that
impermissible stereotypes are those of the "we/they" type, where those who make
the classification have no reason to feel empathy with those against which that
classification operates).
366. Indeed, that may be a reasonable explanation for recent changes in educa-
tional policies adopted by the current pro-statehood administration. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
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taileda v. Partida,367 and as Justice Marshall more fully explained
in his concurrence in that case.368 It is not at all surprising that
one of the principal statehood leaders felt the urge to protest in the
1989 Senate hearings against the use in Puerto Rico's public
schools of first grade books that start by telling their young read-
ers that they are Puerto Ricans. 369
Even before statehood, the current pro-statehood government
is showing signs of what could be in store if that movement ulti-
mately succeeds. The English immersion laboratories in public
schools 370 are just one of many measures which raise doubts as to
the sincerity of the statehooders' nonnegotiability claim. For ex-
367. 430 U.S. 482, 496-500 (1977) (holding that a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination against Hispanics in the selection of grand juries was not rebutted
by the fact that such ethnic group was a governing majority in the county in ques-
tion).
368. See id. at 501 ("Social scientists agree that members of minority groups
frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate
themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative
attitudes towards the minority.") (Marshall, J., concurring). As Dean Ely has ex-
pressed it: "A sufficiently pervasive prejudice can block its own correction not
simply by keeping its victims 'in the closet' but also by convincing even them of its
correctness." ELY, supra note 365, at 165.
369. Mr. Romero then testified:
So, right now, for instance, in the public schools of Puerto Rico, under this
[Popular Party] administration, they have a book for first graders, written
by Ricardo Alegria which [sic] is the Cultural Advisor to the Governor,
where it talks about Puerto Rico. And when it refers to the nation, it says
our friendly nation, the U.S.
It talks about Puerto Rico as my country and it makes no reference what-
soever to the fact that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens. Nowhere in that
book. And that is used for the students in the first few grades.
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 187-88. The next day, Mr. Romero introduced for
the record an excerpt of the first page of the book in question, entitled MY FIRST
BOOK OF PUERTO Rico. The passage to which Mr. Romero alluded, as he himself
translated it, reads:
Who am I?
I am a Puerto Rican.
My family is Puerto Rican.
Puerto Rico is my fatherland, my country.
Puerto Rico is a country of the Caribbean.
Other countries like Puerto Rico in the Caribbean are the Dominican Re-
public, Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad, Venezuela, and Colombia.
Puerto Rico, my country, also has symbols. The symbols of Puerto Rico
are the flag, the seal and the hymn.
Puerto Rico, as every other country, has its flag.
In Puerto Rico, my fatherland, also flies the flag of the United States of
America because Puerto Rico is associated with the United States.
We must respect both flags because they are the national symbols of two
countries, ours, Puerto Rico, and the friendly country, the United States,
with whom we are associated.
Id. at 297.
370. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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ample, in 1994 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held unconstitu-
tional under the Constitution of Puerto Rico, a measure that cre-
ated a voucher program to promote the transfer of public school
students to private schools.371 Attempts to privatize education in
Puerto Rico, particularly in view of the growing number of Eng-
lish-language private schools,372 are viewed with suspicion in
many quarters. The government, moreover, has not relented on
such plans. After a failed initial attempt to create a private foun-
dation to pursue the same goal,37 3 the government has just legis-
lated to divert some forty million dollars annually from the Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico to create a scholarship fund that will
promote the transfer of students from public elementary, secon-
dary and higher learning institutions to those of the private sec-
tor.3 74 Another constitutional confrontation is looming on the hori-
zon.
375
V. Self-Determination for Puerto Rico and for the United
States: Some Indispensable Steps
The decision to admit a state whose culture, language and
way of life are distinct and very different from the first fifty may
be as momentous for the United States as it would be for Puerto
Rico. It calls for an ample and vigorous debate throughout the
United States-in and out of Congress--of an even larger dimen-
sion than that of 1898.376 It is truly perplexing that the prospect of
371. See Asociaci6n de Maestros v. Torres, 94 J.T.S. 145 (1994) (applying P.R.
CONST. art. II, § 5: "No public property or public funds shall be used for the sup-
port of schools or educational institutions other than those of the state."). For a
favorable review of this decision, see Jos6 Julifin Alvarez Gonzflez & Ana Isabel
Garcia Safl, Derecho Constitucional, in Andlisis del Tdrinino 1994-95 del Tribunal
Supremo de Puerto Rico, 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 799, 834-43 (1996).
372. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
373. See Alvarez Gonzflez & Garcia Safl, supra note 371, at 843 & n. 193.
374. See Designan Candidatos al Consejo de Becas, EL NUEVO DIA, June 27,
1998, at 26.
375. The Teachers' Association filed suit challenging the constitutionality of this
new law. See Teacher's Group Challenges Rossell6 'Opportunities' Law, SAN JUAN
STAR, July 16, 1998, at 8. The Teachers' Federation and a coalition of university
students have also expressed their willingness to do likewise. See Carmen Millfin,
Alborota el Avispero la Nueva Ley, EL NUEVO DfA, June 28, 1998, at 28; Luis R.
Varela, Prorneten Retar la ley Educativa, EL NUEVO DIA, June 27, 1998, at 36. For
the view that any such program violates the precise Puerto Rican constitutional
prohibition of government support of private education, see Alvarez Gonzilez &
Garcia Safl, supra note 371, at 843.
376. On the nature of the robust debate of 1898, see supra note 320, as well as
the books of TRIAS MONGE, supra notes 8, 18. On the need for a debate on state-
hood for Puerto Rico, see Editorial, Go Slow on 51st State, BOSTON HERALD, Mar.
7, 1998, at 12 ("Americans everywhere need to debate whether a culture so differ-
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Puerto Rican statehood is almost completely ignored in the current
intense debate over language policy in the United States, even
though such an event could radically alter the very terms of that
debate.3 77
The people of the United States and their political leaders
must openly address a myriad of questions, such as the following:
Do culture and language matter in structuring a political organi-
zation?378 Are modern federations whose components have diverse
cultural and linguistic traits truly similar to the brand of federal-
ism practiced in the United States?3 79 If not, is the difference re-
lated to those divergent cultural and linguistic traits? If it is, does
that mean that a federation whose components exhibit such con-
trasting traits mnust be looser and less centralized than that of the
ent from the mainland culture can fit into the union, and whether it should be ad-
mitted if a substantial minority doesn't want in-likely true for Puerto Rico").
377. Even those few who mention Puerto Rico fail to make the necessary con-
nection:
The eighty to one hundred thousand people who chanted "Inglds No!" to
express opposition to a law making both Spanish and English the official
languages of Puerto Rico may be seen by the American public as a minor
nuisance in a faraway place. For the issue to hit home, the public will
have to be exposed to a situation akin to what provoked the Anglos in
Dade County in 1980-frequent uses of non-English in public forums.
TATALOVICH, supra note 6, at 257. The author seems to ignore the fact that the
"faraway place" is knocking at the door of his "home." Another author who men-
tions the 1993 march for Spanish at the very end of a 100-page article, without
making any other reference to Puerto Rico, is Meyerhoff, supra note 326, at 1012
n.521.
378. See, e.g., BARON, supra note 59, at 6 ("So central is language to political
organization that in many societies defining the language has become tantamount
to defining nationality.").
379. For an argument that the United States is no longer a federal but a unitary
state, with a modest degree of decentralization, see Edward L. Rubin, The Funda-
mentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009 (1997). Ac-
cording to Professor Rubin:
[F]ederalism was once an important principle for regulating relations be-
tween the states and the national government, but that it has now become
irrelevant in that arena. It remains relevant, however, in regulating rela-
tions between the national government and the Native American tribes
that continue to possess reservation land, and between the national gov-
ernment and America's territorial possessions, such as American Samoa,
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands .... These cultural and
political forces have rendered federalism irrelevant in contemporary
America. Federalism is a political expedient to achieve partial unity when
people are divided into territorial groups, with identifiable differences be-
tween them and a sense of loyalty to their particular group. In the United
States, there are no longer any such territorial groupings; everyone lives
in the same place, and that place is a vast, interacting, homogenized na-
tional culture. Thus, no compromise is required and no expedient is nec-
essary. Americans have diverse views, and belong to various interest
groups, but the conflicts among those interest groups are national ones,
played out in a national arena.
Id. at 1041, 1056.
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United States? 380 Is the United States ready and committed to re-
define its notion of federalism?38 1 Would admission of Puerto Rico
as a state only be a small step in a much larger political reorgani-
zation in the huge continent that the rest of the world calls Amer-
ica? Is the United States contemplating this?
Or is it that the United States believes the answers to be oth-
erwise? Does it predict that modern multilingual and multicul-
tural federations will eventually assume a form of integration
more closely resembling that of the United States? Does it believe
that the relationship between Scotland, Lombardy, Flanders and
Catalonia will in time resemble that of California, Mississippi,
Iowa and Vermont? Does it, therefore, predict that cultural and
380. See id. This is, for example, the case of Canada, where linguistic and cul-
tural differences may provide an important explanation. This critical difference
between the United States and Canada has been developed elsewhere:
Another distinction arises from the loose nature of Canada's federation,
which has fostered more provincial than national allegiance. Canadians,
particularly Quebeckers, tend to identify with their provinces more
strongly than with Canada as a nation. In contrast, the fifty states have
come together as a more tightly knit nation than its northern neighbor
and the regional identity is not found in the United States as it is in Can-
ada. Americans possess a national sense of community, tending to con-
sider their status as Americans more significant than their status as
"Tennesseeans" or "Californians."
Richardson, supra note 113, at 532 (footnotes omitted). As shown in the Ateneo
Study, supra note 45, at 9, 91% of the inhabitants of the potential 51st state con-
sider themselves Puerto Ricans first.
And in spite of the relative looseness of the Canadian federation, Quebec sepa-
ratists envision an even looser economic confederation based on the European
Union model. See Massa, supra note 324, at 217, citing MAUREEN COVELL,
THINKING ABOUT THE REST OF CANADA: OPTIONS FOR CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC 29
(York University Constitutional Reform Project Study No. 6, 1991).
381. For the argument that it should not, see Rubin, supra note 379, at 1064:
Federalism is a bit like abdominal surgery. It can save the political life of
a nation under certain circumstances, but it is not benign and should not
be resorted to without a reason. It can be divisive, exaggerating political
differences that might otherwise have dissipated over time, and exacer-
bating conflicts that might otherwise have been resolved. Moreover, be-
cause it grants political sub-units definitive rights against the central
government, it means that some residents of those sub-units are likely to
be treated in a way that the majority of the nation regards as wrong, and
even immoral. Perhaps the reason why people are talking about federal-
ism more these days is that we have managed so well without it that we
have forgotten its dangers. It held our sharply-divided nation together for
seventy years, but only by allowing millions of Americans to be held in
slavery long after the majority of whites had recognized the horrors of
that institution, and only by preserving sectional differences that sent the
[nation] spiraling into civil war. We have done a lot better-not perfectly,
but better-in the past seventy years, during which federalism has
quickly declined into irrelevance. We are unlikely to revive federalism-
certainly, a few Supreme Court cases will not do so-but we would be
ill-advised even to try.
[Vol. 17:359
LANGUAGE IN PUERTO RICO
linguistic differences between the fifty states and Puerto Rico will
wane after statehood,38 2 or will prove to have no political signifi-
cance? Do Puerto Ricans share that belief? Is it important
whether they do share it? What would be the consequence of an
erroneous prediction, "[a] false step,"38 3 either on the part of the
United States or on that of Puerto Rico?38 4
However it answers these and other such questions, 38 5 the
United States must spell out, much more clearly than it has until
now, its expectation concerning language in Puerto Rico.38 6 If it
expects and welcomes the idea that a State of Puerto Rico may
continue communicating with its residents in Spanish and that no
382. Would that view be predicated on a version of Social Darwinism? Or would
the federal government aid in the promotion of such end, as it invariably has in
the past?:
The federal government actively used minority languages to recruit set-
tlers for its sparsely populated territories in the Midwest and West, then
withheld statehood from territories that lacked English-speaking majori-
ties. In addition, both economic pressure and consciously articulated pol-
icy encourage minority language speakers to adopt English at the expense
of their native tongue.
BARON, supra note 59, at 14. Is that the meaning of sections three and four of the
Young Bill? See H.R. 856, 105th Cong. §§ 3(c), 4(b)(1) (1998), discussed in supra
notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
On active-and eventually successful-federal attempts at eradication of Na-
tive American languages, see BARON, supra note 59, at 3, 36, 165-66. Those at-
tempts took place at about the same time when similar-then unsuccessful-
attempts were taking place in Puerto Rico. See id. at 166-70; supra note 57.
383. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 286 (1901) (Brown, J.) ("A false step at
this time might be fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called
the American Empire.").
384. The concluding paragraph in Lowrey, supra note 167, at 319, is illustrative
of what is at stake:
A rational language policy must find some acceptable alternative between
a dictatorial (and probably ineffective) restriction of minority languages
and an unabated linguistic pluralism which could shatter a cohesive na-
tional identity. American language policy must confront the question of
whether such a compromise is even possible. The lesson of the Canadian
experience may be that language differences can be irreconcilable despite
a policy of official bilingualism. The legacy of over two centuries of Cana-
dian bilingualism raises concerns that a system of personal bilingualism,
in which citizens may function by choice in either language, is not feasible
within a federal society. Can American language policy create a society in
which multiple languages and their speakers coexist? Or is the question
after all, which is to be master?
Id.
385. The last time such questions were seriously posed, and some preliminary
answers offered, was during Senate consideration in 1991 of a plebiscite process
for Puerto Rico. See supra notes 321, 323; see also Hernfndez Col6n, supra note
138. The outcome of that discussion was that the process was aborted.
386. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 192; see also id. at 185
('Fairness both to the people of the United States and to that of Puerto Rico re-
quires that there be no equivocation about this.").
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one will have a right to force that government to function in Eng-
lish, aside from translations in the penal and other appropriate
contexts, the plebiscite ballot should so state. 38 7 However, if the
expectation is otherwise, which seems to be the convoluted mes-
sage of the Young Bill, 38 8 that also should be spelled out on the
face of the ballot in much clearer terms. Only then will there be a
true process of self-determination for both parties.389
These issues have not been addressed adequately by United
States policymakers. Particularly unenlightening was President
Clinton's October 16, 1997 televised "town hall" response from Ar-
gentina to a Puerto Rican university student in Miami:
If Puerto Rico were accepted as the 51st state, what assurance
could you give the Puerto Rican community that we would be
able to keep our traditions, our culture, our language and not
lose your Puerto Rican identity?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first, let me state what my position
is. My position is that the status of Puerto Rico should be for
the Puerto Rican people themselves to decide. Whether a
commonwealth, independence or statehood-it should be to-
tally up to the people of Puerto Rico.
If Puerto Rico were to become a State, among other things,
under our laws the educational system of Puerto Rico would
be primarily the constitutional responsibility of the State of
Puerto Rico, so that to whatever extent the state wanted to
have a cultural support for the native culture, the native cus-
toms and the native language would be a decision for the state
to pursue that the federal government should not try to un-
dermine.
So that's my position. I don't think you'd have to worry about
that. There are complicating questions on both sides of that
issue. But I think the preservation of the unique and wonder-
ful culture of Puerto Rico would not be a problem probably in
387. If that promise were to hold true, it would be a first in United States his-
tory. That is a history of eventual domination of all other languages by English,
irrespective of original understandings and promises. It happened with German in
Pennsylvania, see BARON, supra note 59, at 65-83, French in Louisiana, see id. at
83-87, and Spanish in California, see id. at 17-18, 23, and in New Mexico, see id. at
94-106. In all of these states "minority-language speakers typically strove to pre-
serve their language rights while fighting a losing battle against language shift
among the young and in the face of opposition from English speakers." Id. at 106.
388. See supra notes 140-162 and accompanying text.
389. It has been persuasively argued that the tension between Quebec and the
rest of Canada traces its roots to ambiguities in the British North America Act of
1867, which historically have been interpreted differently by both parties. See
GEORGE RAMSAY COOK, PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY, MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE
COMPACT THEORY, 1867-1921 53 (1969), cited in Rodriguez Orellana, supra note
322, at 1086-87. Professor Rodriguez Orellana points out the parallelism between
that legal debate and the one that surrounds Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status.
See id. at 1087 n.23.
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either way. But there may be some specific problems I'm un-
aware of. But I would say that people should make their deci-
sions about commonwealth and statehood probably based on
what they think is best economically, rather than that. I be-
lieve that we'll be able to preserve the culture no matter what.
As a matter of fact, if you look at what's happening in Miami,
what's happening in Los Angeles, what's happening in Chi-
cago, what's happening in the Fairfax County school district
across the river from Washington, D.C., where there are peo-
ple from 180 different national groups in one school district-
we're going to do a lot of cultural preservation in the years
ahead.390
The President's answer to this specific, serious question re-
lied on some traditional cich6s that have surrounded the issue of
statehood for Puerto Rico: the fallacious claim that the decision on
statehood rests exclusively in Puerto Rico's hands; the question-
able argument of exclusive state sovereignty over educational mat-
ters; the disturbing suggestion that economic factors should inform
the statehood decision, to the exclusion of issues of culture and na-
tional identity; and, the misleading comparison of Puerto Ricans
on the Island with ethnic communities on the mainland.
The President's response underscores a common misunder-
standing concerning cultural notions, which historically has
plagued United States-Puerto Rico relations. The President uses
the term "culture" to refer to ethnic traditions, while Puerto Ricans
give that term a much deeper meaning than colorful traditions and
folklore. For Puerto Ricans, "culture" means their sense of self-
identity, forged through five hundred years of common history,
and which is different from and independent of that of the United
States. A governmental Institute of Californian Culture is uni-
maginable, except as a stand-up joke. A government agency called
the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture has existed in Puerto Rico
since 1955, and has always been taken very seriously, even by pro-
statehood governments. 391
A common response to all of these queries is that the United
States need not confront the issue of Puerto Rican statehood until
Puerto Ricans ask for it. Such a strategy would not be particularly
rational. 392 The United States has an undeniable colonial problem
390. President's Remarks in the Univision Town Meeting in Buenos Aires, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1601 (Oct. 16, 1997).
391. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1195-1201 (1989). The general purpose of
this "official, corporate and autonomous entity... is to preserve, promote, enrich
and diffuse the cultural values of the Puerto Rican people, and achieve a broader
and fuller awareness thereof." Id. § 1195.
392. See Berrios Martinez, supra note 117, at 113:
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in Puerto Rico with which it must affirmatively deal, since it is an
international embarrassment. To face that problem, the United
States must announce whether any of the internationally recog-
nized solutions to a colonial situation is unacceptable to it. State-
hood is one of those solutions. If that solution is unavailable to
Puerto Ricans, common decency requires that they be so informed.
To postpone that announcement will only make matters worse.
Pro-statehood support in Puerto Rico has been growing steadily
since 1967,393 fueled by the belief that such a status is attainable
and that it would not signify a radical change in the Puerto Rican
way of life. If either of those beliefs is unsound, the United States
would be ill-advised to postpone announcing it until a supermajori-
tarian demand for statehood arrives from Puerto Rico. That would
only lead to either an even greater international embarrassment
for the United States, if it then refuses to grant statehood to
Puerto Rico, or to a half-hearted admission to statehood, in order
to avoid such an embarrassment. Inattention and neglect con-
cerning the case of Puerto Rico is no longer in the best interests of
the United States.
For one hundred years, the United States has not acted neu-
trally toward Puerto Rico's right to self-determination. 394 Instead,
it has taken many affirmative steps to steer the Island away from
While those in Congress who oppose statehood may be tempted to derail
the Young Bill, such a strategy would be counterproductive. With every
passing day there is a great danger that the irrational statehood band-
wagon in Puerto Rico will be joined in the United States by an equally ir-
rational bandwagon of pluralism. As Hispanic voters become a larger per-
centage of the American electorate, in the desire not to appear to oppose
multiculturalism, many voters and politicians will in fact be promoting
multinationalism. This can only lead to Balkanization and a backlash
against multiculturalism and minorities. Members of American minori-
ties will not constitute a mathematical majority until the middle of the
next century, but their increasing electoral weight will soon become a po-
litically determinant factor in the complex and heterogeneous American
society. If the Senate succumbs to the Walpolian temptation of inaction, it
will merely be postponing an issue that will come back to haunt Congress
in ever more menacing ways.
Id.
393. The results of two plebiscites conducted by the government of Puerto Rico
in 1967 and 1993 demonstrate an erosion of support for Commonwealth status, the
current arrangement, and a concomitant increase in support for statehood. In the
1967 plebiscite, which was boycotted by all major pro-independence forces, Com-
monwealth garnered 60.4% of the vote, compared to 39.0% for statehood and 0.6%
for independence. See 1 Alvarez Gonzfilez, Puerto Rico, supra note 7, at 12. In the
1993 plebiscite, the results were: Commonwealth, 48.6%; statehood, 46.3%; and
independence, 4.4%. See H.R. 856, 105th Cong. § 2(10) (1998).
394. See TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 183-84 (the United States has
actively disfavored independence and is "unwittingly responsible for the existence
in Puerto Rico of a strong statehood movement...").
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its rightful place within the family of nations. 395 If Puerto Rico's
complete integration into the Union would not conform with the
best interests of the United States, it is time for the United States
to atone for past wrongs. An altogether different affirmative ac-
tion program is in order.
Conclusion: Language, Statehood and the Specter of
Secession
A defective process of self-determination which led to state-
hood would be a recipe for certain trouble in the future. But even
an adequate process does not guarantee everlasting tranquility.
Although it has been disputed, I subscribe to the view that the
right to self-determination is not extinguished, once exercised. 396
Many writers-perhaps already a majority-argue that secession
may be a valid exercise of self-determination in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 397 The following is one of the most complete and rep-
395. The definitive account of United States actions to disfavor pro-
independence sentiment in Puerto Rico has not been written yet. For a brief
summary of such measures see Berrios Martinez, supra note 117, at 103-07. Mr.
Berrios identifies the following: the unilateral collective grant of citizenship in
1917, at a time when the principal political party in Puerto Rico had proclaimed
independence as its final aspiration; several actions to repress the Nationalist
Party of Puerto Rico, including imprisoning its leaders and massacring a peaceful
assembly of its followers, killing 22 and injuring 97; the rejection of independence
in the 1940s by the ruling Popular Democratic Party as a negotiated quid pro quo
for federal concessions of a larger measure of local self-government; blacklisting of
independence supporters, with the active backing of federal intelligence agencies;
extension to Puerto Rico of a myriad of federal welfare and other programs, which
increased exponentially Puerto Rico's dependence on federal largesse. See id.; see
also TRIAS MONGE, COLONY, supra note 18, at 65, 88-94, 119, 183 (arguing that the
grant of citizenship was designed to deter independence and citing examples of
repression of the independence movement).
396. See, e.g., HPCTOR GROS ESPIEL, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION:
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub2/405/Rev. 1 (1980); Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World
Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287, 1292 (1991) C'Self-determination is
not a one-shot affair."); Efrbn Rivera Ramos, Self-Determination and Decolonisa-
tion in the Society of the Modern Colonial Welfare State, in ISSUES OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 115, 124 (William Twining ed. 1991) ('self-determination must be
understood . . .as an inexhaustible right"). And although Professor Gros Espiel
denies that this right extends to secession from a United Nations member, see
GROS ESPIEL, supra, at 13, there is no logical or compelling reason to support this
claim.
397. See, e.g., SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 248 (1997) (arguing that when group rights are not accepted
and the group has a convincing historical claim to territory, territorial secession
may be legitimate); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177, 192 (1991) (stating that a normatively
sound claim to territory might buttress a self-determination claim to secession);
Hercules Booysen, South Africa In Need of a Federal Constitution For Its Minority
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resentative statements on the subject:
[F]rom about 1970 on, there could be a right of "peoples"--stiU
not well defined-to secede from an established state that
does not have a fully representative form of government, or at
least to secede from a state whose government excludes people
of any race, creed or color from political representation when
those people are the ones asserting the right and they have a
claim to a defined territory. By 1993, the right had arguably
expanded to be assertable against a government that is un-
representative of people who are defined by characteristics not
limited to race, creed or color. 398
The principal leader of the Puerto Rican independence
movement has specifically advanced the claim to a right to seces-
sion after statehood. 399 If statehood for Puerto Rico does not prove
to be the panacea that its supporters preach, or if their linguistic
and cultural claims prove to be unjustified, other sectors of the
Puerto Rican society may demand another exercise of self-
determination. Even under some of the more restrictive views on
the international right to secession, such as Professor Bril-
mayer's, 40 0 the people of Puerto Rico have a much better normative
claim to the territory that comprises their small island archipelago
than the descendants of those who, by invading it in 1898, "tainted
[the situation] with the 'original sin' of colonialism." 40 Would the
Peoples, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 789, 804 (1997) (arguing that the right to
secession is conditional; the community seeking secession "must have been sub-
jected to economical and political discrimination [and] the central government con-
trolling the community must have rejected reasonable proposals for autonomy and
minority rights"); see also ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF
POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 143-46 (1991);
Chen, supra note 396, James E. Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Deterinination.: A
Jeffersonian Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 210-11 (1991); Minasse Haile, Le-
gality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 479, 509 (1994);
The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802, 804-05 (1980); at 1293; Dietrich Mur-
swick, The Issue of a Right of Secession-Reconsidered, in MODERN LAW OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 26-27 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determnination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
For views against the recognition of a right to secession, see, for example, LEE
C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1991).
398. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Na-
tions Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1994).
399. See Berrios Martinez, supra note 117, at 110 CfIndependentistas have
vowed to continue the struggle for independence-indeed for secession-under
statehood.").
400. See Brilmayer, supra note 397, at 192-202.
401. Id. at 194, citing MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND
PRACTICE 27 (1982). According to Professor Brilmayer, four factors help determine
whether the territorial claim is sound: (1) the immediacy or remoteness of the ter-
ritorial grievance; (2) the extent to which the separatist group has kept the claim
alive; (3) the extent to which the original population composition has been changed
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United States refuse to recognize that claim? Would the great-
grandson of Admiral Sampson bombard San Juan in the 21st Cen-
tury, while the great-grandson of General Miles burns Ponce?
Statehood for Puerto Rico could mark the demise of the
Puerto Rican nationality or, rather, its hibernation. The Puerto
Rican people should not be led down the plank of national suicide,
deceived into believing that hemlock is simply Coca-Cola. And the
United States must ascertain and clearly label which beverage it
means to serve to Puerto Rico and to itself.
The issue of language in Puerto Rico-under statehood or
under any form of relationship with the United States-is very se-
rious, as serious as the issue of Puerto Rican statehood itself. It
simply will not go away through inattention or neglect. After one
hundred years of United States neglect over Puerto Rico-benign
or not-that should be abundantly clear.
by settlements by members of the dominant group; and, (4) the nature and wrong-
fulness of the original grievance. See Brilmayer, supra note 397, at 199-201. The
case of Puerto Rico, even after statehood, and particularly if statehood were
granted without overwhelming supermajoritarian support, would satisfy comforta-
bly all of Professor Brilmayer's factors.
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